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ABSTRACT
TRANSMITTING REVOLUTION: RADIO, RUMOR,
AND THE 1953 EAST GERMAN UPRISING

Michael Palmer Pulido
Marquette University, 2017

This project examines public opinion in the Dresden Region of the German
Democratic Republic from the end of World War II through the summer of 1953. I argue
that the Socialist Unity Party (SED) projected its legitimacy through an official public
sphere by representing publicness to its citizenry. Through banners, the press, and
choreographed public demonstrations, it aimed to create the appearance of popular
support. Even more significantly, the SED used radio to ground its legitimacy in a
burgeoning post-war internationalism that bound residents of the GDR in an imagined
community of socialist nations under Stalin’s leadership.
At the same time, the regime’s opponents challenged its legitimacy and credibility
through a rival public sphere. In this space, foreign broadcasters, especially Radio in the
American Sector (RIAS), chipped away at the regime’s credibility and prestige while
improvised news and rumor undermined the Party’s state building efforts.
Tensions boiled over in the summer of 1953 when RIAS and rumor helped make
revolution thinkable. On the seventeenth of June, East Germans took to the streets in
hundreds of cities and protested the government. RIAS endowed the occasion with
national imaginings before and after East German police and Soviet forces ended the
protestors’ hopes for change.
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TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADN

Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst or General East German
News Service

Aufklärungslokal

Enlightenment venue / socialist education space

Betriebsfunk

Factory Radio Systems

Bezirk Dresden

Dresden Administrative Region (from July 1952 until October
1990)

Bezirksleitung

Regional Directorate

BPKK

Bezirksparteikontrollkommission or Regional Party Control
Commission

BPO

Betriebsparteiorganisation or SED party representation in the
workplace

BRD

Bundesrepublik Deutschland or Federal Republic of Germany
(West Germany)

CDU (& CDU-Ost) Christlich-Demokratische Union Deutschlands and CDU-East
(the GDR Blockparty)
CPSU

Communist party of the Soviet Union

CSR

Czechoslovak Socialist Republic

DDR

Deutsche Demokratische Republik or German Democratic republic
(East Germany)

DFD

Dienst für Deutschland or barracked workers service

DGB

Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund or Confederation of German Trade
Unions (FRG)

FDGB

Freie Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund or Free German Trade Union
Federation (GDR)

FDJ

Freie Deutsche Jugend or Free German Youth

Grosssender

Powerful national/international Radio Station

iv

H.O.

Handelsorganisation or state owned retail outlet

Hetz(en)

popular term used by the SED to denote rabble rousing

KPD

Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands or the Communist Party of
Germany

Kreisleitung

County Directorate (under regional administration)

Landessender

Less powerful regional radio station

LOWA

Lokomotiv- und Waggonbaus or locomotive and car factory

LPG

Landwirtschaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaft or communal
farm

NDPD

National-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands or NationalDemocratic Party of [East] Germany (Blockparty)

NSDAP

Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei or National
Socialist German Workers’ Party (the Nazi party)

NWDR

Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk or Northwest German Radio

RFE

Radio Free Europe

RIAS

Rundfunk im Amerikanischen Sektor or Radio in the American
Sector

SED

Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands or Socialist Unity Party
of Germany

SMAD

Sowjetische Militäradministration in Deutschland or Soviet
Military Administration in Germany

SPD

Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands or Social Democratic
Party of Germany

Stadtfunk

City radio systems that functioned similarly to a PA system

Stasi / MfS

Common names for the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit or
Ministry for State Security

VEB

Volkseigener Betrieb or State-Owned Enterprise

VOA

Voice of America

v

Citations:

Archival abbreviations in footnotes are as follows:
BStU MfS:

Ministry for State Security (Stasi)

DRA:

German Radio Archives, Potsdam

SächsHStA:

Saxon State Archives, Dresden

SAPMO-BArch:

German Federal Archives, Lichterfelde (Berlin)

NARA:

National Archives and Records Administration (II), College Park,
Maryland

Regarding Archival Materials:
Those names protected under German law (Schutzfrist) have been changed to an initial.

German Translations:
I have included the original German in all instances where it is available. However, there
are some cases where documents from American depositories lack the original German.
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Introduction

What follows is an inquiry into public opinion and the origins of a nationwide
demonstration. I focus on the Dresden Region (Bezirk Dresden) which existed as an
administrative unit from 1952 until 1990. I therefore project this region retroactively
when necessary and focus on the capital city of Dresden and the small towns in its
directorial orbit: Görlitz (the second-largest city); Bautzen; Bischofswerda;
Dippoldiswalde; Freital; Großenhain; Kamenz; Löbau; Meißen; Niesky; Pirna; Riesa;
Sebnitz; and Zittau. The events that unfolded here in the summer of 1953 represented an
historically significant occasion, noteworthy for both its familiarity and its novelty.

Early Dresden and Saxony
Dresden derives its name from the Slavic “Drezdzány,” or “swamp forest,” which
referred to a medieval village near an Elbe River crossing. The Elbe runs through a
section of central Europe that features a rolling green countryside, mild winters, and
comfortable summers. Drezdzány sat on the Elbe’s north bank and a Germanic settlement
developed on the south bank before a stone bridge connected the two in 1220. The
Germanic counts of Meißen (from the Slavic “Misni”) eventually subdued their Slavic
neighbors in the name of Christianity and established themselves as the area’s dominant
force. The towns offered a typical central European medieval existence for their residents
and the fertile terrain would prove especially productive in the development of mining
techniques.1

1

James Retallack, ed. Saxony in German History: Culture, Society, and Politics, 1830-1933 (Ann Arbor:
The University of Michigan Press, 2000), xiv; Anthony Clayton and Alan Russell, eds, Dresden: A City
Reborn (Oxford: Berg, 1999), 2-11; Frederick Taylor, Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945 (London:
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From the tenth century until 1815, Dresden, as the capital of Saxony, existed as
part of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. The confederation of over 800
principalities, imperial cities, and other administrative units ranged wildly in size and
strength. From the late 1500s, Saxony wielded considerable political power as an
electorate hosting a prince in Dresden that sat on a committee that selected the Holy
Roman Emperor. Indeed, this state of affairs formed the basis for Dresden’s very
existence and it was one of these Electors, Moritz, who helped shape Dresden into a
notable Renaissance city. One example of his reign includes the city’s first orchestra, the
Staatskapelle in 1548, which found inspiration in the area’s Protestant church music
scene. In matters of religion, the region’s inhabitants had cultivated a predominantly
Lutheran heritage (Electors were Lutheran apart from Augustus the Strong) in the years
after Martin Luther took refuge at Wartburg Castle in nearby Thuringia. Catholic and
Protestant tensions boiled over between 1618 and 1648 and the Thirty Years War begot
disaster that brought an end to most of the city’s cultural developments in this period.
Saxony, located amid the central European battlefield, experienced pillaging, disease, and
misery.2

Prosperity and Power
Not for the last time did a period of prosperity follow one of desolation. Dresden’s
rulers had built up the city’s physical defenses during the war, attracting those peoples
from the countryside looking to evade marauding armies. Thus, in contrast to many
Bloomsbury, 2005), 14-20; Drezga means “Sumpfwald” (swamp forest) and Dresdzane means
“Waldbewohner” and derives from the Wendisch or lower Sorbisch language. The name “Dresdene” first
appeared in German in 1206. See “Allgemeine Geschichte Dresdens” (SAPMO-BArch DH 2 21413)
2
Retallack, Saxony in German History, xiv; Clayton and Russell, A City Reborn, 1-30; Frederick Taylor,
Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945, 14-20; Helen Watanabe-O’Kelly, Court Culture in Dresden: From
Renaissance to Baroque (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 5.
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European cities during this period, Dresden’s population actually grew to just over
21,000 residents, making it a sizeable city for the period. Catholicism returned to the
court in the early modern era and brought with it the baroque grandeur found in other
German-speaking cities like Vienna and Munich. The force behind this bombastic buildup was the colossal personality of Elector Friedrich August II, or Augustus the Strong,
who famously earned his epithet bending horseshoes to demonstrate his physical
strength.3 A cruel man who enjoyed the company of mistresses, Augustus’ grand tour had
taken him to the great Catholic courts of seventeenth-century Italy, Vienna, Spain, and
France where the grandeur of Louis XIV’s Palace at Versailles had left on him an
especially lasting impression.4
Augustus took the throne in 1694 and became an elector following the death of his
older brother. He also became King of Poland when that nation’s nobility, fearful of an
absolute monarchy, chose Augustus (an outsider, instead of a compatriot) for the Polish
throne. Political snarls held things up before Augustus could claim his position, but his
conversion to Catholicism helped seal the deal. As a European monarch, Augustus now
needed to project his legitimacy and Dresden’s mineral wealth and the healthy population
of Saxony and Poland provided the resources to do so. Thus, in the early eighteenth
century, Dresden, and especially the Old City, which sits on the southern side of the Elbe,
saw its iconic cityscape take shape with a notable French influence. Augustus constructed
public gardens that surrounded a palace built in the Baroque style, and like Versailles,
their tidiness and geometric precision evoked control and domination. The Zwinger,
perhaps the second-most famous point of reference in Dresden, represented another

3
4

Ibid. He held several official titles: Elector of Saxony, King of Poland, and Grand Duke of Lithuania.
Taylor, Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945, 16-17; Clayton and Russell, A City Reborn, 2-20.
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defining feature of the city-scape. In German, the name means “outer ward” and, in this
case, it refers to an outdoor courtyard enclosed by a palatial construction that functioned
as a staging grounds for competition as well as royal display and pageantry. Along with
the Semper Opera House (destroyed and rebuilt in 1869), other landmarks built under
Augustus’ watch include the Academy of the Arts, and the landmark Church of our Lady
(die Frauenkirche). Typically, when Saxony’s Lutheran electors died, their bodies were
taken in a ritual procession from Dresden to their final resting place in St. Mary’s
Cathedral in Freiberg. In a departure from tradition, when Augustus died in 1733, the
state placed his body in Wawel Cathedral in Kraków and his heart was placed in the
newly-completed crypt of the Dresden Cathedral.5
As before, war and destruction followed a period of cultural expression and
Dresden’s central location again led to its entanglement in the European conflicts of the
mid-1700s. Frederick the Great’s designs on Silesia and his greater struggle with Austria
forced Augustus III to choose an alliance, and he chose poorly. He switched sides and
watched his Austrian allies loot Dresden and retreat before Prussian conquerors took the
leftovers. The Seven Years War meant that Saxony’s army belonged to Frederick the
Great and the artists and craftsmen who arrived in Dresden during its cultural flowering
vanished followin the city’s military occupation. The Prussians laid siege to, and
bombarded, the city in 1760, destroying about half of it.6 This, of course, would not be
the city’s last experience with demolition. Forty-six years later, Napoleon’s dissolution of

5

Katja Doubek, August der Starke (Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 2007), 139. Jan Hübler,
Dresden: Wo Reiter golden und Wunder blau sind (Meßkirch: Gmeiner Verlag, 2012), 6; WatanabeO’Kelly, Court Culture in Dresden, 5.
6
Taylor, Dresden, Tuesday February 13, 1945, 26-30; Eric Dorn Brose, Modern German History: From
the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Reich (New York: Berghahn, 1997), 45-59; Clayton and
Russell, Dresden: A City Reborn, 19-21.
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the Holy Roman Empire left Dresden under French occupation and politically affiliated
within the Confederation of the Rhine until 1813. Saxony experienced less political
disruption than the southwestern German territories closer to France, although
Napoleon’s ill-fated Russian campaign and the Elector of Saxony’s decision to side with
the Emperor nearly destined the state to Prussian rule at the Congress of Vienna. To
Saxons’ relief, Talleyrand and Castlereagh stepped in and prevented the state’s
dissolution, although it lost about half its territory.7
In the course of the nineteenth century, Dresden’s built environment earned the
city recognition throughout Europe and the sobriquet “Florence of the Elbe,” coined by
theologian and philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder.8 A number of renowned thinkers
called Dresden home, including Richard Wagner, Caspar David Friedrich, Theodor
Körner, Robert Schumann, and Carl Maria von Weber.9 But, once again, revolution
swept across the continent in 1848, sparking an uprising in the Kingdom of Saxony. The
following year, a coalition of students, workers, and political activists—democrats and
liberals—marched through the streets singing the Marseillaise. They decreed a liberal
government before troops squashed the uprising and political divisions doomed reform
efforts.10 In 1866, Saxony again found itself on the losing side of history after siding with
Austria. Sharing the latter’s defeat at Königgrätz, the state emerged a further-diminished
European power. Thus, with its political influence swept away first with the Old Regime
and later by the wars of German unification, Saxon cultural and economic endeavors

7

Taylor, Dresden, Tuesday February 13,1945, 26-30; James Retallack, ed. Saxony in German History, xiv,
Olaf B. Rader, Kleine Geschichte Dresdens (München: C.H. Beck, 2005), 43.
9
Taylor, Dresden, Tuesday February 13, 1945, 30-33.
10
Clayton and Russel, A City Reborn, 21-22. Andrea Neemann, “Models of Political Participation in the
Beust Era: The State, the Saxon Landtag, and the Public Sphere, 1849-1864” and “Saxon Forty-eighters in
the Postrevolutionary Epoch, 1849-1867” in James Retallack, ed. Saxony in German History, 9, 122-126.
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increasingly defined the region. The final war of unification, between Prussia (and allied
German states) and France ended in German victory and unity under Prussian leadership
in 1871.11

Industry and the Working Class Movements
Considerable economic, demographic, and social changes attended the political
developments of the nineteenth century. Economically, the Zollverein had laid an
economic foundation for German unification and Saxony had already established itself as
one of Germany’s most industrialized regions in the 1830s. In the second half of the
century, railroads further enhanced Dresden’s position at the heart of Europe both
culturally and economically. The cityscape in Dresden continued to change, too. As the
populations of the working classes and bourgeoisie grew, the area witnessed the
construction of workers’ tenements and tramways that moved residents into, around, and
out of the city. Workers in the second half of the nineteenth century worked long nine-toeleven-hour days in the factories. Otto von Bismarck’s social security system warded off
any genuine socialist threats and the state tamped down on those that made too much
political noise. Still, notable socialist leaders appeared in or made Dresden their home:
August Bebel delivered a speech that cautioned against Prussian hegemony and later
ascended to parliament through Dresden and Rosa Luxembourg edited the Sächsische
Arbeiterzeitung.12
By the time Saxony became part of the German Reich in 1871 it had reached the
highest levels of industrialization. The textile industries dominated the industrial
landscape well into the twentieth century, especially in the western part of the state. In
11
12

Ibid., Taylor, Dresden, Tuesday February 13, 1945, 31-2.
Ibid.
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the eastern part of the state, the industrial area of Dresden, Pirna, and Meißen boasted
machine building, tobacco processing, metalworking, and textile production. Dresden
also had a vibrant consumer goods industry, and could claim that the modern brassiere,
cigarettes, squeezable toothpaste, and the latex condom had local origins. The region also
developed a robust precision optics industry where skilled workers ground lenses for Carl
Zeiss and other manufacturers. Finally, the railways had brought tourists in increasing
numbers to the city stimulating the construction of hotels and restaurants. By 1900, the
population had reached 4.8 million; home to an eighth of the German population living
on just three percent of the nation’s land area. But despite its continuously expanding
industrial workforce, Saxony experienced little immigration compared to an area like the
Ruhr Valley and as a result, this population remained overwhelmingly German and
Protestant.13
Saxony had long been an epicenter of workers’ movements, and Dresden had a
history of labor strife, with lockouts and disputes driven by the city’s 60,000 trade union
members. The skilled and politically conscious workforce had joined the ranks of the
SPD, founded in 1875, faster than the national average. Still, despite Bismarck’s death
and the elimination of anti-socialist legislation, the ruling class generally kept the party’s
political ambitions at bay. However, the exclusionary tactics practiced by the
Conservative-Liberal coalition also helped deliver the middle classes into the SPD. One
should note here that Leipzig and Dresden produced different types of SPD membership,
with the socialists in the former further to the left on the spectrum while the socialists in
13

Toni Pierenkemper and Richard Tilly, The German Economy During the Nineteenth Century (New York:
Berghahn, 2004); xv, 31; Brose, Modern German History, 168-9; Clayton and Russel, A City Reborn, 24;
Rosemary H. T. O'Kane, Rosa Luxemburg in Action: For Revolution and Democracy (New York:
Routledge, 2014), 27; Nathan LaPorte, The German Communist Party in Saxony, 1924-1933 (New York:
Peter Lang, 2003), 41-4; Taylor, Dresden, Tuesday February 13, 1945, 30-40.
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the latter looked to build a larger coalition and avoid class antagonisms. But although
Saxony’s ethnic homogeneity meant that working class movements lacked the usual fault
lines formed by ethnic and confessional rifts elsewhere in the Reich, a distinct Saxon
political discord did ultimately develop between the SPD and its sometime ally the KPD
(Communist Party of Germany or Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, founded in
1918).14

The Great War and its Aftermath
The First World War left Dresden physically untouched but politically unstable as
the imperial government collapsed and food shortages followed. The Bolshevik
Revolution of 1917 had reverberated in Germany, although the vast majority of workers
favored its anti-war posture and disavowed its violent means. On November 9, 1918,
mass demonstrations broke out in Dresden (and elsewhere in Germany), when Kaiser
Wilhelm II abdicated and Prince Max resigned as Chancellor.15 The region’s industrial
background and politically active working class meant that the revolutionary fervor that
erupted elsewhere in Germany in November found fertile ground in Saxony.
Demonstrators in Dresden established contact with revolutionaries elsewhere in Germany
by radio—a novel development in revolutionary tactics at the time—and quickly declared
that Friedrich August II of Saxony’s reign had come to an end on the thirteenth of
November, deposing a culture of power that had endured for three centuries.16 In its

14

Benjamin Lapp, Politics, Class, and the Rise of Nazism in Saxony, 1919-1933 (Atlantic Highlands, NJ:
Humanities Press International – Studies in Central European History, 1997), 1-53.
15
Sam M. Mustafa, Germany in the Modern World: A New History (New York: Rowman & Littlefield,
2011), 142-4.
16
F.L. Carsten, Revolution in Central Europe, 1918-1919 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972),
43-45; Martin Kitchen, A History of Modern Germany: 1800 to the Present (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell,
2012), 192-6; Taylor, Dresden, Tuesday February 13, 1945, 36; LaPorte, The German Communist Party in
Saxony, 48-9.
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place, the leaders of the demonstrations, in conjunction with the Social Democrats (and
the Independents that joined), declared a Socialist Republic, ending the decades-long
political domination of the Conservative-National Liberal coalition. The new union,
along with workers’ councils operating in Leipzig and Chemnitz, announced a
revolutionary program of production, expropriation, and the dismissal of government
official along class lines. The Spartacist Rebellion failed in January, 1919 as did the Kapp
Putsch of March 13, 1920, after which the national government attempted to retreat to
Dresden. The military commander there denied this move and in May, following a
veterans’ demonstration and the assassination of the minister of war, the military took
control of the situation and declared martial law. Leaders dissolved the revolutionary
workers’ councils and the political class tried to prod Saxony along a more temperate
path of parliamentary democracy. Alas, they would not succeed.17
The politicians that developed the framework for a republic in Weimar felt that
Germany’s legitimacy now derived from its conception as a state of culture and welfare.18
This vision failed to come to fruition either nationally or in Saxony. During the 1920s,
interwar European and global economic trends and emerging industrial regions in China
and Latin America led to restrictive tariffs on imports, affecting industrialized nations
and Saxony in particular. Saxony’s higher wages hurt the competitiveness of its industrial
firms and a regional credit shortage in the mid-1920s (after the stabilization of the Mark)
helped bring about a recession and structural unemployment that persisted through the
Great Depression. The economic downturn hit the state especially hard and it suffered the

17

Carsten, Revolution in Central Europe, 43-45; Kitchen, A History of Modern Germany, 192-6; Taylor,
Dresden, Tuesday February 13, 1945, 36-40; LaPorte, The German Communist Party in Saxony, 48-55.
18
Detlev Peukert, The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity (New York: Hill and Wang,
1993), 141.
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highest unemployment rate in Germany. Some hopeful signs emerged, especially in
Dresden where those specialized and advanced industries that produced modern
equipment—radio, sewing machines, optics— prospered, but in the western half of
Saxony textile manufacturers found themselves vulnerable to competition from producers
in emerging economies. Furthermore, during this period even Dresden never truly
regained its footing as either a premier tourist destination or capital of contemporary
modern art and culture. Instead, economic conditions deteriorated and the Great
Depression of the early 1930s exacerbated political divisions in Dresden, with the KPD
and the National Socialists representing a repudiation of Weimar moderation. Indeed, the
Weimar government failed to truly legitimize its authority. First, as Detlev Peukert points
out, the regime had established itself as anti-monarchical, dismissing traditional sources
(monarchy and church) of authority for Germans, while creating a hospitable political
space for reactionary actors. The regime also struggled to sell the public on a state
committed to a generous nationalism (as opposed to the chauvinistic and xenophobic
nationalism that developed in the latter half of the nineteenth century and middle of the
twentieth). Constitutional democracy failed to engender national pride, with few feeling
any genuine dedication to the republic and even the workmanlike civil servants felt more
committed to the state than the republic. Finally, a charismatic foundation of legitimacy
for the Republic never had much of a chance, as those who held the highest offices
generally lacked magnetism. Combined with two economic catastrophes and the loss of
prestige from the Diktat of Versailles that much of the middle class conflated with the
new order, the Weimar Republic had poor odds for survival.19

19

Clayton and Russel, A City Reborn, 26-27; LaPorte, The German Communist Party in Saxony, 45-7;
Taylor, Dresden, Tuesday February 13, 1945, 39-43; Peukert, The Weimar Republic, 217-8.
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National Socialism and another World War
Turbulent times pushed voters to opposite ends of the political spectrum and into
the KPD and the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (Nationalsozialistische
Deutsche Arbeiterpartei or NSDAP). With the left fragmented by the KPD’s refusal to
unite with the SPD (whom they considered fascists in disguise), the Nazis, initially
viewed by the KPD as the petty bourgeois entering its death throes, now had an easier
path to power.20 Nazi violence, political despair, and an increasingly extremist middle
class also helped lay a foundation for the NSDAP’s success in Saxony. Violence in
particular, or even the threat of it, had become normalized in this politically volatile
milieu, and the communists did not hesitate to engage their far-right opponents. The
Nazis also presented themselves as the party that would destroy the Weimar structure and
made appeals to Protestants in Saxony by highlighting socialist godlessness.21 There is
also evidence to suggest that bourgeois newspapers helped legitimize the NSDAP and
heighten its “respectability” with flattering coverage.22 The Nazis’ newspaper in Dresden,
Der Freiheitskampf (The Struggle for Freedom) boasted the largest circulation among all
daily newspapers in the city.23 The above tactics and the promise of economic salvation
and national renewal turned Dresden into a Nazi stronghold. The 1932 city council
elections in Dresden witnessed the KPD win thirteen seats and the SPD and the NSDAP
22 apiece. While Hitler’s party had lost seats in national elections, his ascension to the

20

Taylor, Dresden, Tuesday February 13, 1945, 42.
Lapp, Politics, Class, and the Rise of Nazism in Saxony, 176, 190-1, 206-7,
22
Ibid. 207-8.
23
Taylor, Dresden, Tuesday February 13, 1945, 43.
21
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chancellorship in 1933 nullified any short-term trends at the polls and the Enabling Law
and the Reichstag Fire Decree legalized his dictatorship in 1933.24
The Nazi seizure of power ushered in an era of carefully choreographed rallies
and propaganda that aesthetically confirmed a restored German vigor. The Nazi regime
aligned the education system with its historical understanding of, and vision for, the
future, and the quickly assumed control of all public media outlets, suppressed opposing
views, and banned political parties, which disappeared or went underground. Churches
came under close observation and the party’s persecution of the Jews changed from
economic discrimination and expropriation to expulsion, enslavement, and murder. The
state’s needs existed above all else in the National Socialist system. In Dresden this
meant that the government utilized the city’s Hygiene Museum for its politically driven
racial studies and renamed some notable locales in Dresden, such as Theaterplatz, which
became Adolf Hitler Platz. And it all happened with a shocking quickness. As the
prominent Jewish professor Victor Klemperer noted, “It’s astounding how easily
everything collapses…complete revolution and party dictatorship. And all the opposing
forces as if disappeared from the face of the earth…”25

Operation Thunderclap and the Dresden Firestorm
During World War II, Dresden was of little military importance after briefly
functioning as a hub during the invasion of Poland. As the tide turned against Germany at
the end of the war, more pressing needs elsewhere prompted the transfer of Dresden’s
anti-aircraft guns. This left the city relatively defenseless—something that most believed
(on both sides) would not pose a problem for a city that the Allies were not likely to
24
25

Ibid.
Clayton and Russel, A City Reborn, 28-34; quoted in Taylor, Dresden, Tuesday February 13, 1945, 46-8.
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target. Indeed, many residents felt Dresden would never suffer the fate delivered by
strategic bombing experienced in other German cities. This rationale had some basis in
rumor, which held that Churchill had a beloved aunt living in Dresden or that the English
remained so enamored with Dresden’s cultural charm that they simply could not bring
themselves to destroy it. While Dresden had been largely spared the experience of war,
its citizens would face a devastating change in fortune as Operation Thunderclap and its
bombing operations commenced. Some scholars speculate that strategists at Yalta drew
up the plans for Dresden’s destruction, though the reasons behind the decision and
whether they derived from a military request to destroy transportation and
communication installations or a desire to terrorize civilians remains a point of
contention. A more sinister theory posits that the architects of destruction envisioned the
ensuing inferno as an allegory for the annihilation of Nazism.26
While inclement weather had prevented this mission for weeks, a spring-like
sunny day on February 13, 1945 meant that Dresdeners’ string of luck had run out,
though they had no idea at the time. Shortly after sundown that day, 244 British bombers
departed England with the instructions to bomb Dresden, whose population of 630,000
occupied the largest city left in Germany that the Allies had left (mostly) untouched.
When the air raid sirens sounded at 9:51 p.m. and bombers neared the city, most residents
ignored what they mistook as another false alarm. The lead planes dropped marker flares
to identify targets near Dresden’s Old City and the incendiary bombs followed closely
behind. The bombers spaced the raids to allow a false sense of security to develop among
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survivors and emergency crews who emerged from the inadequate shelters. American
bombers completed the Old City’s destruction on the morning of February 14—Ash
Wednesday. Kurt Vonnegut recalled waking up to a cityscape that now bore semblance to
the surface of the moon.27 Shocked survivors found that much of Dresden had been
reduced to rubble—though incredibly, the famous Church of our Lady still stood. And
then it collapsed the following day. More devastating than the destruction of the built
environment were the deaths of 25,000 Dresdeners who perished in the attacks. Less than
three months later, the war ended.28

Sovietization
Historians have long focused on the origins of Nazism and just how, exactly, a
sophisticated and cultured people could so quickly discard democratic principles for the
brutality of National Socialism. More recently, however, historians have increasingly
concerned themselves with the Germans’ break with Nazism and their successful (and
astonishingly quick) re-civilization. Richard Bessel and others have suggested that during
the final months of the Second World War, Germans experienced the brutality of the
conflict, especially in the eastern territories, to such a degree that the events came to
define their wartime experience. The sense of victimhood that resulted from traumatizing
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events like the expulsions in the east, the battle for Berlin, mass rape, and in the case of
Dresden, fire bombings, developed along with other new attitudes.29
Dresden’s experience, in particular, did much to cultivate this victim mentality for
Germans even though other cities that experienced terror bombing such as Hamburg
could claim to have suffered equally. Dresden’s attack came late, but Würzburg and
Potsdam, along with a number of other German cities, felt the wrath of Allied bombers in
the final month of the war, too. Still, Dresden emerged as the quintessential Opferstadt or
“victim city,” according to historian Tony Joel. He suggests that a number of factors can
help account for this phenomena, including Dresden’s widely acclaimed beauty; the
enigmatic rationale behind the Allies’ decision to target the city after having largely
ignored it for years; the destruction of non-military buildings (in the Old City especially),
and the devastating efficacy with which the incendiary bombs induced terror and killed
people. Joel also reminds us that the word Opfer means both “victim” and “sacrifice,”
and either translation is suitable. This was true especially in the minds of the socialists
who cast Dresden as both a victim of Western aggression and a sacrifice for the
recklessness and arrogance of the Nazi period.30
Such destruction, combined with socialists’ position that recent history had
proved them right—while discrediting capitalism and the right—inspired a nearly
unlimited righteousness among East Germany’s future leaders. Capitalist rivalry and its
fascist offshoots, after all, had spawned multiple depressions and two world wars—how
much more proof did anyone need that the arrangement was a political dead end? Thus it
should not have shocked anyone that the socialists advocated for and represented a
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pacifist internationalism further encouraged by the psychological and physical
destruction of Dresden. Equally importantly, German politicians who came to rule East
Germany in the early postwar period readily capitalized on their anti-fascist biographies.
Indeed, the emotional and political rubble of postwar Germany offered a gloomy but
fortuitous site into which Old Communists could stake their rightful claim to German
history.31
At the Yalta Conference in early February of 1945, the Allies failed to lay out a
precise vision for Germany’s future other than its division into four zones of occupation
and the imposition of reparation payments. But at Potsdam in July of 1945, leaders made
a number of border adjustments, including giving those lands east of the Oder and Neisse
rivers to Poland—an issue that would fester leading up to the 1953 events in Saxon
border towns near Dresden. The Soviets, under Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov, planned to
annihilate the capitalistic institutions that had fostered fascism in its zone under SMAD
(Sowjetische Militäradministration in Deutschland, or Soviet Military Administration in
Germany).32
A number of historians have labeled this multi-year revolution from above in
Eastern Europe as “Sovietiziation.” This term is useful in describing the process by which
the German communists, with Soviet support, transformed the Soviet Zone of Occupation
(and other future Eastern Bloc states) into a soviet-style satellite state. Sovietization was a
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two-part project that entailed imperial domination and the imposition of a Soviet-style
modernity. Indeed, the project was ambitious in its scope: the initiation of “democratic
centralism,” which was essentially a synonym for Stalinist Bolshevism; seizure and
control of the public sphere with concomitant disciplining measures; transformation of
the countryside alongside; industrial development; and the politicization of daily life.33
Germany experienced Sovietiziation along a timeline similar to other Eastern
European states. This includes the arrival of the Walter Ulbricht and his group of exiled
members of the native communist party in 1945, the electoral disappointments of 1946
(that proved a turning point as it dashed communist hopes for legitimate political
hegemony), appeals to patriotism, and the development of “block politics” in an effort to
attract moderate and right-leaning parties.34 This last development included the creation
of the Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, or SED) out of a
forced merger of the SPD and the KPD in 1946. The Ulbricht Group’s faith in their
mission found its clearest expression with the “magnet theory” (Magnetwirkung),
whereby East German economic successes (which did indeed exist with regard to food in
the immediate postwar years) would draw broad support. These attempts came up short,
and as the SED recognized its failure to gain political power at the polls, leadership
shifted its attention to seizing control of the Soviet zone. This process took place in
stages, the first of which witnessed Communist Party rule through leftist coalitions and
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the redistribution of land and the nationalization of industry from 1945 until 1947/8.
These operations established two core socialist institutions: the communal farms
(Landwirtschlaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaften or LPGs) and the state-owned
enterprise (Volkseigener Betrieb, or VEB). On October 7, 1949, the GDR formally came
into existence as a nation state and an escalation of the above policies along with
establishment of armed forces, collectivization drives, and an emphasis on the
development of heavy industry characterized Sovietization from 1948 until the summer
of 1953. Finally, the process by which the SED consolidated single party rule defined the
second stage politically, which lasted until Stalin’s death in March of 1953.35
Some historians have called this phase “Stalinist,” but this term’s application in
the GDR as well as Stalin’s role in the division of Germany is more complicated than
many in the West might have liked to believe. First, as Corey Ross points out, Stalinism,
and its politically institutionalized attributes—terror, arbitrariness, and a cult of
personality—relied on Stalin’s presence and leadership.36 Furthermore, the term
Stalinism implies a degree of fear, violence, and repression, such as that during the Great
Terror in the Soviet Union, which simply did not exist in the postwar satellite states.37
Furthermore, historian Wilfried Loth argues that Stalin never even wanted East Germany
as a satellite state and that its creation was solely the work of Walter Ulbricht and his
group. However, Dirk Spilker offers a convincing rebuttal to this claim, noting that it
only appeared this way, before the Soviets and their East German puppets gave up on
winning at the ballot box and moved to take direct control of the political situation in
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their zone.38 But as Carolyn Eisenberg reminds us, partition became reality in the second
half of the 1940s as American and British leaders constructed a politically and
economically integrated zone, doing their part to strengthen the division of Germany.39
Indeed, she sees this division as primarily an American design. However, that too is still
much too simple. As Edith Sheffer points out, the partition of Germany took place in
stages after 1945 and in many ways represented the handiwork of not just political
leaders, but the residents, especially those sharing borders, who did their part to make the
division an everyday reality by reinforcing the it socially and economically.40 Of course,
these same GDR residents were probably tempted to give Stalin most of the credit after
seeing his portraits plastered all over their towns.41
So while historiographical contention regarding Stalinism and Germany’s division
lingers, clearly the East German leadership looked to Stalin’s Soviet Union for
inspiration. To be sure, the GDR’s politicians represented his image and power in the
early years of the GDR and the Soviet leader cast a long shadow over the East German
state.
The Politicization of Dresden’s Aesthetics
Sovietization also extended to the built—and destroyed—environment. In her
essay “Public Space and Societal Utopia: State planning, Communication, and
Presentation of Power in the Soviet Union using the Example of Moscow between 1917
and 1964,” Monica Rüthers reminds us that the environments created by city planners for
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the Communist Party of the Soviet Union intended to form a new type of habitat for a
“new type of human.”42 And, not surprisingly, so it was with East German communists
and Dresden, which, as an Opferstadt and an urban tabula rasa, often starred in the
promotion of the socialist program. Consequently, the city, as it fit into the greater
socialist schema, offers us insights into the SED’s vision for the future.
Although one journalist lamented the conversion of the famous sanatorium in
Weißer Hirsch into a hospital, the city’s Soviet sympathizers—who controlled the
press—projected its future as a bright one as early as 1946. Strategic bombing had
toppled a good deal of Dresden’s celebrated Old City silhouette, but much of the city
appeared in good repair just a few kilometers away. As early as 1946, many of the
suburbs that had escaped the devastation that befell the Old City witnessed a resumption
of normal life. Eighty percent of the streetcars reportedly ran and businesses had reopened. And even in the Old City, where bombs had left little intact, a sympathetic
observer put a positive spin on the situation, noting that a wholesale rebuild here would
be easier than removing and rebuilding toppled structures amidst those in good repair.
Cars reportedly zoomed through the streets beside the rubble at the busy interchange of
Postplatz and across the river at Albertplatz. As for entertainment, the city that still
guarded its reputation as a cultural center already put on shows and hosted premiers.43
Such rosy perceptions constituted a key part of the vision adopted by the eternally
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optimistic and forever forward-looking one-party government that ruled over Dresden
and the surrounding area. The SED detected immense political value in the area’s
destruction, too: rubble could always be tied to the West, whether, fascists, Americans or
West Germans.
In this way, Dresden’s destruction and the remaining rubble allowed the SED to
represent the malevolence of the West through its press in commemorations and
harangues when the party highlighted the city and mourned its victims on February 13
and 14. At the same time, the destruction gave the city a low baseline from which to
rebuild. Local headlines in the SED’s papers from the early 1950s suggested Dresden
serve as a reminder for all Germans that the “senseless destructive frenzy” of the AngloAmerican terror bombers had destroyed a portion of “the city of art” and created a
twelve-square-kilometer pile of ash and rubble within the Old City.44 The deaths caused
by Allied bombing naturally represented Anglo-American inhumanity. Neues
Deutschland pointed to thirty-two thousand charred and asphyxiated people—and the
true number of deaths, which had yet to be ascertained, looked to the party like it would
reach more than 100,000 (the true number is believed to be around 25,000, as mentioned
earlier). The 90,000 demolished residences and the other 80,000 that bombing had
damaged represented the “ruthless balance of a day of imperialist murder rage.”45 One
former Dresdener who had left his native city in 1939 and returned after the war,
experienced shock at the extent of the destruction. Walking through the rubble fields of
his hometown, he came to understand why the GDR used the city’s destruction as a
pretext to campaign against the English, the Americans, and especially Konrad
H. Sta., “Das Schicksal Dresdens geht auch dich an!” Neues Deutschland 13 Februar, 1951.: “Sinnloser
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Adenauer’s remilitarization efforts; his former home served as a morality tale spun from
a recurring theme that linked the West to capitalism, fascism, and destruction. More
specifically here, the published letter—genuine or not—reinforced the SED’s position:
“Dresden [was] the manifest unmasking of Anglo-American war criminals.”46 As another
former Dresdener put it in a letter published in the Sächsische Zeitung: “From Dresden
outward—from its delightful and unwavering fostering of the arts, streamed wonderful
currents through the world and to England and America, who’ve been most receptive.
Have they forgotten that?”47

Soviet Virtues in the Built Environment
Dresden’s destruction also functioned as something of an allegory for the political
vision of the state as it rebuilt with a scheme that would produce—if it had not already
started producing—socio-economic prosperity for its residents. So while imperialist
murderers had tried to destroy Dresden and all its treasures while furthering their
“policies of destruction in Korea…and West Germany,” Dresden had, with Soviet
backing, begun to rise from the ruins and move in a new and better direction.48 By 1951,
the SED had its fingers all over the city’s blueprints. Were one to pick up a copy of the
Sächsische Zeitung or Neues Deutschland prior to a trip to Dresden in the early 1950s,
one might have arrived in the city with a number of expectations, not the least of which
would include the opportunity to take in a new and improved urban environment. This
meant the city and its annual celebrations served to represent the greatness and potential
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greatness of Soviet-style planning. Prior to July 1952, this new Dresden, according to
technical and political leadership, derived its character from so-called democratic and
antifascist-democratic principles. The SED referenced the preamble to the September
1950 law related to the construction of cities in the newly formed German Democratic
Republic, noting that it would follow the five-year plan, raise living standards, and create
a habitat to serve as a “visible manifestation for the economic and cultural advancement
in the German Democratic Republic.”49 Leadership pointed out the Baroque Old City—
the Dresden, really—had been “built” by the princes, meaning “the people” financed and
built the city, but the princes’ desires shaped it. Now, the people had at last become the
employers, financers, contractors, and executives.50 Not surprisingly, the Soviet system
served as a model for this new type of representative habitat.51
Authorities from Dresden toured Soviet cities including Moscow, Leningrad,
Stalingrad, and Kiev, and gleaned knowledge regarding building techniques best suited
for the working class.52 The party boasted that residents again enjoyed theater and that
the heavily damaged Zwinger Palace had already been partially rebuilt by February of
1951, as had the Hygiene Museum and the Academy of Fine Arts.53 Grunaer Street
evidenced the new type of Dresden emerging, serving as the city’s model street. It
featured mixed housing that brought together workers and intelligentsia now that the
quaint notion of a specific workers’ quarter had been relegated to history. In August of
1952, the SED listed the street among a number of exemplary projects in the GDR, a list
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spearheaded by the monumental Stalin Avenue in Berlin that represented the new
democratic principles.54
In July of 1952 at the Second Party Conference, the SED announced the
accelerated construction of socialism. As far as any real changes for the future of
Dresden’s physical layout and appearance, the repercussions here were largely limited to
the public use of the term “socialism” in lieu of “democratic,” “peaceful,” and other
softer adjectives. Officially, the SED confirmed that the plan for the future of the built
environment in Dresden and elsewhere would find guidance in the Soviet experience.
This plan, now “borne from the knowledge that every citizen in our Republic is ready to
work and fight for the construction of our home, for the unity of our Fatherland, and for
world peace” also served to represent a newfound unity, purpose, and prosperity in the
city and region.55 Political rhetoric intensified in this period, and the Sächsische Zeitung
noted that as part of the larger effort to rebuild the GDR, the working class, bound
together with farmers and progressive intelligentsia, now found itself resolved to lead a
“ruthless campaign against all enemies of the peaceful, socialist rebuilding of Dresden.”56
According to the chief city architect, the “will of the people” now determined Dresden’s
appearance.57
By early 1953, the party claimed that a new Dresden radiated outward from the
market square where the old “oppressor of the people” had once banned

“Das Neue Dresden Entsteht;” “Dresdens erste sozialistische Straße.”
“Beschluss über die Städtebauliche Planung der Stadt Dresden” 28. August 1952 (SAPMO-BArch DH 2
21413): Getragen von der Bewussstein, dass jeder Buerger unserer Republik bereit ist, für den Ausbau
unserer Heimat, für die Einheit unseres Vaterlandes und für den Frieden in der Welt zu Arbeiten und zu
kämpfer”
56
“Baut das Sozialistische Dresden“ Sächsische Zeitung, 13 Februar, 1953: …ist entschlossen gegen alle
Feinde des friedlichen, sozialistischen Aufbaus unserer Stadt einen rücksichtslosen Kampf zu führen.”
57
“Unsere Träume gehen in Erfüllung,” Sächsische Zeitung, 13 Februar, 1953: “Wille der Bevölkerung;
Unterdrücker des Volkes”
54
55

25

demonstrations.58 Here at the market square, the regime had initiated the construction of
“representative residential buildings” as part of a larger socialist buildup that would tie
Dresden’s tradition of prosperity together with contemporary working class optimism.59
The shops that had ringed the old town were to be replaced with those run by the socialist
trade organization. These were to be bright and large enough to satisfy an advanced
consumer culture, which, in the early 1950s, even the most ardent optimists must have
recognized as wishful thinking.60 Dresden, then, now functioned as a representation of
SED power—its planning, the prosperity it promised, and the solidarity it would inspire.
But, as we will see, the built environment was only one sphere where the regime
projected its power.

*

*

*

The thesis of this study, the key points of which will be elucidated below, is as
follows: In the East German dictatorship, the SED represented publicness to its people
while private citizens and their foreign accomplices challenged the regime through a rival
public sphere, where in the summer of 1953, revolution became thinkable.

The Public Sphere in the GDR
Any discussion of the public sphere begins with Jürgen Habermas’ classic
thesis.61 At first glance, the distance between East Germany in the 1950s and the early
modern setting for Habermas’ research might appear an historical chasm in terms of
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political structures and social and economic relationships, but there are some fundamental
similarities. Early modern regimes and the SED (along with other dictatorial and
authoritarian governments) similarly represented their legitimacy and power through an
official public sphere, or representative publicness. As Habermas and others have shown,
alongside this representative culture a new type of publicness emerged in the late
eighteenth century in which participants deliberated the pressing issues of the period on
equal terms and produced what we would recognize as public opinion.62 More
importantly, the new public sphere became a politically potent counterweight to state
power and, in the French case, gave shape to a space where revolution became
thinkable.63 Still, the instances are quite different and applying this historical concept to
the GDR requires explanation and alterations.
The original conception and translation of “public sphere” merits some
discussion. Various scholars have challenged Habermas for romanticizing the democratic
openness of these exchanges while critics also routinely note the clunky translation of
Öffentlichkeit to “public sphere,” charging that this may have unfairly distorted his
intended or original meaning. As Hartmut Kaeble points out, Habermas really meant for
the term Öffentlichkeit (more precisely, publicness) to imply a development less
particular, encompassing not only assembly and public meetings, but what Kaeble refers
to as an “imagined translocal public sphere.”64 This is a good starting point to apply
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Habermas’s historical conception to a modern industrialized society. Similar in function
and effect, we will see that these spaces for the production and exchange of critical ideas
existed not in salons or designated areas in the GDR but in the communities bound
through the ether by radio in the form of radio waves and in ephemeral public and private
exchanges. But moving from the eighteenth century to the twentieth with these ideas
requires a number of other clarifications.
One way to consider the historical relationship between the concept of the
bourgeois public sphere and its greater socio-political arrangement and that of the GDR is
to identify a several key political analogies between late-eighteenth century absolutism
and twentieth century dictatorship. Habermas argues that after the ideal-type public
sphere disintegrated in the late nineteenth century, the process of what he called the
“refeudalization of society” took place. This meant that the demarcation between public
and private blurred as private interests took on political tasks and the state shouldered an
increasing number of societal functions. Political participation waned, the vigor of the
public sphere diminished, and the ills of mass society proliferated.65 Thus, the Bolshevik
Revolution completed the course of refeudalization, with some irony of course, by detangling the partially degraded public sphere from politics and once again plainly
partitioning state and society.66 Self-governing in name only, the one-party rule that
emerged under the guise of democratic centralism and the promise of a peaceful and
prosperous future had no space in its design for a truly adversarial public as it already
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represented the public.67 Thus, as in the late Middle Ages, only one public figure existed,
at least officially: the regime.68 Of course, one only needs to consider the chants of “We
are the People” in 1989 that brought the SED’s fundamental failures in this regard into
sharp relief. To be fair, this was not the intention of socialist leaders who were at least
professedly humanistic and of course did not see the arrangement in a negative light.
Instead, socialist leadership viewed its official public sphere as a moderated forum (or, in
more critical terms, a “simulated public sphere”) that could compromise, but only in
limited ways as the party always scripted its public political debates.69 The result though,
especially in the GDR, if one “squints,” is an arrangement that resembles that of the early
modern world in some respects, with a regime that represented publicness to its subjects,
and private citizens who aired grievances publicly through (oftentimes) illicit channels. In
other words, following re-feudalization, things came full circle with a regime that
claimed and dominated publicness and a competing public opinion that functioned as a
buffer to the government.

Representational Culture, the Official Public Sphere, and Legitimacy
I borrow heavily, then, from Jürgen Habermas and those who have followed his
line of thinking in conceiving of what I refer to as the official public sphere, based on the
idea of “representative publicness.”70 Tim Blanning’s expansion of this concept, which
he similarly refers to as “representational culture” or, more clearly expressed as “representing power before the people,” is likewise instructive and is the meaning I use
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throughout this study.71 Like Habermas, Blanning points to the court and reign of Louis
XIV as the pinnacle of representational culture. This differed from the Middle Ages when
representational culture existed in public places—streets and parks—before it shifted to
the palace in the early modern period.72 In the eighteenth century, Louis’ Versailles and
European imitations such as, of course, Augustus’ Zwinger in Dresden came to embody
this new representational culture that projected the confidence, vigor, stability, and
legitimacy of the state. The court and its prince were the state, or as Bossuet put it, “the
whole state is in the person of the prince. In him is found the will of the whole people.”73
A key to this early modern representational culture was distance: the figurative
and literal space between royal authority and those who passively observed it. This is one
area where early modern examples of representational culture and the representational
culture of the SED diverge: as a socialist party, the SED presented itself as close to the
people—of the people, and continuously strived to create Verbindung (a connection) with
the masses through its propaganda. Unfortunately for the party, its claims of legitimacy
rested on the appearance of democratic representation and popular support that never
truly existed, although that did not stop the SED from creating an official public sphere or
what several scholars have labeled a Scheinöffentlichkeit: a “phony public sphere” or
world of appearances that falsely represented its claims to popular legitimacy and
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functioned as representational culture, reupholstered and outfitted with electronic
communication apparatuses for the modern era.74
The representational culture maintained by the SED existed not in the form of
elaborate court ritual, but in city planning and the built environment (as we have seen),
distinct forms of visual propaganda (Sichtwerbungen), choreographed demonstrations
and, most notably, radio broadcasts designed to represent state power and popular support
for the socialist program under Soviet guidance. As James Sheehan points out, over time,
the princely court had lost its facility to represent the state in a corporeal and localized
manner, and in the modern world, political communities came to exist as imagined
communities. In other words, they stretched beyond visible representations, or, as
Sheehan smartly puts it, “the state…must be imagined; that is to say, it becomes a
projection of what we know on to what we don’t, what we can see on to what we can’t.”75
This study will show that within the official public sphere, the SED looked to
establish an imagined community of socialist nations designed to bolster its claims to
legitimacy. Revisiting Peukert’s three categories of analysis finds that the socialist
regimes of Eastern Europe could not solely rely on tradition, a rational/legal foundation,
or charisma for their legitimacy. Historians argue that the USSR and Eastern Bloc
regimes instead based their legitimacy on historical and inevitable achievements along
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with the symbolism of the “trappings of communist power,” the eternal promise of a
better tomorrow, and, of course, the unspoken threat of Soviet intervention.76
One way in which the SED hoped to accomplish such a feat was through radio
broadcasts, and more specifically, programming that incorporated the citizenry of the
GDR into an international socialist community under Stalin’s leadership. In this way, the
imagined community elucidated by Benedict Anderson—and the basis for this
argument—must be modified. Anderson’s thesis holds that citizens imagine their nations
as a “deep, horizontal comradeship” existing within boundaries that separate one’s
national community from others.77 When restricted to the boundaries of the nation state,
such nationalist imaginings would certainly run counter to the internationalist tenets of
Marxist ideology, but Anderson’s idea sheds light on the SED’s attempts to represent its
legitimacy through radio and print. In doing so, the SED represented (though often
grossly exaggerated) popular support from below for its policies. The citizens of the
Eastern Bloc states, bound formally by a professed commitment to a socialist future and a
steadfast solidarity in defense of it, became the greater imagined community to which
East Germany now belonged. This new internationalism fit well with core socialist
political impulses in that it cut across national boundaries, and it served East German
leaders’ goals particularly well as it helped Germans move away from the brands of
nationalism cultivated by the German Right since the late nineteenth century. Put
differently, through radio and print, the SED projected the appearance of popular support
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through an internationalist approach that meshed with the anti-fascist profile of the Party.
Historians can also point to another historical parallel; the attempts of early
modern states and the GDR to project power and legitimacy also derived from the
regimes’ need to conceal underlying uncertainties—or as Blanning points out, “the
greater the doubts, the greater the need for display.”78 And in the GDR there existed good
reason for doubt—despite the unwavering confidence that characterized the SED’s
representations. As Mary Fulbrook notes, the words “not yet” (noch nicht) pepper the
SED’s internal record, evidence of the party’s belief in a persistent and pervasive false
consciousness infecting the masses that prevented the realization of its socialist vision.79
And so it was with many of the SED’s claims regarding the physical reconstruction of
Dresden, the distribution of consumer goods, economic planning, and societal unity. The
party’s optimistic media productions meant for public consumption could conceal these
sometimes obvious deficiencies, but the doubts surface with regularity throughout the
regime’s internal record. Thus, despite some appearances of a cohesive society and a
popular government, cracks in this façade occasionally emerged in public spaces if one
looked hard enough.
For instance, were a visitor to have walked down Grunaer Street—trumpeted as
Dresden’s first socialist street—in the spring of 1952, they would have seen anti-RIAS
(Radio in The American Sector) signs hanging from the new housing blocks that
inadvertently belied any claims to a media monopoly. “Trust your own strength – not the
war monger – don’t listen to RIAS!” read one of the signs while another urged residents
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to “Shut the door to RIAS lies.”80 When considered along the lines of the old historical
axiom that the enforcement of a law often verifies the existence of the outlawed activity,
one could correctly conclude that RIAS enjoyed some measure of popularity in the GDR.
As this study will show, such an assumption would have been a safe one. The notorious
western station, a thorn in the GDR’s side until 1989, represented a powerful and
relentlessly disruptive force that protested the existence of GDR and advocated for
German unity.

Protest and Resistance in the GDR
Germans protested Sovietization and all subsequent governments, institutions, and
apparatuses to varying degrees from the earliest period of the Soviet occupation until
1989.81 The nature and success of resistance remains a point of contention among
historians, as does what we might even consider a “true” act of resistance. In the postWende period, during which the release of documents that have verified various types of
discontent, questions of what constituted opposition and dissent have stirred academic
debate. Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk has proposed a categorization of oppositional behavior
that divides resistance (he uses the terms opposition and resistance interchangeably) into
subcategories: passive refusal, social protest (partial strikes—which were always
political, petitions), political dissent, and ultimately, mass protest which, of course,
defined the summer of 1953 and fall of 1989.82 Corey Ross has endorsed historian
Hubertus Knabe’s similar, but more comprehensively weighted, ten-point system that
Neues Deutschland, April 1952: “Vertraut eurer eigenen Kraft – nicht der der Kriegshetzer – hört keinen
RIAS!”; “Riaslügen”
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also concludes with open revolt.83 Knabe’s scale recognizes risk level for the participant,
degree of criticism, and public versus private action.84 Ross points out that such a system
acknowledges the variability of protest and the way in which actions could escalate,
proving that resistance was often a process, rather than an event. Gareth Dale
distinguishes between resistance, which he sees as endemic in the GDR and often
successful, and opposition, which sought political change—actions we really might only
apply to several cases, notably 1953 and the 1980s. Thus, Dale found himself in
disagreement with Ross, who argued that even in the final decade of the GDR’s
existence, activists really only opposed the regime, rather than communism itself, thus
leading him to label this opposition as “limited.”85 In Revolutions and Resistance in
Eastern Europe historians Kevin McDermott and Matthew Stibbe acknowledge the
competing definitions in the wide-ranging literature on the subject and choose to adhere
to historian Lynne Viola’s definition of resistance, which states that, “At its core,
resistance involves opposition” and is wide ranging in its execution. Thus, issues of
terminology remain unsettled in the literature. Still, the regime experienced two episodes
of resistance that posed existential threats, in the summer of 1953 and the fall of 1989.
The origins and character of the first incident concern much of this study.86

June 17 and Terminology
An encyclopedia-like synopsis of the June 17 demonstrations might read as
follows: In the summer of 1952, the SED initiated an accelerated buildup of socialism
83
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along Stalinist lines. Economic planning emphasized heavy industry at the expense of
consumer goods. “Bourgeois” institutions and those organizations deemed to be enemies
of socialism by the Party (such as the Church) came under increased pressure to better
align themselves with the regime’s atheistic model. The regime raised workers’ quotas to
increase production in the factories and living standards and attitudes deteriorated; the
regime had gone too far, too fast. Stalin passed in 1953 and his successors, recognizing
the dire situation in the GDR, called on East German leadership to temper their efforts.
On June 11, the SED announced the New Course, a planning package that scaled back
much of the accelerated drive. Curiously, the heightened quotas for workers remained in
place, rousing resentment among certain sectors of the workforce. In Berlin, construction
workers began to organize strikes related to the norms in the capital and took to the
streets on June 16. RIAS broadcasted the news that evening and the following morning,
demonstrators took to the streets in over five hundred cities throughout the GDR, airing
demands that had moved on from calls for reform to calls for revolution and
reunification. That evening, the GDR’s police forces suppressed the demonstrations with
help from the Soviets. While scholars generally agree with this much, points of
contention remain, starting with just what we should call this event.
To be sure, a significant issue regarding the characterization of June 17 is the
search for a term (or words) that most accurately convey the events that transpired. A
number of terms have proved divisive or problematic. The SED typically used the terms
like “anxiety,” “unrest,” “riots,” “enemy action,” “demonstrations,” and “(fascist)
provocation” as shorthand for the collective actions of those who protested before settling
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on the ominous-sounding “X Day”87 The regime also used the word “unrest” to describe
a range of behavior, from discussions hostile toward the state, to moderate confrontations
with authorities in public spaces, while terming more boisterous public disturbances
“riots.” Interestingly, terms “revolution” and “uprising,” appear more often when the
regime is quoting demonstrators or opposing interpretations. The term
“counterrevolution” appears in the SED’s analysis while some western observers and
scholars adopted the term “failed revolution.” But the idea of “revolution” proves
problematic using certain criteria. Historians’ hesitation to use the word probably begins
with what Charles Maier noted as historians’ general conception of the events as
“ephemeral and local.”88 Such thinking likely encouraged scholars to shy away from a
word that suggests a more substantial event. The term “revolution” raises other questions.
For example, Theda Skocpol and Meyer Kestnbaum argue that the term, since its modern
designation that developed out of the French Revolution (which has remained static
since), requires, “sudden, fundamental, and innovative departure in a nation’s social and
political life.”89 Based on demonstrators’ calls for the removal of the SED and
reunification, June 17 certainly presented the struggle for major political change, though
perhaps that the event occurred so soon after Sovietization reminded observers that the
existing system was not as entrenched as the Old Regime or the SED of 1989. Still, the
temptation to use the term “failed revolution” might also derive from a pervasive (at least
among most non-Party members) notion that revolution would have been good: the
“Mißstimmung,” “Unruhe;” “Ausschreitung;” “feindliche Aktion,” Demonstrationen,” “Provokation”
“Der Tag X”
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euphoria of 1989 might have come thirty-six years earlier. As Jack Goldstone notes, the
theory of revolutions has traditionally characterized them as vehicles for progress where,
for example, revolutionaries have cast themselves (or been cast) as the proponents of a
new and better order. The counterrevolutionaries, on the other hand, have been tagged as
guardians of an undesirable and obsolete arrangement.90 Or, as Eugene Weber quipped in
a 1974 article, “one never hears of a counterrevolution in automobile design.”91
Other terms have become more established in the literature. Among the
demonstrations’ sympathetic observers and public figures, the most common term used is
“uprising” (Aufstand), though some historians prefer mass/popular uprising
(Volkserhebung). The initially popular “workers’ uprising” fell out of favor as research
uncovered the demonstrations’ broader participation. At least one historian has adopted
“Uprising with revolutionary traits,” which, while an unwieldy phrase, is accurate in
some ways.92 Guido Knopp argues June 17 constituted an uprising, a peoples’ uprising,
and a failed revolution that began as a workers’ revolt.93 At this juncture, I propose that
“mass demonstrations” fits best as a general phrase to describe what happened in the
GDR on June 17, as those who took to the streets demonstrated a newfound political
power.
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Interpretations of June 17, 1953
The SED leadership wasted no time in publically blaming the “putsch attempt” on
reactionary agents, Western actors, saboteurs, and most of all, fascists. The events—
strikes, protest marches, and a slew of demands that called for fundamental change in the
GDR—were, in the official SED historiography, machinations, and fascist provocations
that radiated from West Berlin. The SED argued that “Western agents” and fascists
orchestrated the entire uprising and that it had been planned for some time (just how long
is never stated). The official story that emerged in the days following the events within
the SED held West Berlin “string pullers” (die Drahtzieher) responsible for the planning
and initiating the unrest.94 As Englemann and Kowalczuk point out, the possibility that a
spontaneous escalation and politicization could grow out of a workers’ protest concerned
with the issue of the heightened norms simply had no place in the imaginations of the
regime’s leading functionaries.95 The working, the regime argued, could not protest
against a government of the working class and the day would be officially
commemorated in the GDR as “X-Day.”96
Historians agree that the June 17 events constituted a significant moment of
conflict in the brief history of the GDR. The literature surrounding the event has followed
two significant trends. The first involved overturning the SED version’s of the event. PreWende studies produced in the West such as Arnulf Baring’s Uprising in East Germany
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from 1957 established an outline of the event, but did not have access to materials that
could confirm the number of participants.97
After reunification, historians gained access to previously unavailable archival
materials and began reconstructing just what happened in June of 1953 in the GDR. A
wave of publications in the 1990s was followed by a flurry of literature for both popular
and scholarly consumption for the fiftieth anniversary in 2003. The result of all this work
is a basic consensus of what led to the uprising, how it transpired, how the authorities
extinguished the revolt, and its political, economic, and social consequences. Naturally,
disagreements and areas where further work is needed remain.
Historians have generally been in agreement concerning the long-term causes of
the uprising. Heidi Roth and Karl Fricke have convincingly demonstrated in a superblydocumented case study of Saxony that the development of the East German state, which
began with the postwar Sovietization process, contained in it the seeds of the June unrest.
These included the Stalinization of the economy and a shift towards heavy
industrialization, expropriation of private industries, and a lack of political legitimacy.98
In his case study of Saalfeld, Andrew Port argues that the postwar housing situation,
intensified by the presence of SAG (Sowietische Aktiengesellschaft) Wismut, refugees,
and the evictions and requisitions prompted by the needs of the Maxhütte mill workers,
led to endemic shortages and anger stemming from perceived (and real) privilege. 99 IlkoSascha Kowalczuk suggests, along with Heidi Roth, that the difficult housing situation in
Görlitz contributed to the long term frustrations, and also higher concentrations of people
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that contributed to heightened levels of anger in that city.100 In Waffen gegen das Volk:
Der 17. Juni 1953 in der DDR, Torsten Deitrich utilizes police records to demonstrate
that the military build-up (Aufrüstung), including the barracked police units (Die
Kasernierte Volkspolizei) grew out of the SED’s anti-fascist mentality and deep-rooted
fear of Western imperialist ambitions that stemmed from Moscow. Diedrich also notes
that the establishment of the European Defense Community in 1952 hastened the buildup,
all of which funneled money away from civilian needs, lowering living standards for the
population which he identifies at central to the events of June 17.101
Historians have unanimously identified the SED’s decision at the Second Party
Conference (July 1952) to lurch forward with the “planned construction of socialism” as
a critical event leading to the uprising. The above-noted military buildup constituted what
Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuck deemed the highest phase of Stalinism in the GDR,
accompanied by the construction of social building blocks along the lines of the
Führerprinzip. The establishment of these building blocks, argues Kowalczuk, led to
attacks on the Church, increased persecution and arrests of “subversive elements,” and
tightened border security, which instilled fear among intellectual classes of isolation from
international peer groups.102
Historians are in general agreement that the immediate political causes of the
uprising can be traced to three related events: the SED’s decision to raise production
norms in early 1953, the implementation of the New Course, which relaxed or canceled
much of the rushed socialist build-up from the summer of 1952 following orders from
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Stalin’s concerned successors in Moscow, and the admission of error(s) by the SED
coupled with the decision to retain the heightened workers norms. Kowalczuk points out
that this acknowledgement of error had profound and unintended consequences that
affected SED leadership in a variety of ways. He argues that functionaries who had been
responsible for carrying out the SED’s orders lost their credibility with the population
and found themselves in a state of uncertainty. Some, he points out, continued on as
mindless followers of the SED while others expressed hope for the reestablishment of the
SPD. Roth and Kowalczuk note the role of rumors (particularly those that alleged
Ulbricht’s flight and the withdrawal of Soviet troops) in fostering excitement and hope
among residents and energizing workers. This development, according to Kowalczuk,
coincided with the permanent angst among the general population, creating a dangerous
situation for a regime revealing weakness. This study will expand on this subject.
Historians have rightly observed Berlin as the epicenter of the revolt, while later
publications, including several comprehensive regional studies have demonstrated that
unrest had a far greater reach.103 To be sure, all studies point to the construction workers’
barracks in the Stalinallee where personnel planned the demonstrations that set off the
uprising, which then swelled as the demonstrators marched through the city. Dietrich,
Roth, and Kowalczuk take note of the role of communications—a defense of the decision
to retain the norms in die Tribune, and the spread of the strikers’ activities on RIAS—in
fostering the spread of discontent, although the extent of the role played by the latter
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remains a point of contention. Dietrich also has shown that what began as peaceful
protests often turned violent when demonstrators became aggressive, although he notes
that violence was initially directed mainly towards symbolic government buildings and
prisons that housed political “criminals.” Likewise, Roth has articulated the notion that
events generally began in a peaceful manner throughout Germany on the morning of the
seventeenth, as striking workers, who were often led by experienced strike leaders,
organized marches. However, events often became unpredictable when protestors took to
the streets and riled-up students and young people joined them. Dietrich argues the
outbreak of violence can in many cases be traced to the manner in which police and
military forces were deployed, either in insufficient numbers or by late arrival at sites of
disorder due to underdeveloped communications apparatuses and protocols. The result
was that forces agitated the crowds, yet were unable to suppress the agitation. This would
seem to support Kowalczuk and Roth’s assertion that the regime’s ability to deploy and
station sufficient numbers troops to Dresden beforehand helped prevent the level of
violence seen in some other locales.104
Torsten Dietrich has characterized the uprising as primarily a workers’ revolt, yet
he concedes that it eventually inspired large cross sections of the population to take
action. This follows a larger trend wherein historians have expanded the dimensions of
the uprising to illustrate a spirit that extended beyond the factory floor and reflected
deeper social and political frustrations. Notably, Gary Bruce has attempted to shift
emphasis away from the workers and economic concerns and instead suggests that the
primarily political motives of official dissenters—the Blockparties—and noncommunists inspired the events of 17. June. By examining party archives of the SED,
104
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LDPD, and eastern CDU, he demonstrates that the SED’s destruction of any true
opposition parties and an independent judiciary fostered political antagonism across large
sections of the citizenry. Thus, Bruce is able to show that the numerous political demands
made throughout the GDR that called for removal of the SED regime in the latter half of
June stemmed primarily from political discontent, rather than economic aggravation. In
the end, he sees the revolt as an anti-communist movement—an assertion to which most
scholars would not be hostile.
Roth’s detailed study of the June events in Saxony has emphasized several
important aspects of the uprising. A central contention advanced (successfully) by Roth is
that the uprising could take on quite different characters based on local conditions,
contingencies, and personalities. For example in Leipzig, the police’s decision to raid the
Free German Youth’s headquarters energized its occupants and sent youths into the
streets, radicalizing the events in that city. She has also argued that local leadership in
some places, such as Karl Marx-Stadt, responded to the morning’s strike activity more
delicately than the leadership of other cities, thus effectively tamping down worker
discontent and rebellious energies. While Roth’s meticulous reconstruction of the events
in Dresden is an admirable and useful one, she leaves considerable room for further
discussion regarding the role of rumor, radio, and the contentious issue of nationalism on
June 17.105 This study, which approaches the June 17 events with a theoretical framework
in place and focuses on the local preconditions (Roth begins her survey on June 17), thus
seeks to build on Roth and others’ empirical research.
This study will argue that the 1953 demonstrations represented the first modern,
electronically transmitted mass demonstration, a critical historical development that
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allowed events to move at an unprecedented pace. For instance, while historians nearly
universally reference the way in which the 1848-49 revolutions “spread like wildfire,” the
events still unfolded rather slowly by twenty-first century standards.106 The banquets that
led to street demonstrations in Paris on February 22 spread eastward, triggering
demonstrations in Munich on March 4.107 The news, which took days to travel between
cities, meant that “wildfire” did not appear in Vienna until March 13, nearby Budapest
two days later, Venice two days after that, and Milan and Berlin still one day later.108 The
diffusion of revolt in 1918 in Germany took similar amounts of time to travel between
cities. Strike waves began that summer in the north leading to the sailors’ revolt in Kiel
on November 2 and unrest in the form of mass demonstrations spread to other major
German cities on November 7.109
The widespread adoption of personal radios prior to the June 17 demonstrations
showcased how this time lag no longer existed in industrialized areas. While large-scale
demonstrations in Berlin took place prior to the nation-wide uprising, the June 17
demonstrations unfolded simultaneously throughout the nation. Participant and activist
(in Berlin) Rainer Hildebrandt rightfully noted in a 1954 article that until this point,
experts insisted that an uprising in an entrenched, totalitarian system had hitherto proved
impossible. That all seemed to change, he argued, suggesting that we had entered a new
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era—one in which a “leaderless” uprising had become possible.110 Furthermore, he
suggested that, in this new era, when forty demonstrators took the streets, mere hours
later, ten thousand would be present. Now, if everyone demonstrated simultaneously, he
contended, power in numbers would lead to [political] power.111 Hildebrandt’s last two
points receive further consideration in the present study. On one hand, the June 17
demonstrations proved a nation-wide demonstration could unfold with unprecedented
rapidity—a phenomenon that has, in recent years, reached new levels with “flash mobs”
and “critical mass” events, whereby groups of people coordinate a sudden, unexpected,
and dominating occupation (typically) of a public space. His second point, that
simultaneity and the power in numbers bred confidence and power can also be expanded
to include the role of radio.

The Question of Spontaneity
The supposed spontaneity of the demonstrations that broke out on June 17 has
been categorized as spontaneous throughout much, if not nearly all the current
historiography and this characterization deserves more attention. But, this is also a point
where modern historiographical consensus and the former official East German
interpretation diverge. Since 1953, observers and historians have noted the inherent
spontaneity of the demonstrations. Dealing with this word can be a bit tricky, as one is
required to deduce one meaning of the word out of several based on the context in which
it originally appears. For instance, when describing an uprising or demonstration as
spontaneous, the term generally means “unplanned” or “without preparations.”
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Considering that the word translates directly between English and German, we might also
add “unprompted,” or “without premeditation or outside impetus.” As early as June 17,
the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency along with the State Department reportedly
accepted information that the riots in East Berlin represented “the spontaneous result of a
planned demonstration” the previous day.112 Contemporary interpretations have
continued to note the spontaneity of the demonstrations. Gerhard Ritter points out that the
“organization of the spontaneous Revolt” began in the factories with elected strike
committees.113 Engelmann and Kowalczuk argue that despite RIAS’s contributions to the
uprising, political demands “developed in many places spontaneously.”114 Along these
lines, Fricke contends that “the strikes, demonstrations, and unrest on June 17 broke out
spontaneously,” but for all their spontaneity and regional differences, a general pattern
emerges in which workers’ demands regarding the norms turned into political
demands.115 The “spontaneity” of the demonstrations, according to Fricke, also meant
that organized preparations and central leadership failed to materialize.116 Roth notes the
“spontaneous” origins of the work stoppages and demonstrations in Saxony, although she
also points out that workers had become aware of the events in Berlin on the way to
work—a key issue.117 Despite this, she offers RIAS a smaller role than some
interpretations. Participants and witnesses, too, occasionally characterize the events as
spontaneous, though occasionally disagreement appears, for example, one student who
later recalled of the demonstration in Dresden: “Whether it was an organized
112
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demonstration, I can no longer say. But I think so.”118 Of course, others disagree and one
always finds it challenging to refute what a participant remembers happening—especially
when it supports, in some ways, the SED interpretation and it serves as a helpful
reminder that participants’ experiences, of course, varied. Still, an investigation of the
demonstrations’ “spontaneity” proves revealing and one could argue that historians have
been overzealous in dismissing the SED’s major interpretations as fabrications.
Another related task upon which historians have yet to reach agreement concerns
the June 17 events’ historical categorization. Jonathan Sperber has rightfully noted that
the events of June 1953 remain difficult for historians to categorize and contextualize,
partially because of the events’ diminished standing in popular memory.119 One might
also note that the problems faced by citizens in the Dresden region and elsewhere in the
GDR were not unique or memorable ones: low wages, a government that, according to its
critics, bungled and misdirected state resources, and the existence of oppressive state
apparatuses. Citizens saw a regime that kowtowed to a foreign power that undermined
(what they perceived as) a more authentic nationalism and had made the worst of what
still seemed to be a temporary arrangement.120 But the methods with which they
communicated their frustrations in many ways reveal just as much about the period and
place as the actual demands.
The SED’s contention that the demonstrations had been planned far in advance is
not far-fetched when considered more closely and from a different perspective. In a
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recent edited volume, Keith Michael Baker and Dan Edelstein have spearheaded an
investigation into the notion of what they have termed the “revolutionary script.” They
argue that self-conscious revolutionary actors work from an historically informed
revolutionary script that serves as a model for action. The actors might deviate here and
there and improvisation is frequent, but the script provides an outline and a general
narrative. The authors locate the invention of the first modern revolutionary script in
France between 1789 and the Congress of Vienna. Following this period of upheaval, to
proclaim a situation revolutionary or oneself a revolutionary meant carrying out a
performance that followed the established script. The authors further note that after a
crisis, whether financial, political, or military, a “critical mass of actors opts for a
revolutionary diagnosis” and the actions that follow tend to follow a similar pattern.121
Silvana Toska points out that the periods prior to revolution often witness the formation
of a “revolutionary culture” whereby certain groups try to exploit unhappiness and
establish a revolutionary consciousness. The first act in the script calls for reform before
actors move to calls for revolution. The present study will examine the spaces where the
revolutionary mentalities and scripts of the June 17 demonstrations originated.122

The Rival Public Sphere
In Dresden, revolutionary mentalities developed in what I call the rival public
sphere. The rival public sphere, consisting of unsanctioned communications including
foreign broadcasting, rumors, and pamphleteering, and other uncontrollable strata, served
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as a counterweight to SED hegemony and emitted authentic public opinion that
challenged the credibility of the government.
Scholars have put forth several arguments regarding the existence of a public
sphere or spheres in the GDR and in its fellow Soviet satellite states. Some also argue
that no genuine public sphere existed or could have existed in a closed system, but that
citizens could retreat in private “niches,” though this concept is probably more applicable
to later the decades in the GDR.123 Some scholars have pointed out that the public sphere
had the potential to challenge the regime in the latter half of the GDR’s existence. For
instance, Peter Hohendahl has argued that a public sphere did indeed exist in what was a
closed society, and that a “revolutionary public sphere” developed in the turbulent period
leading up to the peaceful revolutions of 1989.124 Rühle comes to a similar conclusion
with his study, wherein he attempts to answer the question of how a political publicness
developed alongside the official or simulated public sphere. His research leads him to
conclude that no bourgeois public sphere existed in the GDR because the preconditions—a private economy and the search for money and power—did not exist in the
GDR (though this does require one to disregard black or shadow markets).125 Instead,
Rühle suggests the existence of a “second public sphere,” independent from the state in
the 1980s alongside the official one.126 Originating in the Protestant Church before
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establishing networks and becoming a national network, this space found impetus in
changing societal values (Wertewandel) and a generational break that led to heightened
conflict in the 1980s.127 The search for venues outside the home, then, wherein authentic
and anonymous debate could take place led to the formation of “communicative
societies” in the Church. Rühle contends that these private exchanges in what he labels
the “church public sphere” also functioned as identity-forming exercises and fashioned a
connection between this public (second) public sphere and the lived-in-world and a buffer
between the second public sphere and the official or simulated public sphere.128 The
second public sphere transformed into a counter public sphere and became intra-regional
through calls for solidarity, signed lists, and declarations of protest.129 Despite the
prominent role of the church and the peripheral role assigned to Western media (more on
this shortly), Rühle’s model serves as a starting point for a framework of the public
sphere in the early 1950s.
Similar to the notion of broader, translocal public spheres proposed by Hartmut
Kaeble, Gabor T. Rittersporn, Jan Behrends, and Malte Rolf suggest that in order to
locate a public sphere in Soviet-type societies we must first dispense with governmentgenerated categories of analysis (such as “peasant” or “intellectual”) and broaden our
search for spaces where social relations formed. In other words, “secret spaces” where
individuals could meet privately yielded insufficient results to offer a useful space of
inquiry and they called on historians to consider any framework provided by the state.
That is to say, any place where the state allowed people to come together such as city
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squares or shops functioned as a public sphere.130 In other words, we can simply locate a
public sphere in the same places where the party expected to educate its citizens. This
stems partially from necessity, as the pervasiveness of the party meant that arenas free
from state intervention were exceedingly rare while social standings and political
leanings prevented the exchanges that distinguish a free society.131
Monica Rüthers suggests a useful model based on a general dichotomy of
communications, with legal or “formal communications model” on one hand (or a
representative type) and the “informal communications model” on the other.132 This
informal sector then supplemented the formal sector in a fashion similar to the way a
shadow economy augmented the planned economy. Rüthers points out that informal
networks formed and people spread information by word of mouth among friends, in the
workplace and at school—places that became sources of information and as Rüthers puts
it, came to resemble the bourgeois salons, coffeehouses, and reading societies of the
nineteenth century.133 Other forms of informal communications included vandalism,
violence, refusal of participation, laziness, sabotage, graffiti, song, and jokes, samizdat,
and the consumption of foreign literature. Also pertinent to this study, Rüthers notes that
the Stalinist regime withheld or falsified information as a method of control during the
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revolution from above. Secrecy, too, then, though practiced covertly so as not to betray
the party’s stance as the embodiment of the people (a contrast with absolutist regimes that
also employed this technique), was part of the regime’s communications repertoire.134
Such paradoxes were, according to Rüthers, characteristic of the “neo-feudal Stalinist
system of rule.”135 Secrecy did lead, however, to rumors and to an “unrefined” public
sphere and public opinion—a development that will get empirical treatment in this
study.136 While Rüthers imposes these categories of analysis on Soviet Moscow, the
general arrangement can be profitably applied to the GDR, especially in the case of
rumors, which formed one component of the rival public sphere.137

Rumors
“Rumors are to everyday life in the GDR as bread is to the consumption of food,”
wrote regime opponent and historian Bernd Eisenfeld.138 Though there is little consensus
regarding how we might define, categorize, and analyze rumors, scholars have certainly
recognized that they are a troublesome and powerful phenomena. Jean-Noël Kapferer
reasons that rumors represent the first type of mass media and despite sharing space with
print, radio, and electronic media, have lost none of their influence. While agreeing with
other scholars who regard rumors as bits of information or news relating to contemporary
affairs, he also notes that rumors exist to convince, rather than stir contemplation or
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deliberation. And Kapferer also notes that for too long, researchers have emphasized false
rumors, pointing to numerous cases of true rumors such as the health issues of Reagan,
Brezhnev, Andropov, and Pompidou. Furthermore, he notes that rumors demand
categorization that separates them from the authentic diffusion of news.139 Sociologist
Tamotsu Shibutani categorizes rumors as “improvised” news borne from collective
conversation. He and others have pointed out that earlier thinkers painted rumors as the
pathological manifestations of “rumor mongers” rather than something endemic to all
societies—especially in times of unrest or social strain.140 Along these lines, Timothy
Tackett views rumors as “statements communicated in times of uncertainty, ambiguity,
and perceived dangers that help people explain the situation they are confronting and
develop responses.” 141
Cass Sunstein argues that people accept false rumors as true based on our hopes
and fears—emotions that certainly run high in times of great uncertainty. He sees rumors
spreading in the form of a “cascade,” as we tend to rely on others for information and
quite often these are individuals who think like we do. The most significant impediment
to such occurrences is the availability of impartial information, which was not easy to
access in Stalinist states.142 Such a conception of rumors offers us insight into the volatile
situation in Dresden in the days before the June 17 Uprising. As this study will show, this
last theory of the rumor is certainly reminiscent of one put forth by the SED in its
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analyses of improvised news. Above all, such improvised news helps explain or make
sense of a situation based on the available information. Tabitha Leigh Ewing has argued
for the historicity of rumors and their presence in the historical record. While refuting the
conception of rumors as pathological, she adopts Clifford Geertz’s contention that
rumors, with all their inventiveness should be construed as “imaginative works built out
of social materials” and sees them and their production and transmission as a form of
political participation.143 Drawing from these studies, this study will show that rumors, as
part of the rival public sphere, constituted improvised news with varying degrees of
veracity and allowed for a distinct form of political participation in a dictatorship.
While rumors have received only passing attention from scholars of East German
protest, other more visible acts and institutions have found ample space in the
literature.144 GDR-specific forms of protest to add to Ruther’s categories above included
leaving and visiting the West, though whether this constituted an act of protest has stirred
some historiographical contention. We can also add notable outside groups that actively
countered the SED ( at least in the early 1950s) such as the Investigative Committee of
Liberal Jurists (Untersuchungsausschuss freiheitlicher Juristen), the Taskforce against
Inhumanity (Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit), the SPD-Eastern Office (SPDOSTBURO), and finally, the notorious RIAS.145
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Franziska Kuschel’s recent study is a superb examination of RIAS and other
western outlets as key players in the GDR’s media landscape.146 Like Rühle, she notes
that Habermas’s bourgeois public sphere and the open, rational, and critical debate it
engendered is not applicable to the GDR with its governmental restrictions. Instead, she
introduces the framework of a “rival public sphere.” Building on the work of sociologists
Jürgen Gerhards and Friedhelm Neidhardt and communications scholar Michael Meyen,
she further breaks down the categories of publicness as follows: 1) arenas of mass media,
2) organized groups, 3) smaller, unorganized encounters, and 4.) internal—for instance
letters and petitions composed by an individual. RIAS, she argues, which constituted one
of the two major mass mediums in the GDR, influenced the exchanges that took place
within the other three categories. For example, through communal listening (and later,
watching), friends, colleagues, and students discussed, during chance encounters, the
information they heard listening to RIAS.147
The present study builds on these ideas with an empirical assessment of their
manifestations in the Dresden region. The rival sphere here constituted local and national
arenas for the exchange of information outside of the official public sphere and allowed
for the production of what we can recognize as authentic public opinion. Composed of
the exchange of illicit ideas and critiques that took the form of rumors, illegal leaflets,
and other types of informal communications. The records evaluated here bring to light the
SED’s very real fear that residents undermined the regime when authorities were not
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present (and sometimes when they were). Ultimately, the criticism, exchanges, and, ideas
that circulated within these uncontrollable strata allowed the regime to become
challengeable in the summer of 1953. Thus, we will see that in June of 1953, the rival
public sphere provided the space where revolution became thinkable and cultivated the
script for its enactment.
The study is divided into five chapters. Chapter one examines the official public
sphere and the methods used by the SED to represent publicness and power in the
Dresden Region. Drawing on the concepts of representational power hitherto outlined, I
insist that the SED’s goals bore semblance to those used by early modern rulers, and that
the ensuing representative publicness should be also understood as a modern and
distinctly Cold War solution to the age-old challenge of establishing and maintaining
legitimacy. The chapter will examine the re-founding of domestic radio stations in
Dresden, the popularity they enjoyed in the region, and the programming they aired.
Analysis of this programming will show that the SED aimed to construct an imagined
community of listeners and supporters in national and international realms, thus
bolstering their claims of popular approval. This chapter also offers an analysis of the
visual methods used by the SED to project power into public space and concludes with an
exploration of Stalin’s death and the opportunities it presented the regime to represent its
authority through choreographed display, ritual, and the publicization of such activities.
Chapter two examines the rival public sphere in the Dresden region. As a source
of authentic public opinion, the rival public sphere challenged the vision and planning of
the SED and thus its authority and legitimacy. Rumors, and to a lesser extent, leaflets,
also served to undermine the government and adopted an increasingly rebellious tone

57

following Stalin’s death. The chapter will also examine RIAS’s programming, which
delivered news that a large portion of the population in the GDR deemed to be more
credible than that delivered by the GDR and stimulated conversations and action that
undermined its government. Furthermore, it will show that through this programming,
RIAS built an imagined community of all Germans that was integrated into the West. The
survey concludes with an analysis of how RIAS and rumor conceived of Stalin’s death
and the GDR’s future in March, 1953.
Chapter three surveys the volatile period between the announcements of the New
Course and the eve of the June 17 demonstrations. Research here shows that RIAS and
especially rumors challenged the regime’s ability to maintain an appearance of authority
and misinformation—often construed as disinformation by the SED—whittled away at
the prestige of the GDR’s leaders and brought about a crisis of legitimacy for the
government. Furthermore, analysis will show that the narratives of real events took on
new life in the imaginations of residents and the chapter will demonstrate that this
allowed revolution to become thinkable: the rival public sphere became a revolutionary
public sphere.
Chapter four examines how East Germans communicated knowledge of events on
June 16 and 17. Research here investigates the function of rumors and radio in shaping
collective action as well as RIAS’s role in endowing the demonstrations with all-German
imaginings, which contributes to the debate surrounding the role of nationalism. Chapter
five surveys the aftermath of the demonstrations and considers how the regime projected
authority in the official public sphere and its opposition challenged such efforts in the
rival public sphere.
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Chapter One
Representational Culture in the Dresden Region, 1945-1953

“Dresden and Leipzig radio stations appeared as the primary representatives of MiddleGermany Radio, and therefore, representatives of Saxony’s political, intellectual, and
cultural life, once again, through a tribune of the airwaves.”
-Senior Councilor, Department of Popular Education – Radio, GDR1
“Who represents Dresden in the airwaves, who carries the name of our city throughout
the entire world? It’s our regional station, Radio Dresden!”
- Sächsische Zeitung2
“It must appear democratic, but everything must be in our hands.”
-Walter Ulbricht3
“Radio—a decisive organ of state power.”
- Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands4

“A bleak stone desert.”5 So Dresden appeared to one West German journalist in
1951 who regretted that a city noted for its beauty and cultural history had suffered such
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destruction in wartime bombing. Making their way through the city, the author’s group
stumbled across a number of depressing sights. The sanatorium at Weißer Hirsch, which
had attracted guests from around the world, now seemed as if it belonged to a different
era entirely, as did the city’s status as a cultural center where visitors had lined up to see
Rafael’s Madonna at the Gemäldegalerie. Dresden, a place Richard Wagner once called
home and the site of the premiere of Richard Strauss’s Die schweigsame Frau, seemed to
have been literally and figuratively swept away by war. Trümmerfrauen, along with tired
and joyless workers charged with rebuilding the city for their “Red Masters” now
inhabited the city.6 Esteemed cultural institutions appeared neglected in lieu of public
establishments that provided essential services focused on rudimentary needs or the
politics of occupation, like the Handelsorganization, or H.O.s—state-run stores—the city
council, and barracks for Soviet soldiers. Images with the nation’s new leaders, Otto
Grotewohl, Wilhelm Pieck, and the leader of the future, Joseph Stalin, now hung in
public spaces.7 In short, Dresden, in the eyes of critics, embodied something along the
lines of a “tragic city”—a place losing its tradition behind banners and posters that
(falsely) promised residents a better future under leadership in close association with the
victorious Soviet Union.8
A short trip on the streetcar to the Weißer Hirsch neighborhood, perched in the
hills above the Elbe, revealed to the author’s group that the Albrechtsberg Palace had
been transformed into a “Pioneer Palace” on the Soviet model and named for Walter
K., H., “Dresden verlor sein Gesicht,” Berliner Anzeiger, 25 November 1951 (DRA Potsdam: RIAS
Ostarchiv Dresden, 3, Standort: 363/7/1): “Eine Trostlose Steinwüste”
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Ulbricht, the “best friend of the youth.”9 At nearby Auf dem Meisenberg, one would find
comfortable villas that housed the Party big-wigs— the so-called Bonzen—and other
beneficiaries of the adopted Soviet system. Nothing remained of the neighborhood’s
traditional elegance as Red Army Officers strolled in front of the Spa. Luisenhof, once a
popular restaurant, still overlooked the Elbe and offered a view of the cityscape, but now
operated as a state-run eatery. From this point, visitors could see Dresden’s silhouette
missing some its most recognizable landmarks, most notably the dome of the
Frauenkirche. The famous church would remain a pile of rubble for the duration of the
GDR’s existence, an inverse monument to fascism and its destructive powers.10
Across the Elbe River in the picturesque Old City, the Western visitors noted
other changes to Dresden’s built environment, such as the disappearance of the King
Albert monument, recently melted down for scrap metal to help fuel the government’s
Five-Year Plan. Socialist objectives had compelled authorities to strip the interior of the
Zwinger palace during the larger rebuilding effort and, according to the visitors, a good
number of paintings had traveled eastward. Several blocks away visitors would find the
Postplatz, a traffic exchange and one of the busiest public spaces in the city. Residents
waiting there for the streetcar experienced Dresden’s new postwar soundscape,
broadcasted from a loudspeaker hanging above their heads that transmitted slogans from
the National Front, a forced alliance of the mass organizations and block parties.11 What
exactly came out of that loudspeaker on that particular day in November of 1951 is
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difficult to say, though one can surmise that it probably related to the audible
representation of the SED’s socialist vision.
This chapter analyzes how the SED represented its authority and legitimacy in the
Dresden region from 1945 until 1953. It will examine the regime’s construction of an
official public sphere or, more cynically, “phony public sphere,” through radio and visual
display. Analysis pertains to the regional authorities’ re-establishment of local radio and
(to a lesser extent) print media for the representation of an imagined, transnational public
sphere designed to impart the legitimacy of the new regime and to orient residents
eastward by incorporating them into the Eastern Bloc under Soviet leadership. This
international imagined community, bound by members’ commitment to a socialist world
order served, to underscore the righteousness of the SED’s vision and its widespread
acceptance.
The chapter will conclude that the SED’s efforts to establish its broadcasting
apparatuses as powerful instruments to disseminate news while representing public
opinion struggled not only to reach listeners, but also to win their confidence. One traces
some of the problems attending this process to early technical difficulties stemming from
wartime destruction and others derived from the SED’s lack of a popular mandate. The
chapter will then survey other methods by which the SED represented its legitimacy and
power, such as through banners, images of leaders, “Friendship corners,” and
“enlightenment centers.” Finally, the SED employed orchestrated and publicized
demonstrations to project visually an image of mass support in the form of massive
crowds.12
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A central component of the new East German nationalism included a focus on the
formation of an anti-fascist and internationalist citizenry. The state administration in
Saxony argued that the deeds of fascism had discredited propaganda in the minds of
Germans, which during the Nazi period amounted to the malicious dissemination of lies
and slander. Still, the SED recognized the essential role of propaganda, pointing to the
importance of its propaganda department to the larger nation-building mission while
trying to distance itself from the negative history of the National Socialists.
Unsurprisingly, the propaganda of the GDR was to be the “exact opposite” of its
predecessor and spread “the truth,” even if such truths were difficult ones.13 The GDR’s
propaganda would also serve as an instrument that would cut through or across any social
castes and privileged groups to enlighten and educate all Germans. The “spiritual rubble
of the past” was to be liquidated, and a new people created.14 The socialists would need
to rely heavily on radio to transmit this new internationalist nationalism—a task made all
the more difficult by the postwar condition of the region’s broadcasting systems.

Re-founding Local and Regional Radio
In the months following the war’s end, regional authorities rebuilt and reestablished radio in Dresden as a means by which they could broadcast a political vision
for the future and build one of the cornerstones of the official public sphere. It took only

“Abteilung Propaganda,” Rechenschaftsbericht – Volksbildung, Landesverwaltung Sachsen,
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five days for Radio Berlin to resume broadcasting amid the rubble, but things took a little
longer in the Dresden region.15
Prior to 1945, there existed three regional stations: Görlitz, Dresden, and Leipzig,
each technically maintained by the postal administration. On May 8, 1945, Dresden’s
transmitting equipment had been destroyed, although the machinery in nearby Leipzig
remained operational, or at least in much better shape, and was fully functional by the fall
of 1945. Led by confirmed anti-fascist Rudolph Pfützner, who oversaw a staff of around
sixty, the station had begun transmitting programming produced in Berlin on September
1, 1945.16 At this point, Berlin still received content by courier and SMAD required
original programming to be routed through censors, which resulted in news that was no
longer so current. Meanwhile, the non-functioning station in Dresden, which had a rating
of only 1.5kW, had been temporarily placed in an inn and staff awaited orders and
approval to begin transmitting Leipzig programming. Those with basic reception
capabilities within fifty-one kilometers would be able to receive such programming.
More distant reception was impossible because the radio tower for the station in Görlitz,
the second largest city in the region, originally constructed of wood, had been damaged
during fighting on May 8.17 On November 20, 1945, Mitteldeutsche RundfunkGesellschaft celebrated its founding and on December 7, 1945, and transmitted its first
15
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broadcast to the public out of Leipzig at noon with the words: “This is Middle–Germany
Radio including Stations in Dresden and Leipzig.”18
The Landessender Dresden served as the city’s radio station until the GDR’s
broadcasting systems underwent a massive re-organization in 1952 (more on this later).
Although designated a Landessender, the station remained underpowered at 1.5kW for
quite some time and despite plans to boost its transmission capabilities, the station’s
broadcasts did not reach those beyond the city limits. SMAD ordered that the five
Landessender (Schwerin, Potsdam, Weimar, Halle, and Dresden) increase their power to
20kW but this had not happened by the end of 1946 in Dresden, prompting the radio
department to write the newly formed SED and express their concerns regarding the
station’s anemic output. Uncertainties with regard to the greater political arrangements of
postwar Europe also led to concerns within the party and among leaders who felt that a
functioning radio system would provide influence and protections against reactionary
elements. The intendant of the station envisioned its role as an institution in the socialists’
propagandizing arsenal, and thus more transmitting power could only help, though
approval had to come from the state executive committee of Saxony.19
With a basic radio delivery system in place by 1946, the radio department noted
that efforts to broadcast propaganda had intensified and it appeared some early selfcongratulations were in order, with officials boasting that all strata of society—workers,
farmers, artists, women, and youths—now received broadcasts. “That which had only
“Mitteldeutsche Rundfunk Gesellschaft in Dresden,“ Volksstimme vom 24.11.45 (SächsHStA 11376 Nr.
4521, 0022); “Erste Sendung der Mitteldeutschen Rundfunkgesellschaft,” Volksstimme Dresden, Nr. 72
(SächsHStA 11376 Nr. 4521/0021); Werner Doberenz, “Zwei Jahre Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk,”
Sächsische Zeitung, (SächsHStA 11376 Nr. 4512/0019).
19
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been conceivable in Saxony’s public life [had been] put to use as radio propaganda,”
noted one report.20 Though the SED did not yet control the region, behind these efforts
stood the anti-fascist parties and the labor unions with Soviet backing. But first,
authorities had to overcome several technical matters and although its propaganda
department claimed that listeners—and voters—had been won over, such a celebration
proved premature.
By June of 1947, SMAD controlled two Großsender in the Soviet Zone, Berlin
and Leipzig, each utilizing 120kW transmitters, while only two of the Landessender
(Schwerin and Halle) had been upgraded to 20kW.21 At the head of the Dresden station
sat Dr. Mauthner along with artistic director Richard Walter Hahnewald and conductor
Hans-Hendrik Wehding.22 Mauthner petitioned the State Executive Committee - Saxony
(Landesvorstand Sachsen der SED) to upgrade his station from late 1946, and the postal
administration (Oberpostdirektion) in Dresden had poured the necessary concrete in
preparation for the upgrade, but the plan to upgrade Dresden to 20kW in the second half
of 1947 remained unfulfilled.23 Headway towards upgrading Radio Dresden into a true
Landessender (also designated as an affiliated station to MDR, meaning it would also
transmit the larger station’s programming) lagged behind peer stations. The listening
zone for Dresden remained restricted from the SW-NE axis to a 15-20 km listening
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area.24 A review of the station in December, 1948 by the Sächsische Zeitung noted that
the station still operated at 1.5kW and that the power upgrade had failed to materialize
due to the Berlin Airlift.25 Not until 1950 did Radio Dresden finally received its power
upgrade.26
Radio’s Potential Sphere of Influence
In late November of 1945, estimates put the number of residents in the federal
state of Saxony at approximately five-to-six million residents, of whom there were an
estimated 750,000 radio listeners or at least potential radio listeners.27 This estimate is
based on the 375,000 radio owners registered at the post office and authorities concluded
that the number of radio listeners could potentially double this figure.28 Another estimate
by the Saxon government placed the actual number of residents in the region influenced
by the large stations in Dresden and Leipzig at around two million. The task then, for the
SED, was an obvious one: to better connect the regime to the people. By the end of 1947,
more self-congratulations were in order. Authorities boasted that radio, an instrument
misused by the Nazi regime, had successfully reemerged, with increased listenership,
under their watch as a tool with which to educate Germans in a democratic fashion.
Statistics published by the Sächsische Zeitung placed listenership in Saxony at 500,000 in
“Betr.: Strahlungsanlage des Landessender Dresden,” Technische Betriebsleitung, Dresden den 5. Juni
1947 (SächsHStA 11856 IV/A Nr. 264, Bl.5).
25
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January of 1946 and almost one million by October 1947.29 Estimates of listenership in
Saxony could derive from two types of estimates, one based on registered receivers and
the other based on the volume of listener mail. The latter drew on experience that
suggested between sixty and ninety listeners existed per listener letter received.30 Of
course such estimates cannot reliably asses (nor do they attempt to appraise) how many
listeners might gather around one radio or interpersonally transmit radio broadcasts
which would extend radio’s reach (more on this in chapter two). Unrepresented in these
statistics was the number of Saxons who turned in foreign broadcasting from the West,
which amounted to a direct challenge to the SED’s rule. In other words, these types of
surveys did not account for what stations listeners preferred.
The existing qualitative evidence regarding listenership suggests that technical
issues negatively affected audience size or at least irritated listeners through at least 1951.
A listenership survey in the eastern section of Saxony based on 432,000 questionnaires
distributed to the population in the region that yielded 9,002 responses noted the lack of a
connection between Dresden radio and its listeners, while the paltry number of letters
received per month (60) suggested tepid listener interest.31 Note here that this survey
refers only to Radio Dresden, which often carried programming produced by the larger
station in Leipzig, though listeners often failed to differentiate between the two.
Regardless of the broadcast’s perceived origin, 41% of 4007 respondents in Dresden
complained of interference (a whistling sound) and the number increased to 56% at night.
Reception difficulties only increased as one moved westward towards Görlitz where
“Zwei Jahre Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk.”
“Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk an den Landesvorstand Sachsen SED,” z.H. des. Genossen Hans Schrecker
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31
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residents needed wired radio or a high-quality receiver.32 In fact, Radio Prague could be
heard more clearly in this area.33 These concerns may not have directly prompted the
erection of a wired public announcement system, but the construction of one could boost
listenership as the audience would be essentially captive. Residents could control radio
when inside their homes or private spaces but authorities (first SMAD, then the SED) in
Dresden and elsewhere in the GDR could create an official soundscape by broadcasting
directly into public space with strategically placed loudspeaker systems
“Stadtfunk:” City Radio and the Construction of a Socialist Soundscape
The Stadtfunk (localized public announcement systems) and its speaker system
served as one of the SED’s audible representations of legitimacy in the public sphere and
a messenger of a new internationalist orientation.34 Political instructions arrived on
September 9, 1945 in the form of order Nr. 78 from SMAD, which permitted the
construction of public loudspeaker systems that were capable of transmitting at low and
high frequencies via wire. SMAD charged the postal service with the system’s technical
fabrication while the communication department within the Landesverwaltung Sachsen
managed the studios and developed programming. Such arrangements were to be
constructed in all the locales of Saxony deemed necessary by administrative survey. 35 In
the Dresden Region, this included communities within Bautzen, Dippoldiswalde, Dresden,
Kamenz, Löbau, Meißen , Pirna, as well as several in Niesky and Zittau where existing
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systems had been damaged.36 The “free cities” of Radebeul and Freital had no equipment
of their own.37
In February of 1946, Dresden had seven loudspeakers while Görlitz had five,
Meißen ten, Pirna three, Riesa fourteen, and Zittau seven.38 By the end of the month,
officials claimed in the local newspaper that an additional seventy speakers had been
ordered for Dresden and awaited installation in the city’s busiest traffic points as well as
in peripheral zones. In Dresden, a studio at Stadthaus Karl-Marx-Platz had been prepared
and would soon be in operation. Programming was to serve the public by not only
broadcasting official proclamations, but also news relating to traffic conditions and other
things of “general interest,” along with of course, political reports, signifying that party
leaders viewed the Stadtfunk system as an instrument of didactic capabilities.39
By 1949, the Stadtfunk system in Dresden had started to take shape, though the
earlier public estimates of its expansion cited above proved a bit overzealous. Through
the first of January that year, six new substations for the Stadtfunk were created around
the city, including units at Neustädter Markt and Grunaer Straße—points of heavy public
traffic. Each substation consisted of a twenty-watt amplifier, a loudspeaker (either
directed or omni-directional) and for 1949, two omni-directional speakers per every
fifteen watts. In Görlitz, too, efforts to improve the Stadtfunk meant a technical
modernization of the broadcasting capabilities, with new facilities and microphones. Just
as importantly, engineers worked at that time to connect the Stadtfunk system to the
36
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Betriebsfunk (more on this shortly) at VEB LOWA (Vereinigung Volkseigener Betriebe
Lokomotiv- und Waggonbau—state-owned factory that produced train locomotives and
cars), the largest workplace in the city and later the focal point the June 17
demonstrations in Görlitz.40
By the beginning of 1952, the SED had installed twenty-two loudspeaker units in
Dresden with plans for twenty-two more for the year, though it remains difficult to know
the final number as broadcasting responsibilities shifted quite a bit after the Second Party
Congress of 1952 and the reorganization and centralization of the GDR’s radio
activities.41 Important public spaces in the city, including the Postplatz mentioned earlier,
and Platz der Einheit ( today, Albertplatz), now broadcasted national and local
programming through twenty-five watt loudspeakers directly at passersby and crowds
waiting for streetcars.42 By the spring of 1952 Görlitz had 18 functioning public
loudspeakers.43 Among smaller locales, Bautzen had 26, Löbau 12.44 The SED continued
to amplify its transmitting power in Dresden and smaller towns in its region thus
establishing an essential component of the official public sphere.45
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Betriebsfunk: Representing in the Workplace
Another method by which the state audibly represented its authority in public
space included the Betriebsfunk system, or workplace radio systems that broadcasted
directly to workers within the confines of the workplace. As with the traditional systems
developed in the GDR, intentions here were also largely political: to influence the labor
force and the conversations held in the workplace. The erection of the Betriebsfunk
system under SED guidance dates to 1948, though a detailed overview is largely absent
from the record as the origins of this endeavor were rather sporadic and the formation of
the system lacked centralized direction. The impetus behind the scheme likely stemmed
from the earlier use of factory loudspeaker systems and their employment in certain
situations to provide what SED termed “supplemental agitation in certain political
situations” or the transmission of “educational lectures” to prod recalcitrant party
members. This task at first fell largely to the SED’s Betriebsgruppen and the growth of
the system could be traced to the labors of the same authorities behind the regional
broadcasting institutions. The radio authorities thus became the first to impose
organization along political lines with regard to the Betriebsfunk.46
The SED received reports out of the most important workplaces in the Zone that
the programs aired sparked lively conversation among workforces and by the fall of 1948,
the General Directorship for Radio Stations in the Soviet Occupied Zone (General
Intendanz der Rundfunksender der sowjetisch-besetzten Zone), perhaps sensing the
power of this tool, ordered the strengthening of Betriebsfunk systems’ technical and
political capabilities. The Riesa Steelworks in the Dresden Region [the future Dresden
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Region, that is] served as the pilot plant, working with Landessender Dresden, the
region’s main station. At the urging of the directorship, the RFT (Rundfunk und
Fernmeldetechnik – Radio and Telecommunications) standardized the equipment.
Regional radio stations took charge of programming and trained broadcasters. 47
By April, 1950, a number of important work places in and around Dresden,
including Stahl und Walzwerk Riesa, Einsen und Stahlwerk Gröditz, TU Hochshule
Dresden, LOWA Waggonbau Görlitz, and the massive Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz had
functioning Betriebsfunk systems that continued to expand. These in particular could
transmit broadcasts from Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk through a studio receiver (usually by
radio, rather than wire, with the exception of Riesa Gröditz).48 By 1951, a number of
workplaces also had the ability to record the conversations that took place, a tool that the
party recognized as one that could offer insights into workers’ daily lives.49 But the
Betriebsfunk worked best as a propagandizing method with which to establish Soviet
strength, for example with the themes such as “Soviet Work Methods” that told the story
of three Stakhanovites.50 Betriebsfunk also functioned as a means to shoot down rumors
or what the party perceived as misinformation. One example from 1951 dealt with the
alleged rumor spread by “enemies of humanity…against progressive humanity” that
youth from the GDR in Berlin for the [international socialist directed] World Festival of
Youth had not eaten for three days.51
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Programming
Programming constituted one method by which the party represented its popular
legitimacy and transmitted a specifically East German internationalism based on
integration into the Eastern Bloc. With such broadcasting, those who drafted the
programming beamed messages into public space and aimed to accomplish several things.
First, programming featured an internationalist component that could help re-orient East
Germans eastward through the construction of an imagined community based on
international socialist solidarity with Stalin standing in as the new savior of the German
people. Second, programming placed German unification along socialist lines—even
prior to the establishment of two Germanys—as a priority. Above all, through
broadcasting, the SED aimed to create imagined communities—imagined solidarities or a
represented Verbundenheit—between two primary groups: East Germans and those living
in other socialist states and eventually between West Germans and East Germans.52
Following the Second Party Congress of September, 1947, prior to the founding
of the GDR in October of 1949, the SED used broadcasting to publicize its efforts as the
lead organizational force behind the fulfillment of the Two-Year-Plan.53 The general
programming plan developed by the Radio Department set in motion an eastward
orientation philosophically based on peace. At the head of the new order stood the Soviet
Union above all other progressive (socialist) states in the world. Radio’s task then was to
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popularize and support this arrangement.54 For domestic politics, the SED officially
stated that radio programming would work to support the democratization of government
and economy, while improving industrial production and living standards. The word
“socialist” appeared relatively infrequently before the Second Party Conference in 1952,
though the regime’s political vision and was hardly a secret. To wit, programming
included a campaign celebrating thirty years of the Soviet Union and impressions of its
economy, agriculture, transportations systems, along with first-hand reports.55 By the last
quarter of 1948, GDR radio programming for the Landessender Dresden fell under the
general theme “Implementation of the Economic plans.”56 This generally included antiWestern programming that attacked the Marshall Plan while promoting the “magnet
theory” which held that Soviet Zone economic successes would attract those from the
Western Zones and lead to German unification with a socialist mandate. Other
programming efforts included reports of women’s delegations and their missions to the
Soviet Union and Hungary while negative political attacks highlighted striking workers
in the West.57
Following the establishment of the GDR on October 7, 1949, programming in
Dresden continued this celebration and representation of Soviet strength, achievements
and German-Soviet bonds with, for example, the literary musical production “Day of the
Red Army,” which examined the history of, and paid tribute to, Soviet Military success.
The program “Aktuelle Worte” (“Current Word”) focused on the Soviet Union and its
“Arbeitsbericht des Rundfunksachgebietes nach dem 2 Parteitag,” Abt FUNK, Gez. Schirmer
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role as a friend of Germany and the strongest factor in the establishment of peace.
Broadcasts aimed at youths explained what they could learn from the Young Pioneers in
the Soviet Union.58 A good portion of radio programming produced for the show aimed
to reinforce the concept of a peace front spearheaded by the Soviet Union. The radio
station argued internally that East Germans shared this position based on the growth of
the Society for German-Soviet Friendship (Gesellschaft für Deutsch-Sowjetische
Freundschaft) from October 1949 through the spring of 1950 in Saxony. Commentary
worked to “deepen the friendship of the Soviet Union” and its satellites by promoting and
publicizing the two states’ newfound relations, evidenced by initiatives such as letter
writing exchanges between Soviet and East German (Saxon) youths, invitations to Soviet
workers from local industry, discussions of Soviet film, and various commentaries that
glorified life and work in the Soviet Union.59
By April, 1950, almost all such programming related to the growth of the Society
for German-Soviet Friendship, which publically claimed 75,000 members by the end of
April 1950. Listeners learned how revolutionary theory could be successfully put into
practice using examples from Russia and how the moral righteousness of Soviet foreign
policy would lead to success in Germany in line with the “wishes of the German
people.”60 In October of 1950 GDR radio celebrated almost daily the thirty-third
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anniversary of the October Revolution, with “Youth Radio” (“Jugendfunk”) producing
on-air conversations with young German workers to celebrate the thirty-two years since
the founding of the Komsomol, the Soviet inspiration for East German youth
organizations. This newly fabricated bond between Soviet and German citizens played
out in the program “Our Plan for a Better Life” with continued coverage of the statesponsored letter exchange campaign.61
One theme for 1951 centered on the GDR’s official “Radio Day,” which
celebrated the bond between MDR (this includes Dresden Radio) and its listeners and the
station’s continued efforts to promote peace based on socialist principles. Broadcasts
focused on a “representation of the tremendous economic and cultural development of the
Soviet people on the way to communism” with the intention of transmitting the solutions
to national issues to all strata of the East German population.62 Part of this meant,
naturally, representing the increasingly closer relations between Germans and the Soviet
Union. Programming cast the Soviet Union as the voice of all people, and the greatest
ally of Germans, and as the GDR’s strongest trade partner.63 By the second half of 1951,
programming dedicated to the Soviet Union amounted to about 5.6% of all spoken (nonmusical or Wortsendungen) programming.64 The SED also used radio programming as a
representational institution to publicize the state’s (and thus its citizens’) blossoming
relations with its Eastern Bloc allies as well as its own institutions. Radio detailed the

“Monatsbericht des Landessenders Dresden für den Monat Oktober 1950,” Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk
Landessender Dresden an die Generalintendanz der Rundfunksender in der Deutschen Demokratischen
Republik 8. November 1950 (SächsHStA 11856 Nr. 264 Bl.234).
62
Leipzig, den 23 April 1951 (SächsHStA 11856 Nr. 269 Bl.1;12): “der Darstellung der gewaltigen
wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen Entwicklung der Sowjetvölker auf dem Wege zum Kommunismus”
63
“Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk Leipzig Perspektivplan vom 1 Mai bis 31 Juli 1951” (SächsHStA 11856 Nr.
269 Bl.14).
64
“Analyse über die Arbeit des Landessenders Dresden,” Dresden den 30. Oktober, 1951 (SächsHStA
11376 Nr. 4535 0117).
61

77

socialist development of these states, comparing for example the simultaneous revival of
Poland and the GDR while establishing the friendship between the nations.65
In November of 1951 the propaganda department in Berlin called on radio
stations to improve their work through a number of measures with the intention of further
popularizing the Soviet Union, its development, and the lives of its citizens. Material
from the Soviet press would be distributed to the GDR’s radio stations and the foreign
policy discussion from Radio Moscow would air on Sunday evening. Pertinent to this
chapter’s discussion of an official public sphere constructed to appear democratic and
inclusive is the radio series of “Public Forum” (“Öffentliches Forum”). In this series,
working class, members of the intelligentsia, and radio personalities would hold round
table discussions and discuss the Five-Year-Plan, with planners noting that “progressive
bourgeois people” should be included.66 Of course at the same time, radio programming
that promoted the Soviet Union as the “voice of all peoples” suggests open debate was a
merely a mirage, and all decisions rested, as Ulbricht famously noted, in the hands of the
SED’s central leadership.67
After the Second Party Conference in the summer of 1952, the SED reorganized
the GDR’s administrative bureaucracy to accelerate the construction of socialism. The
Council of Ministers (Ministerrat) announced the creation of the Staatliches Kommittee
für Rundfunk (State Radio Committee) and centralization of the GDR’s radio
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programming in Berlin as Berlin I, II, and III.68 The SED looked to strengthen the power
of radio to contribute to the larger nation-building effort at hand. This meant that
programming aimed at all Germans, but especially those in the West, moved away from
the internationalism so popular in the GDR’s other broadcasts. Indeed, the SED charged
the State Radio Committee with “awakening love of country” and strengthening “national
consciousness.”69 Programming followed the development of national projects (“We’re
Building Germany’s Capital” and “We’re Building the Five-Year-Plan”) and analysis of
American policy and news (“The Truth about America” and “Mass strikes in the
USA”).70

Representing Popular Support in West Germany
One of the self-professed roles of the State Radio Committee as an “organ of state
power” and “collective propagandist, agitator, and organizer” was to help realize “the
bond between the working class and [socialist] farmers…and the union of all German
patriots.”71 It is also important to remember that in the early 1950s Germany’s partition
still felt to most Germans like a temporary arrangement and the SED openly and
regularly discussed reunification hopes and scenarios. With this in mind, it comes as little
surprise that the party used radio to portray protest that occurred in West Germany as
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evidence of anti-FRG sentiment. To accomplish this, the State Radio Committee
expanded its reporting from West Germany to project its bi-German support. Such
reporting fell under the broad umbrella term “West-Arbeit” which, in the case at hand,
entailed placing agents armed with tape recorders at the scene of workers’ protests in
West German cities. The Committee oversaw these operations after the institution’s
formation in September in 1952, though the program encountered technical difficulties at
the outset in the second half of 1952, generously referred to by the commission as a
learning time for operatives. By October, the nine correspondents had become more
proficient with their recording equipment and had begun documenting West German
strikes and demonstrations. The reports focused on social, economic and national issues,
and, of course, questions regarding national disunity. These recordings (Westbänder) then
made their way into various GDR programs such as “We Speak for West Germany,”
“Forum for German Patriots,” and “Behind the Façade,” that the SED broadcasted at
home and in the Federal Republic.72
By the first quarter of 1953, this portion of the GDR’s West-Arbeit had become a
reasonably well functioning operation, and technical problems subsided. Correspondents
had been posted in those areas deemed important by the State Radio Committee—North
Rhine - Westphalia, Hamburg, Bavaria, Baden - Württemberg, Hessen, and RhinelandPfalz—from where they sent the collected materials to a central correspondent. These
reporters conducted and recorded interviews with striking textile workers in cities such as
Mannheim, Hamburg, and Düsseldorf. On February 12, 1953 the State Radio Committee
“Bericht: Über eingegangene Westbänder und deren Auswertung durch die Redaktionen für die Zeit von
Juli bis Dezember 1952 Regierung der DDR,” Staatliches Rundfunkkomitee, Leitung, Gesamtdeutsche
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claimed that the effect of their work on the West German population had become
palpable, notably through the claimed procurement of new West German listeners. The
agency focused on the southwestern region of West Germany, with correspondents
covering strikes and demonstrations in Stuttgart and Lörrach. The State Radio Committee
quoted Volksstimme (The Voice of The People), which wrote on Friday, February 6, 1953,
“It gets around by word of mouth: ‘listen to GDR radio, listen to GDR radio stations,
Berlin, Leipzig, which cover our strike daily.’”73 The paper argued more and more West
Germans tuned into the East German radio and listened with bewilderment as to “how
quickly this radio station react[ed] [to events] and the precision with which it reported
news of the strikes…they are pleased with the calls to solidarity.”74 The efforts here to
foster rebellion and construct a community of dissent and solidarity through the airwaves
and across the East-West border unknowingly foreshadowed the modern transmission of
protest. This was a defining characteristic of the June 17 Demonstrations, with, of course,
the roles reversed here.

Reception
Evidence suggests that the SED was largely unsuccessful in its mission to win
over the population through broadcasting. Beginning with the SED’s goal of creating a
connection between radio and citizen, it is highly likely that survey respondents’
preference of musical programming and general distaste for serious political
programming pleased party bosses. In fact, most of those 9,200 respondents in a 1951
“Die Wirkung der Sendungen des Staatlichen Rundfunkkomitees nach Westdeutschland,” Abschrift/Soe.,
12 Februar 1953, Pe/Pu. (SAPMO-BArch DR 6 Nr. 199): “Es geht von Mund zu Mund: Hört den
Rundfunk der DDR, hört den Deutschlandsender, Berlin, Leipzig, die sich täglich mit unserem Streik
beschäftigen.”
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survey had no opinion on how programming could be improved—which could be
construed as satisfaction but more likely reflected pervasive disinterest. A proportionally
large number of anonymous respondents stated the party broadcasted too much political
programming and they wanted more music while many workers specifically requested
light (conversational) programming in the evening supports the latter conclusion.75 One
VEB Meyer-Optik worker opined that interference from RIAS (and Radio Moscow) was
only part of the problem: he could hardly get through a half-hour music program (he
wanted evening-long shows) when a sudden (and unwanted) political feature interrupted
his program.76 Another respondent to a November 1951 survey, Herr Berdau,
underscored the technical challenges facing GDR radio. Berdau, the Schulleiter der
Betriebsberufschule des VEB Meyer-Optik in Görlitz (and a member of the SED) noted
that he could only receive MDR radio because he had a wired set. Unwired sets had
difficulties picking up the East German stations as RIAS and NWDR operated on the
same wavelengths—a symbolic challenge if there ever was one.
Finally (and this will receive more attention in chapter two), East German radio’s
chief rivals, and especially RIAS, enjoyed a larger and more enthusiastic audience. As
one respondent from Oelsnitz [not in the Dresden Region, but in Saxony and I can
confidently say that his opinion matches conditions in the Dresden Region] noted, about
60% of the population in his region preferred RIAS.77 Statistical evidence from
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HICOG/DIVO78 reveals numbers that suggest East German stations lagged behind their
Western competition in listener interest though Leipzig (MDR) was slightly more popular
than other East German stations in one 1952 survey.79 Furthermore, as the next chapter
will demonstrate, the regional authorities in Dresden found themselves forced to wage an
energetic anti-RIAS campaign. In conclusion, the connection between state and citizen
desired by the SED never materialized, at least to the extent the party might have wanted
and this situation would reach a nadir in June and July of 1953. The party did, however,
have other means with which it would represent its legitimacy and the virtue of its
socialist vision for Germans.

Sichtwerbung: Visual Representations of Power
Walter Ulbricht’s infamous directive, “It must appear democratic, but we must
control everything,” extended to the SED’s representation of power in public space in
several ways.80 As the SED represented power, community, and legitimacy through radio
broadcasts, Ray Rühle argues along with Vaclav Havel that in socialist dictatorships such
as the GDR, no true public sphere existed and ideology formed the basis for maintenance
of political power (leadership). He points to Havel’s contention that this existed as the
“bridge between (the) power and the people” and offers the following example: “the
vegetable merchant places a banner in his shop window between the onions and the
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carrots that reads, ‘Workers of all nations unite!’”81 The key here is not the vegetable
trader’s belief in the socialist system, but the ritual itself: the sign remains hanging only
to ward off bothersome authorities. Taken further, Rühle argues that “The political leader
can also, through the attempt to construct an all-encompassing ‘decoration’ of publicness
which is constructed so that the ‘world of appearances’ is no longer perceived as a sham,
but rather becomes interpreted as a part of reality.”82 Such a system stabilizes as
participants like the shop owner become willing accomplices in the arrangement. In his
analysis of official public spheres in state-socialist societies, Walter Süß argues that a
condition of “societal schizophrenia” develops where the phony public sphere helps
create an amoral and schizophrenic universe wherein participants knowingly lie to each
other in one space and tell the truth in another.”83 Of course, one needs to guard against
presenting the population as a monolithic body that always opposed the SED’s every
move, but RIAS’s popularity, the genuine election returns during early postwar period,
and the June 17 demonstrations provide the empirical data necessary to suggest that the
party did not enjoy popular support and this probably helped prompt the construction of
an official public sphere.
The following section considers how the official public sphere of the early GDR
used visual representation in the public sphere to promote power, legitimacy, German
unity and a new eastward-looking internationalism.84 Visual enlightenment, according to
the party, could not be separated from other forms of party communication, an arena in
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which the National Front and its Aufklärungsgruppen (enlightenment/clarification task
forces) worked to create the illusion of a public sphere (Scheinöffentlichkeit) that
supported and legitimized the socialist regime by attempting to win over the population.
Ultimately, such efforts functioned as propaganda that represented the authority of the
regime and its popular support—whether real or not.
The SED intended to leave no public space without its presence. In addition to
outdoor locations, the party naturally observed that thousands of residents regularly
visited movie theaters, hospitals, stores, restaurants, train stations, post offices and
doctors’ offices, and the party viewed these as opportunities to make the public aware of
its efforts to create a unified Germany and a peaceful political situation.85 One way the
party did this was through what it termed “individual visual propaganda” (individuelle
Sichtwerbung). The intention here was to demonstrate the extent to which the population
recognized the seriousness of the political situation (war brought on by the West) while
confirming the establishment of a “democratic national consciousness.”86 More
specifically, Aufklärungsgruppen attempted to convince Dresdeners to demonstrate their
opinions and commitments in a public manner. Sometimes this just meant homemade
placards with one’s political orientation (obviously favoring the SED) scribbled out, for
example, “no blood for capitalism” or “I fight for peace.”87 Other times, a simple,
handwritten poster pleased the party, for instance, that of the mother who proclaimed her
desire to use her entire strength toward the establishment of peace.88 The party also asked
“Anleitung für die Verbesserung der Sichtwerbung in Stadt und Land,” Nationale Front des
Demokratischen Deutschland; Landesausschuß Sachsen, o.D. (SächsHStA 11376 Nr. 4502/0015;0024). An
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individuals to express themselves in concrete ways rather than with abstract or general
beliefs, for example, with written calls for inter-German negotiations (Deutsche an einen
Tisch!) or promises to remember February 13, 1945 (the night of the bombing) and
campaign against the development of atomic weaponry.89 Other posters expressed
commitments to community service as a result of that \ night, for example one housing
community that promised to clear the local playground of rubble.90
Among public authorities and institutions, those working to establish the visual
cues of the official public sphere worked closely with transportation authorities at the
Deutsche Reichsbahn,91 Straßenbahn, and VVB Kraftverkehr and the majority of these
erected forms of Sichtwerbung. Inside public spaces such as train stations, the SED
publicized the party’s slogans with banners that tied Germans to the Soviet Union or
nationalistic slogans calling on “patriots” to defend the peace. In the National Front’s
Aufklärungslokalen, or “enlightenment centers,” visitors could read slogans from the
party’s literature, commitments from staff members, and view portraits of local and
national leaders. In these spaces visitors also found “friendship corners”
(Freundschaftsecken) designed to create the impression that the Soviet Union was the
GDR’s best friend and that Stalin represented the greatest leader of socialist states.”92
The SED employed communal housing units as a cheap and easy way to create
the large, easy-to-read banners announced the collective opinions of the building, for
instance: “Don’t forget February 13, 1945—fight for peace”; “Our Commitment: every
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three percent of our gross earnings go to the peaceful rebuilding of Berlin.”93 Bulletin
boards and display cases functioned as so-called “enlightenment” vessels that considered
the important political questions of the day, and, not surprisingly, held their answers.
Some posters, for example, made the choice a seemingly obvious one, such as between
imperialist (Western) destruction and peaceful socialist re-construction.94 Finally,
returning to the example given at the beginning of the section, the SED and its education
task forces expected storeowners to use their storefronts as spaces for the visible
representation of workers’ accomplishments and improving living standards. Authorities
would persuade shopkeepers that such window decorations, whether handwritten
opinions, or portraits of socialist statesmen—always arranged with care and with relevant
text—represented their readiness to take an active role in the SED’s goals.95 The sum of
these words, displays, portraits, and personal declarations showcased one facet of the
SED’s official public sphere—a world of appearances.

Theatrical Representations of Party Support
“Solidarity knows no borders” claimed one headline in the Sächsische Zeitung
that promoted East German workers’ declarations of support for West German workers’
strike movements.96 Such occurrences became increasingly regular in the GDR’s early
period as the SED aimed to confirm imagined communities, bound in solidarity and
public protest that would help legitimize its rule and undermine the leadership of the
Federal Republic and its supporters.
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The party’s representation appeared in the form of choreographed public
demonstrations of support for the party—events that participants in, and historians of, the
June 17 uprising might use as a point of contrast when discussing the authenticity of that
demonstration. For instance, to celebrate the SED’s fifth year in existence and protest the
remilitarization of the FRG, the party published detailed plans in the newspaper for the
day’s event that included the streets along which workers from each city district would
march before reaching Pirnaischer Platz, a significant public square in Dresden.97 Five
days later, headlines claimed that more than 200,000 workers demonstrated, representing,
according to the Sächsische Zeitung, a manifestation of their “faith in their party, the
party of the working class.”98 The workers approached the square carrying images of
party leaders and banners with slogans that “made it clear that the will of the people
fought for peace at the Soviet Union’s side.”99 Such official public demonstrations
functioned as a political ritual that represented national and international solidarity and
political strength between not only the citizenry and its regime, but between the GDR and
other socialist nations. Stalin’s death on March 5, 1953 provided an opportunity to
practice the theatrics of this type of representation on an especially grand scale.
As Stalin’s health failed in the spring of 1953, questions surrounding his
inevitable demise shifted to the forefront of political debate but remained behind closed
doors.100 Of course, policy shifts as they related to the GDR would not be made available
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for public consumption for some time, and for several days, Stalin’s status as savior and
leader of the German people took center stage in the official public sphere. His death
afforded the SED and its regional leadership in Dresden an occasion to represent its
political mission in the ritual and pageantry that accompanied the leader’s burial in
Moscow. Press and radio transmissions provided the means by which to involve the
regime’s citizens and publicize popular emotion. Of course at the same, Stalin’s death
offered RIAS and other critics an opportunity to produce and transmit critical
programming into the GDR that undermined the SED’s attempts to project political
power and international solidarity (more on this in chapter two).
Official news of Stalin’s deteriorating condition appeared in regional media via
ADN Moscow (Allgemeine Deutscher Nachrichtendienst- General East German News
Service) on March 5 and East German readers would have learned precise details of his
circulatory problems and blood pressure and thirty-six breaths per minute and 38.2 (grad)
temperature.101 On March 6, the 16:00 hours update informed East Germans that his
situation had become even more serious. While the news seemed grave, the SED used the
opportunity to remind East Germans that they were part of a larger, international,
socialist community. Neues Deutschland informed readers that Pravda, the official organ
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), reminded its readers that the power
of the party rested on the communion between party and masses: “The great strength of
the party of Lenin and Stalin lies in its close bond between the millions of workers; in its

“Bulletin über den Gesundheitszustand J.W. Stalins vom 5. März 1953, 2.00 Uhr,” Neues Deutschland,
6 März, 1953.
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unbreakable unity with the people.”102 This publicized closeness and community would
become a recurring theme throughout the mourning period.
ADN distributed to the newspapers the telegrams of the Central Committee of the
SED sent to the Soviet Central Committee regarding Stalin’s health. Such telegrams
functioned as a reminder that East Germans’ imagined community of “peace-loving
humanity” had also received and been moved by the news. “The Soviet people,”
according to the version published in the Sächsische Zeitung, “and the working people of
the entire world have been affected by the news of Stalin’s condition….These telegrams
from the communist and workers’ parties speak to the resolve…to come together in these
difficult times.”103 The message from the SED to the CPSU noted that the Soviet leader
had delivered the German nation from fascist enslavement and its citizenry now “felt
bound” with the Central Committee of the Soviet Union and with the “great Soviet
people” with whom Germans would continue to strengthen their bond.104 In a similar
telegram, the council of ministers communicated with the Soviet government to
communicate that the entire East German people would fight to strengthen the friendship
between the Soviet and German peoples and continue the struggle to generate a socialist
society.105
The East German media began transmitting expressions of solidarity through a
transnational public sphere, extending to the other Soviet Socialist Republics and western

“Die grosse Einheit von Partei und Volk,” Neues Deutschland, 6 March, 1953: “Die große Stärke der
Partei Lenins und Stalins liegt in ihrer engen Verbundenheit mit den Millionen Massen der Werktätigen; in
ihrer unlöslichen Einheit mit dem Volke. ”
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Telegrammen der Kommunistischen und Arbeiterparteien spricht die Entschlossenheit, sich in diesem
schweren Tagen noch fester…zu scharen.”
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states. ADN published the telegrams of the Polish Unified Workers’ Party which spoke in
the name of the Polish nation and its expressed empathy regarding the news of Stalin’s
condition.106 The official telegram from the Czech government communicated that its
people would, in these difficult times, “work to build socialism alongside the Soviet
people in still greater unity and brotherly love.”107 The SED also publicized Western
telegrams of support from France, which claimed that the entire nation had been
“grievously affected” and affirmed the brotherly bond of the French Communist Party
and the Soviet people.108 The SED also published similar telegrams from the communist
parties in Great Britain, Belgium, and Italy, all of which represented the extensive
imagined community grieving together.
On March 6, GDR radio broadcasted: “The heart of a comrade and general carrier
of Lenin’s idea, the wise leader and teacher of the Communist Party of the Soviet People,
Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, has ceased to beat.”109 Word of Stalin’s passing also
reached Germans in the Dresden region via 6,000 special editions of the Sächsische
Zeitung that arrived via courier at one o’clock in the afternoon on March 6.110 Local
authorities in Dresden received orders to distribute some to political operatives (agitators
and Aufklärer) and others publically. Dresdeners reportedly ripped newspapers from the
hands of distributors at the Postplatz.111 Flags outside of workplaces and factories now

“Telegramm der Polnischen Vereinigten Arbeiterpartei und der Polnischen Regierung,” Neues
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flew at half-mast and comrades had begun preparations for public displays of grief.
Makeshift Trauerkundgebungen, had already begun before lunch on March 6 after the
special edition of the newspaper publicized Stalin’s passing. His life works were honored
and some even featured music.112
ADN represented the communal grieving spreading over the Eastern Bloc: “All of
Poland…is in deep mourning,” wrote ADN.113 The message of the official telegram from
the Polish government, reprinted in the local paper, noted the Poles’ call for unity with
the Soviet people.114 In Romania, the news reports, apparently, or at least according to the
ADN report in Neues Deutschland, prompted workforces in the factories, in the city and
in the countryside, to gather and give thanks to Stalin while pledging their close solidarity
with the Soviet Union.115 The Romanian newspapers, adorned with a black border to
signify the nation’s mourning, allegedly, according to the SED, spoke for the entire
Romanian people whose sorrow at this time cut around across societal lines.116 The SED
published similar reports from other Eastern Bloc nations. Such communications form
instructive examples of socialist governments’ representations of a unified and supportive
imagined community that constituted the most important basis for their claims to
legitimacy. Stalin’s funeral would offer optimal conditions to create and publicize scenes
full of imaginings that represented the authority of communist regimes.
The planning for the scenes that would unfold in Dresden the following Tuesday,
March 10, began on March 6. Leadership in Dresden held a quick meeting with all the
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mass organizations in the region immediately after getting official news of Stalin’s death
from Moscow. 117 The Central Committee sent out the guidelines for the demonstration in
Berlin and operational instructions for regional party leaders laid out their immediate
tasks. Agitators found themselves charged with stirring up materials that could provide
representational material for the GDR’s media outlets: mobilizing workforces and
procuring “commitments” concerning production targets, heightened awareness of
provocateurs and saboteurs, and aid for security apparatuses and the police, along with
declarations from the politically unaffiliated who planned to join the party.118
The Monday (March 9) edition of the Sächsische Zeitung revealed the schedule
for the Trauerkundgebung in Dresden and spoke for the “entire working class of the
Dresden region” which expressed their sympathies and veneration to Stalin.”119 Stalin’s
entombment was scheduled for noon that day (Moscow time) and the SED would stage
parallel ceremonies throughout the GDR (two hours earlier).120 At 9:00 A.M. in Dresden,
the state was to broadcast grieving music over the airwaves for one hour and everyone
was to be in place at 9:55 A.M.121 At precisely 10:00 A.M. the GDR’s airwaves were to
go silent for five minutes. Sirens in the factories in Dresden (district) were scheduled to
sound at 10:00 A.M. and five minutes after to signal to the workers the beginning and
conclusion of five minutes of silence. Traffic through the city was to come to a standstill.
Throughout the region’s places of administration, schools, and other institutions
concurrent events were to take place. The leader in each space was to deliver a message
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sent by the Soviet regime. The secretary of the Party Organization of the SED was to read
a telegram from the Central Committee of the SED. Shortly after ten, GDR radio would
broadcast the funeral procession (Trauermarsch) live from Moscow.122 At noon in Berlin,
residents would take part in a mourning march to Stalin Avenue, the monumental street
in Berlin under construction as a tribute to the late soviet leader.123 Throughout the day,
the smaller towns and cities through the GDR were to stage simultaneous demonstrations
to honor Stalin. Those who marched would present the flags of the GDR along with
images of Stalin along with Marx and Engels. Such events were to be “scrupulously
organized.”124
At 12:00 P.M., GDR radio transmitted the funeral procession live from Moscow:
“The thoughts of millions convene here at Red Square, at the Kremlin Wall in front of
Lenin’s mausoleum that will also serve as Stalin’s last resting site.”125 The broadcast
detailed the funeral procession and the placement of Stalin’s remains as Chopin’s famous
“Funeral March” (Piano Sonata No. 2) played. In the early afternoon of that cold and
windy Monday, the residents who had formed Kranzdelegationen (wreath carrying/laying
delegations) throughout Dresden streamed out of factories and places of work, the
administrative, and organizational houses toward the Unity Square. The wind billowed
the banners which had written in gold, black and red the “eternal gratefulness” of the
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German people to “their greatest friend, their savior from the yoke of fascism and teacher
who would give them a happy future.”126
At three o’clock that afternoon Dresdeners packed the square to offer Stalin his
last honors. The image of Stalin loomed over Dresdeners and the red, black and gold
banners bowed before his likeness. The eyes of all those in attendance reportedly were
drawn to the towering image of the “Führer…who was a father to us.”127 The regional
SED leadership filed through and met with the friends of the Soviet Control Commission.
All lingered at the Soviet Cenotaph before leaving a wreath at the image of the Soviet
soldiers. Alongside Stalin’s image, guards, including a Soviet soldier, an officer from the
East German barracked police force and a comrade from the Society for Sport and
Technik, stood like statues. Together they formed an “uplifting symbol of the
determination to defend peace, if necessary with arms, in memory of the great one who
has passed.”128 The Sächsische Zeitung reported: Greek Pioneers, boys and girls, “who
had seen the face of battle…move past the blazing flames of the offering cups.
Awestruck, they lay their flowers down and raised their hands in a pioneer style
greeting…”129 The streamers attached to the wreaths offered Dresden’s tributes to Stalin:
“To the leader of the free people of the world,” and “To the best friend of the German
people.”130 The various mass organizations constructed by the SED streamed by the
memorial and an elderly woman slowly laid a bouquet of lilacs and paused for a moment
of silence. As the wreaths piled up in the area of the monument, the workers began to
“Unsterblich schlägt sein Herz in unserem Herzen weiter,” Sächsische Zeitung, 9 März, 1953.
Ibid.: “Ja, der uns Vater war”
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stream into the area, carrying images of Stalin. As the sun set, the demonstrators,
reportedly numbering around one hundred thousand, headed home.131
That evening, GDR radio reported the mourning demonstrations from around the
world.132 Telegrams from Dresden’s workplaces to the central authority in Berlin
expressed the gratitude of various workforces for Stalin’s leading role in the German
nation’s liberation from fascism. Reports from the Bezirksleitung in Dresden to Berlin
indicated that local authorities were pleased with the outcome of the events. The FDGB
claimed that the publicization (Popularisierung) of the services of “progressive peoples”
throughout the world and the sympathy telegrams of the different parties and
organizations had increased awareness among the workforces of these were published in
the local press.133 The workers at the Rheostat Factory, according to the Sächsische
Zeitung, for example, held a demonstration and sent their condolences via telegram to the
CPSU and the Komsomol.134
In the wake of Stalin’s death, Georgi Malenkov would appear to take the reins of
a new collective leadership called the CPSU Presidium that included, among others,
Vyacheslav Molotov, Nikita Khrushchev, Nikolai Bulganin, Kliment Voroshilov, Lazar
Kaganovich, Anastas Mikoyan, Maksim Saburov, and Mikhail Pervukhin. 135 Kaganovich,
Bulganin, Beria, and Molotov became deputy chairmen. The move away from Stalinist
policies—accelerated build-ups and an aggressive and paranoid world outlook—came
less than one week after Stalin’s body had been laid to rest, with Malenkov, speaking to
the Supreme Soviet, proclaiming that no situation was beyond peaceful resolution.
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Détente seemed to sprout almost overnight, reflected for instance in the Soviets’ decision
to temper its media campaign against all things American.136 The Stalinist approach to
socialist construction, mirrored in the accelerated program adopted by the GDR in 1952,
ended in early June 1953, though not as quickly as Soviet leadership would have liked.
Ulbricht and the SED leadership appeared either unaware of this seismic shift or
willingly ignored it so as to continue along the Stalinist course until they found
themselves summoned to Moscow in the summer of 1953 and ordered to abandon their
program. By this point, conditions and attitudes had begun to deteriorate in the GDR and
the rival public sphere, most notably foreign broadcasting and rumors, increasingly
chipped away at the SED’s prestige and its claims to legitimacy. The next chapter will
survey these forces.

Conclusions
The representational culture developed and practiced by the SED in these postwar
years constituted a multi-pronged propaganda campaign. Radio broadcasts represented
the vigor and virtue of the Soviet system under Stalin and the international community,
including the GDR, which stood to profit from it. Radio also represented imagined
communities of support in local, national, and transnational spheres, especially through
the publicization of organized protests. As radio listenership remained unreliable due to
technical issues and a programming schedule that failed to resonate with listeners, the
party relied on the construction of public loudspeaker systems and factory radio systems
to transmit their messages to a more-or-less captive audience. Visually, the party
represented its legitimacy in the official public sphere with banners, images, and
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orchestrated expression of public opinion. Carefully choreographed demonstrations
functioned as political ritual and evidence of popular support. The aggregate of these
activities amounted to a representational culture furnished with modern tools and
designed to project the confidence and virtue of the SED while simultaneously disguising
its doubts and lack of genuine support.
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Chapter Two
The Rival Public Sphere in the Dresden Region, 1945-1953

“RIAS will fight for the principles until twenty million Germans in East Germany again
have the opportunity to unite in a political and economic relationship with West
Germany.”
- from W. H. – RIAS Direktor
to A.S., a critic of the station in Dresden, 19491
“On the territory of West Berlin the American station RIAS constitutes a great espionage
and subversive organization. RIAS carried special instruction broadcasts for its agents
on the execution of acts of diversion and sabotage and destructive activities”
- General W.I. Tschuikov
Chairman, Soviet Control Commission for Germany
In a letter to High Commissioner Walter J. Donnelly
October 1, 19522
“There are no refugees fleeing the GDR, land of milk and honey; these rumors, lies out of
the whole cloth, are invented by RIAS, the Northwest German Radio, the Western press
and other capitalist crooks in order to create a psychological atmosphere for war against
[the GDR] and the [Soviet Union].”
-Radio Berlin I, II, III, March 4, 19533
“I can say without intending to flatter you that the entire East Zone population listens to
RIAS.”
-Frau A.A., Eberswalde4

Abschrift - Berlin, am 6 Juli 1949, von W. H. – RIAS Direktor an A.S. (SächsHStA 11856 IV/A Nr.
2008, Bl.99): “RIAS wird für die Prinzipien kämpfen, bis die 20 Millionen Deutschen von Ostdeutschland
wieder in der Lage sein werden, sich in politischer und wirtschaftlicher Beziehung mit Westdeutschland zu
vereinigen.”
2
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Collection, G. C. Marshall Foundation, VMI 1/6).
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This chapter will advance several arguments, chief among them is that a rival
public sphere developed alongside the official public sphere discussed in the previous
chapter. This was the arena where ideas that challenged the SED’s hegemony originated,
circulated and began to adopt a more revolutionary tone after Stalin’s death in March of
1953. The rival public sphere existed in the form of foreign radio broadcasts, rumors, and,
to a lesser degree, leaflets. The ever-popular programming produced by RIAS
represented an especially powerful element in the rival public sphere. Indeed, the
station’s popularity and its relentless criticism of the GDR chipped away at the
legitimacy of the state’s government and eventually helped make revolution thinkable in
the summer of 1953.

RIAS: Radio in the American Sector
One example of such criticism turned up in the mail at the Görlitz SED office on
December 2, 1953:
Dear God, make me deaf,
so I never believe RIAS.
Dear God, make me dumb,
so I never end up in prison.
Dear God make me blind,
so that I accept everything as true.
And since I am deaf, dumb, and blind,
Yep, then I must be Stalin’s favorite child.5
5

Informationsmeldung Nr. 7/53. Dresden, den 20.2.1953 an die ZK für Staatliche Kontrolle Berlin,
Zentrale Kommission für Staatliche Kontrolle, Bezirksinspektion Dresden (SAPMO-BArch DC 1 6212):
Lieber Gott mach mich taub
Dass ich nie dem RIAS glaub.
Lieber Gott mach mich stumm
Dass ich nie ins Zuchthaus komm.
Lieber Gott mach mich blind

100

Indeed GDR Radio labeled RIAS the “Pied Pipers of U.S. occupation” in March of 1953
in reference to RIAS, displaying one side of the Cold War confrontation. 6 The station’s
architects and fans would have suggested that RIAS offered an objective source of
information for East Germans and an alternative to the overtly politicized, state-censored
information from domestic outlets. To a large degree, that was accurate.7 This chapter
conceptualizes RIAS as a powerful institution in the larger rival public sphere that
operated as a quasi-forum for the productions of candid critiques and the anonymous
airing of grievances while providing the framework for an imagined community of
listeners. On this second point, one notes that the similarity between radio broadcasting
(or radio listening) and print media did not escape Benedict Anderson in 1983 when he
wrote that “Radio made it possible to bypass print and summon into being an aural
Dass ich alles für richtig befind.
Denn bin ich erst taub, stumm u. blind
Ja dann bin ich Josef Stalins Lieblingskind
6
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representation of the imagined community where the printed page scarcely penetrated.”8
Others have drawn parallels between the mass simultaneity of newspaper reading and
radio listening, whereby millions of Germans performed this daily ceremony that formed
the basis of Anderson’s model. The division of Germany, which felt so provisional to so
many in the early years of the GDR, meant that the political boundaries of the two states
could easily be penetrated and challenged, if not dismissed, by a station like RIAS.9 This
chapter will show that the imagined community created by RIAS was a protestor nation
that actively campaigned for a unified Germany. The following sections will present this
conceptualization of RIAS with a short history of the station’s origins, followed by a
quantitative and qualitative review of the station’s listenership and its programming,
reception, and effects on the Dresden region.

Founding RIAS
RIAS evolved out of the U.S. Army’s “DIAS,” or “Wired Radio in the American
Sector” and quickly became the dominant force in the rival public sphere.10 Created on
November 21, 1945 at the order of the U.S. Office of Military Government – Berlin
Sector, Communications Branch, the station grew out of the Soviet refusal to place the

8
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Reichsender Berlin under allied control.11 DIAS, under American control, began
broadcasting on February 7, 1945, to provide a “mass medium of expression for the
democratic West in Berlin and the Soviet Zone.”12 Early schedules offered seven hours of
programming and the station changed its name to RIAS (Radio in the American Sector)
following the switch to over-the-air transmission in September of 1946. Compared with
the Soviets’ Berlin transmitter that operated at 10,000 watts, RIAS only utilized a 1000watt transmitter for a short time before its lack of power quickly prompted the installation
of more powerful units. Staff size grew and the need for a larger facility landed the
operation at its headquarters on Kufsteiner Straße in Schoenberg, Berlin, on July 6 1948.
To offset problems related to a loss of nighttime signal while increasing broadcasting
power to Thuringia and Saxony, authorities installed a second transmitter (medium wave)
in Hof, Bavaria. In 1950, the station procured clearer frequencies for the two transmitters
and thus strengthened its range to include portions of West Germany and other areas of
Central Europe. Another, smaller power upgrade of twenty watts helped mitigate
problems related to daytime short-wave transmission in August of 1951 and the power
was again supplemented with a 300-watt transmitter in January of 1953 to counteract
Soviet jamming.13 The early development of RIAS, then, looked quite similar to the GDR
stations as both sought to increase transmitting power as part of an effort to fashion the
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largest listening community possible.14 Of course, the messages produced by RIAS
diametrically opposed those produced by its domestic competition.

RIAS Programming
Like the GDR’s domestic radio stations, RIAS attempted to pull listeners into
aural communion with the fellow listeners and the West by creating instances where the
audience concurrently consumed political, cultural, and intellectual information. RIAS
existed primarily as a political instrument and institution and its programming reflected
this reality. By 1951, the station was on the air around the clock and news and politics
accounted for 29% of its programming.15 The most popular programs among RIAS’s
offerings included news (42%) and musical programs (22%), which demonstrates an
inverse result when compared with listener preferences for the GDR’s programming. 16
The station broadcasted fifteen newscasts daily during the week and one fewer on Sunday,
all of which ranged from three to fifteen minutes. A 1952 study by DIVO revealed that
news and political commentaries constituted the most popular types of programming.17
By 1953, weekly output of program hours included 3.5 hours designed for the GDR, 3.5
hours for all Germans, and 1.5 hours aimed at West Germans, though the station noted
that there was a fair amount of cross-listening.18 When asked what shows they listened to
specifically, “Berlin Speaks to the Zone,” topped the list with 45% of adults (and 34% of
youth) tuning in five-to-six times per week. This particular show had originally formed
14
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the basis of RIAS programming, beginning in the spring of 1949 as the fifteen-minute
program “Broadcast for Central Germany” that aired twice per week.19 “Current News
Show” was the next most popular at 15% for each group followed by “Everyday life in
the Zone.”20 Other popular shows included “It Happened in Berlin,” “About all-German
Problems,” “Hit Parade” and “Coffee Circle.”21 These programs all paid close attention to
the GDR and provided residents with information that was not available from domestic
sources that drove the station’s popularity, with commentators taking care to avoid
legitimizing the state by simply referring to it as “the Zone” or “The East Zone.”
Other efforts to undermine the SED’s endeavors were more overt. “Berlin Speaks
to the Zone,” produced specifically for the GDR and aired daily in ten and fifteen minute
segments, aimed to help those living under the SED and to create and maintain feelings
of hope for “liberation from communist rule.”22 The show had earned its reputation and
listeners by offering information on how to deal with despotic laws while undermining
the SED and warning East Germans of “soviet agents.”23 In the “unmasking segment,”
announcers delivered the information as though “pronouncing a death sentence” for the
exposed agents.24 For example, drawing on information from the East Bureau of the SPD,
RIAS warned residents in the town of Niesky (Dresden Region) that local man Johannes
Brückner, who resided at Zisendorferplatz, worked to set up a State Security Service
Office at the county Economic Enterprise on Königshainer Straße.25 Other programs such
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as “Mirror of the East” surveyed news in the satellite states and the USSR and operated
as part of the “truth campaign.”26
With its programming, RIAS aimed to maintain an intellectual connection
between East Germans and western institutions. To reach all strata of East Germans,
producers crafted shows aimed at white and blue collar workers (early in the morning),
farmers, housewives, and a review of the “free” West German and foreign presses.
Similarly, other programming incorporated listeners into West German conversations and
functioned as a public through the airwaves. “Berlin Press Review” offered a comparison
of the presses from East and West Berlin. Literary programs received less airtime than
programs that used fictional characters to create the image of “man in the Western World
and the questionability of everything human under totalitarian regimes.”27 Youth
programs (“Jugendfunk”) similarly contrasted the lives of West German youths with
those in the East and strived to create for the latter, a “sense of community with the
West.”28 The program “European Hour,” which aired on Sundays, was also designed to
create a sense of community for GDR residents, according to the station, by beaming
news and music from London, Paris, Vienna, Zürich, Stockholm, the Benelux countries,
Madrid, and Rome. The station also kept East Germans apprised of political affairs in the
FRG with “Week in Bonn,” which provided a survey of political developments. “Report
from the Berlin House of Representatives” transmitted recorded bits from the Berlin
legislature every couple of weeks. Other programs aimed to combat Soviet indoctrination
of children using fairy tales and stories that encouraged “humanity and tolerance.” Youth
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and young people listened to RIAS productions that criticized the Free German Youth
and recounted youth activities in the West. “Youth in our Times” offered radio plays and
discussions concerning the “human and political problems” that youth faced in the GDR.
Finally, “University of the Air” presented lecture series by Western scientists, scholars,
and other experts in their fields as a response to the “intellectual emergency situation” in
the GDR.29
RIAS combined politics and entertainment to satirize the GDR’s politicians and
political actions. The most frequently listened to of such shows among adults, the
comedy duo of Pinsel & Schnorchel, voiced by Erich Kestin and Friedrich Steig,
ridiculed the SED’s various missteps and the Soviet agenda writ large. The show began
in 1951 and aired on Saturday evenings.30 The eponymous hosts portrayed the roles of
two communist functionaries, one dedicated and the other comically overzealous. They
met at a fictitious tavern called “The Old Red Mill” where they figured out how to avoid
political deviations while reviewing the complexities of the Soviet system.31 The show
also mocked the GDR’s imagined (in both senses of the word here) bonds with the Soviet
Union and China forged by its media apparatuses (see chapter one). The station
sometimes did this with jokes, for example:
An airplane with a policeman, a Czech, a Pole, and a Russian transferring
troops from one military exercise location to another suddenly has engine
troubles. The pilot informs the passengers that three of the four soldiers
have to jump from the plane. None of the four has a parachute. With a
salute to President Bierut, the Pole jumps out first. The Czech shouts
“Background on RIAS,” RIAS Organization & Programming Information (G. Ewing Collection, G. C.
Marshall Foundation, VMI 1/4)
30
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“Long live Gottwald” and takes the plunge. The Russian grabs the German
and tosses him out of the plane, calling out after him, “Long live GermanSoviet Friendship!”32

Programming and Action
RIAS took aim at what it perceived as anti-worker maneuvers in the GDR’s
factories, which in 1951 appeared in the form of labor contracts designed to boost
productivity.33 The station pointed out that workers in the GDR had no organs of their
own as the SED had complete control of the nation’s media outlets. The regime had also
co-opted the associations and clubs that traditionally formed the social basis for workers’
organization. Thus, RIAS would “arm” the workers and assume the role of advisor,
“gathering and disseminating as much news as possible…to break down the isolation of
the many worker groups” while hopefully “supplanting the lack of a free press.”34 The
station aimed to operate as an organizational force for the opposition and provide a means
to “combine the powers of hundreds and thousands of men and women.”35 Finally, the
station functioned as a forum, boasting that it would “work out a single, strong line of
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argument from [workers’ and listeners’] individual arguments” in order to present a
unified front to the regime.36
While the station had knowledge of the contract issue going back to early 1951,
the campaign began, in a way, with a single worker about fifty kilometers outside of
Dresden in mid-March, of that year.37 A man employed at the rolling mills in Riesa,
which served as the pilot plant for the rollout of the new contracts, had received the
collective contract for his plant, taken it home with him, and critiqued its content in the
margins. He then mailed it to “Free Berlin” and it ended up in the hands of RIAS
employees where it became the basis for a broadcast campaign against the contracts. 38
While station bosses had conceded that the contracts would eventually be forced into law
everywhere, it aimed, through programming, to, at the very least, create a more genuine
dialog regarding the contracts through careful evaluation while offering advice to GDR
workers.
RIAS went about this in several ways. Above all, hosts presented analyses of the
factory contracts and pointed out the disadvantages they held for workers while arguing
that the Soviet Union stood as the principal beneficiary. The station also suggested
workers avoid negotiating when fewer than 100 persons were present in order to bargain
from a position enhanced through “safety in numbers.”39 Early morning programs gave
workers “practical, detailed advice on ways to combat the contracts without serious
danger” and then capitalized on instances of resistance by publicizing the occurrences,
36
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creating an imagined community of protestors.40 RIAS reports equipped workers with
arguments received from colleagues around the GDR and encouraged those listening to
confront party functionaries, forcing the FDGB into drawn out discussions and debates.41
Evidence of RIAS’s influence also appeared in SED organs as authors bemoaned workers’
use of “RIAS arguments,” which perhaps inadvertently confirmed listenership.42 This put
the regime on the defensive, forcing it to directly deploy propagandists (“an army of
instructors”) in workplaces. Interestingly, RIAS encouraged workers to avoid these more
skilled debaters and instead offer a cold shoulder and silence.43 The station received
reports from workers that such tactics had shown the efficacy (and this was also
confirmed in GDR press reports) of such methods, though at least one individual
conceded that this approach might merely have been the most obvious one and not truly
the brainchild of RIAS. Still, radio functioned as a surrogate for traditional workers’
publications and organization and made the tactics available to workers throughout the
GDR. By making such information available to an entire nation, workers came to a
“unified course,” they mitigated risk through collective action, and “the workers’
attitudes” according to RIAS’s own assessment, “became a mass-phenomenon against
which the system was temporarily powerless.”44 This represented a powerful and
distinctly modern development.
RIAS appeared quite proud of its work here, further noting that “a major portion
of the population of the Soviet Zone was brought together in opposition to the communist
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regime and was thereby incalculably strengthened in its adherence to the West.”45
Though the SED eventually forced through the contracts some six months later in the
winter of 1951, Gerhard Haas, who led the anti-communist German Trade Union
Federation advisory office in Berlin for Soviet Zone workers, later boasted: “Last year
RIAS almost singlehandedly solidified anti-communist resistance in the Soviet Zone and
turned individual resistance into mass resistance. I think we all ought to recognize this
fact and implore RIAS to maintain this policy.”46 Such an outcome was indeed closely
aligned with the station’s stated goal of creating “a new sense of solidarity against the
rule of the Socialist Unity Party.”47 Later, this statement might seem to corroborate the
SED’s claims that RIAS orchestrated the June 17 mass demonstrations. But perhaps the
most striking achievement here was less obvious: by fostering resistance, RIAS
controlled the optics of the situation and forced the SED to publicly impose the contracts
against the will of the workers. The regime could have simply written the contracts into
law overnight and perhaps generated less resistance, but by engaging in a prolonged,
public—and highly publicized—debate, no matter how scripted the outcome, it came out
a political loser. Such episodes used up the regime’s political capital—and real capital—
and whittled away its claims of popular support.48
Only occasionally did RIAS find itself forced into a defensive stance. As
discussed in chapter one, the “West-Tactics”49 employed by the East German State Radio
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Committee, which broadcasted worker unrest and strikes in the FRG attempted to achieve
similar results: create an imagined community of dissidents that could challenge the
Adenauer government and the status quo of division.50 In the spring of 1953, RIAS
responded to the reports and headlines that appeared in the SED-controlled press that
claimed every such strike indicated—in the words of RIAS—“another step towards the
collapse of the capitalist system.”51 Station editors took care to note that not only did
these strikes in the FRG aim not to topple the government and that they also
demonstrated what the SED simply refused to admit: that workers in the West were
organized.52
In sum, RIAS programming created an aural and imagined community that
consisted of GDR listeners and representatives in the FRG while at the same time pulling
East German listeners westward. The station achieved this by providing an ersatz forum
for East (and West) Germans and placing East Germans in an everyday aural communion
with West Germans. And like their communist counterparts, RIAS officials felt they were
educating or enlightening an audience, although opponents of the SED would point out
that residents of the GDR did not have access to reliable or non-partisan news. In this
way, to claim that RIAS merely represented another simulated public sphere has some
merit. Certainly, the station’s existence began and ended with an unwavering political
position, but programming claimed it strived for objectivity in its reporting and more
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importantly, its audience agreed.53 In that way, these efforts reflected the powerful and
authentic impulse of a majority of East and West Germans to re-connect with one another
and the SED appeared to stand in the way of this objective. It thus found itself the target
of an unrelenting criticism that whittled away at its prestige and legitimacy.54 While the
partition may not have existed because of the SED, according to at least one historian, the
Americans and British were successful in establishing this narrative.55 And unfortunately
for the SED, the Americans’ radio station in the GDR enjoyed a wide-ranging and
dedicated listenership that appreciated its programs and made it only more difficult for
the regime to communicate its positions and vision to the masses.

Listenership in Dresden
Middle-Germany Radio, a load of shit! RIAS… good!
-written on a bathroom door in Bischofswerda, Dresden Region, 195256

Compared to GDR broadcasting, RIAS programming found a larger and more
enthusiastic audience. This meant that it more completely and effectively realized its
mission in establishing an imagined community of listeners bound together in opposition
to its Cold War adversaries. There are two main ways researchers can quantify and
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qualify RIAS listenership in Dresden and the rest of the GDR: through Western surveys
and functionaries’ observations from the SED record.
In the early 1950s, RIAS was probably the most popular station in the Dresden
region and the rest of the GDR. The surveys on the Western side, conducted by DIVOGesellschaft für Markt- und Meinungsforschung m.b.H., Frankfurt am Main, which had a
contract with the Evaluation Staff at the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for
Germany (HICOG) reveal listener preferences for Saxony in the early 1950s. In June of
1951, in a survey of refugees Berlin found that among radio listeners, 78% of GDR
residents listened mainly to RIAS while only 6% claimed not to listen at all. In the
localized survey conducted by officials in Saxony, Radio Leipzig was the most popular
domestic station among all GDR residents and refugees sampled in the West, attracting
62% (13% frequent listeners and 49% occasional) of a refugee sample.57 These numbers,
as pointed out in chapter one, possibly reflect the listening habits of approximately
seventeen million East Germans with radio ownership in the early 1950s at about one set
per five residents. In general, radio listening in the GDR was quite popular, with radio
serving as the primary means by which East Germans received “reliable information” and
maintained contact with the outside world.58 Among those questioned who came from
Saxony (105 cases), 79% stated that they listened mainly to RIAS, while a mere 17%
listened mainly to GDR stations. Listeners revealed that the most popular times to tune in
were typically after lunch and in the evening hours between 6:00p.m. and 9:00p.m.
Perhaps most tellingly, when asked if RIAS offered too many or too few political
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broadcasts, only 7% of respondents felt the number should be lower. While the people
surveyed here are not representative, the results do not contradict other evidence of the
station’s popularity. For example, these numbers are essentially the opposite of the same
findings of the Dresden-based survey in chapter one regarding the local station in
Dresden.59
Between 1951 and September 1953, RIAS listenership plateaued and eventually
waned perhaps 20% or so due to Soviet jamming operations (it also did not help that most
of the radio sets in the GDR were at least ten years old) and the threat of reprisal.60 It is
difficult to track the decline with much precision though, as authorities in the GDR along
with the Soviets began jamming on January 21, 1953, and then re-upped their jamming
efforts following the June 17 Uprising in 1953 (see chapter five).61 There seem to have
been other issues with reception by the fall of 1951, with 37% noting they often
experienced interference, 33% sometimes interference, and 41% recalling [refugees] that
they had clear reception.62 More problems arose in the fall of 1952 when GDR stations
began broadcasting on the same frequencies as RIAS (and the Armed Force Networks)
disturbing the signal.63 But interviews revealed that the majority of listeners experienced
difficulties tuning in and almost all former residents stated that they depended on house
electricity to power their radios. Only 4% could use batteries to power their sets in the
event of power outages which remained a part of daily life in the GDR in the early
1950s.64 The outages remained unpredictable, with 45% noting that they could not
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forecast outages and thus these occurrences sometimes kept potential listeners from
tuning in.65 Finally, the threat of government reprisal loomed, though the situation here
remained somewhat fluid, since, as we will see, the SED chose not to outlaw the station.
Despite such deterrents, RIAS broadcasts constituted a critical component in the
rival public sphere. It offered Dresdeners what they deemed to be reliable news, palatable
opinion, and popular entertainment. By doing so, RIAS became a significant force in
public and private life in Dresden and the rest of the GDR. Group listening to RIAS
appears to have been common, for example, at one banker’s home where up to fifteen
people listened to RIAS and other western stations and a hospital where patients listened
to the Voice of America programs RIAS transmitted.66 Or take the example of Comrade
Otto T., a farmer in the Volksgut Kunnerwitz, who stayed at a spa where he reported
hearing nothing but RIAS and other western news sources played over the speaker
system during his five month stay.67 When asked why they listened to RIAS,
interviewees most often mentioned that they sought alternative news sources that could
provide “factual” news about political changes in the East and West and secondly, to
“maintain contact with the free world and to obtain psychological reinforcement of their
anti-communist attitude and opinions.”68 Interviews with East German refugees in MayJune 1951 showed that 55% of those questioned about word-of-mouth transmission of
RIAS information stated this happened “very often” with another 25% stating “often.”
The poll was detailed enough to also show that this communication process happened
most often at the “opinion-leading level,” meaning “better-educated, professionals, and
65
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higher income groups.”69 In some cases, leadership within the mass organizations
complained that RIAS held an influence over entire units, for example within the
Democratic Sport Movement in Dresden which prompted leadership to call for members
to publically declare their intention to refrain from tuning in to RIAS.70
One can also confirm RIAS listenership at the local level through regional SED
reports, which reveal officials’ frustration and listeners’ enthusiasm and thus seem to
corroborate the popularity suggested by the formal surveys. Since the late 1940s, local
authorities frequently noted the presence of RIAS listening and what they perceived as
RIAS-stimulated discussions.71 Authorities in Oelsnitz (later absorbed into the Karl
Marx-Stadt Region that neighbored the Dresden Region), which lay in between the RIAS
transmitter in Hof and Saxony, reported to leadership in Dresden that the stronger signal
meant more RIAS “rabble rousing” in the region.72 Other reports from locales in the
southern portion of what was still Saxony complained that a cross up on the wavelengths
meant that RIAS had become so powerful that a large portion of the workers were forced
to listen to the station.73 One comrade tuned into what had been Radio Leipzig and heard
“Berlin speaks to the Zone” from RIAS—and that was not the only problem. He was
shocked to learn that the broadcast reflected “exact knowledge of what a Comrade
Glasser had said in a district committee meeting the previous day.”74 The comrade
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broached the possibility of sabotage and called for colleagues to explore how RIAS could
have known about a meeting that had taken place the same day.75
RIAS’s popularity manifested its reach in less obvious ways, too. Functionaries
tuning into the station also presented a problem within the party and substantiated the
station’s popularity and ability to find secondary transmission. Consider the following
case that illustrates the source of information and opinion production RIAS had become
in the small town of Zittau: Comrade L. walks into the room of Comrade M. and hears
RIAS broadcasts playing in the open. Comrade L. looks into the situation and finds out
that the Party reportedly instructed Comrade M. to regularly listen to RIAS broadcasts so
as to better familiarize himself with the arguments of the regime’s opponents and more
ably defend the SED’s positions.76
It is difficult to say if the numbers of reports stating that RIAS broadcasts stirred
up trouble through communities in the Dresden region increased following the
accelerated construction of socialism in 1952, but such an assertion would hardly be a
bold one—and this despite the station’s slightly lowered listenership due to political
threats and jamming. The party quite often viewed rabble-rousing and resistance as the
obvious byproduct of its accelerated planning packages and by December of 1952,
individual reports from the counties in the Dresden region confirmed an “intensified class
struggle.”77 For instance, officials noted that RIAS-rabble rousing had become noticeable
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to the point that some large-scale farmers now shirked their communal obligations in the
belief that “the Amis were coming anyways and they would get their estates back
again.”78
The extensive influence of RIAS in the GDR suggested by surveys of listeners
and the SED grumbling about the station’s pervasiveness in the east is further
substantiated by the sheer volume of letters the station received. From 1948 through May
of 1953, RIAS received 794,550 mail receipts and monthly listener mail averaged almost
2,000 pieces from the GDR and West Berlin—which represented a mere 10-15% of the
total volume received. Prior to March of 1952, one-third of the mail received came from
the GDR before increased border controls stemmed the flow of letters. The Dresden
region represented about 10% of the GDR’s population which, based on the average
listenership levels in the area, suggests that residents there probably composed and
mailed approximately 200 letters per month.79 RIAS found in these letters considerable
reinforcement that its programming resonated with listeners in the GDR. “Your station is
the only thing that gives us hope and confidence – hope that one day things will be
different for us,” wrote one anonymous resident from Saxony.80 A housewife in Görlitz
wrote to the station noting that “For a long time it’s been on my mind to thank you for the
courage and inspiration you give us with your broadcasts….keep on as you are so that we
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here may someday experience liberation.”81 RIAS’s role as a buffer to the SED was
apparent to a seventy-year-old woman (name and origin unknown) who thanked the
station for its service combating its enemies on the air and asked that the station continue
its work to “keep contact with us as the ‘big friend,’ I mean the real one (not that of
‘Eastern’ origin), for those of us barred from the West. You are the only one informing us
of the truth and the world’s events!”82 As administrators hand-picked these quotations
from the thousands of letters—which does not mean they are not representative of
audience opinion—they also reinforce our understanding of RIAS’s intention to represent
a unified German nation.

Dear RIAS,
Such letters signified points of contact between East Germans and RIAS and thus
an association in the rival public sphere that the SED worked to sever. Although the
station received thousands of letters from East Germany every month, some letters never
made it to West Berlin. In the case of an interception, the sender could expect a visit from
the police or state security. Such offenses represented a violation of Article Six of the
GDR’s constitution, which included the penal concept of boycott-instigation
(Boykotthetze)—utilized by authorities to prosecute those who engaged in discriminatory
acts, the boycott of democratic institutions and organizations, and war-mongering.
Together, these categories of offense gave officials significant latitude in their
accusations.83 The content of intercepted letters leaves little wonder why officials looked
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to break the connection between Dresdeners and RIAS. Wrote one Dresdener “Today the
so-called East Regime does not enjoy the trust of the population; it has no right to speak
in the name of the eastern population,” whose letter ended up in the hands of the Stasi in
1950.84 Such a proclamation, conceived and drafted in private would seem to confirm to
party officials that residents maintained a cloistered dialogue with RIAS that could (and
would, eventually) allow the SED to become challengeable. Instances of authorities
intercepting letters intended for RIAS reveal that the party took such correspondence
quite seriously. A single letter addressed to RIAS could land one in serious trouble with
the authorities and the interception of such letters and the subsequent statements given by
the suspects also offer insights into the connections between the station and its listeners—
and how those forced to account for their letters might defend themselves.
In 1950, a police operation in a small town (thirty kilometers from Dresden)
turned up a letter addressed to RIAS, setting off an investigation as the communication
constituted a crime under Article Six.85 Authorities at a checkpoint discovered the letter
in the pocketbook of a man, N., from Dresden, riding his bicycle home. He (N.) admitted
that the letter belonged to him and that he had dictated it to a friend (whom he declined to
name at the time) who composed it on a typewriter. He protested that he had not sent the
letter to RIAS because the station had morphed into an outlet no different from the Naziera newspaper, Der Stürmer, and that he merely wanted to express his mindset. He stated
and racial hatred and of hatred against other peoples, militaristic propaganda and warmongering as well as
any other discriminatory acts are felonious crimes within the meaning of the Penal Code. The exercise of
democratic rights within the meaning of the Constitution is not an incitement to boycott. Those persons
convicted of such a crime are disqualified from holding public office or a leading position in economic or
cultural life. They also lose the right to vote and to stand for election.”
84
“Abschrift – an Rias Berlin.” Neustadt/Sa.den,25.10.50 (BStU Archiv der Außenstelle Dresden MfS BV
Dresden, KD Sebnitz 3922): “Die heutige sogenannte Ostregierung besitzt nicht das Vertrauen des Volkes,
sie hat kein Recht in der Namen der Ostbevölkerung zu sprechen”
85
“Aktennotiz,” Harnisch. Untersuchungsorgan Pirna. Pirna, 15.11.50. Tgb.Nr. E/1608/50 (BStU Archiv
der Außenstelle Dresden MfS BV Dresden, KD Sebnitz 3922).

121

that he had neither given the letter to anyone nor spoken about it to anyone. He further
pleaded that he often composed articles concerning how democracy and socialism ought
to be, but never shared them. In fact, he pointed out that his wife often complained that
such writings would be his downfall and that she had already thrown a number of these
letters into the oven. “When I wrote such things, I wanted to vent to my feelings because
one cannot speak [openly] of such acts,” he concluded.86
Z., who also ended up in custody, admitted that N., who was the party chairman
of the local NDPD where they both worked, often dictated letters to him at the office.87
Typically, he would type materials related to party business, but over time, personal
letters had become part of a side deal involving small payments and on several recent
occasions N. had dictated several letters to RIAS. Z. claimed to have warned him that to
send such a letter meant he was breaking the law and that he knew RIAS as a rabblerousing station. Still, he typed the letter anyways as N. paid him ten DM to do so. He
concluded his statement by admitting guilt as far as typing the letter and not reporting the
contents, and claimed he feared doing so would bring reprisal for his small-scale
profiteering.88
Three days later, on November 23, 1950, N. amended his previous statement,
adding that he had sent a letter to his sister in Berlin. In the letter, he discussed family
affairs but also asked his sister if she had forwarded a previous letter to RIAS.
Furthermore, he admitted that through his sister he had a connection contact with RIAS,
“Vernehmung.” Pirna, den 15.11.1950 (BStU Archiv der Außenstelle Dresden MfS BV Dresden, KD
Sebnitz 3922): “Wenn ich so etwas geschrieben habe, wollte ich meinen Herzen Luft machen, weil man
über derartige Handlungen nicht sprechen kann.”
87
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it offered its members no real political power.
88
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but stressed that it only concerned a “contest” that he knew about because he habitually
listened to the station.89 He had titled the letter, “The Question of Germany’s
Reunification.”90 N. then (again) professed his disdain for RIAS, claiming that he was of
the opinion that those who supported RIAS’s partisan rumors and rabble-rousing news
should be designated as warmongers.91 The investigation moved on, and by late
December, N. revealed the July RIAS contest had been called “The Next Step toward
German Unity” and he had put his entry in an envelope addressed to RIAS inside another
envelope addressed to his sister to avoid the censors. When asked if he knew anyone else
in contact with RIAS, he claimed he did not.92

The Struggle against RIAS in Dresden
While action taken in association with RIAS could result in legal consequences,
dealing with those who simply listened to RIAS prompted a different approach by the
SED. After all, the Party’s anti-fascist biography meant that to criminalize the availability
of foreign broadcasts would constitute a massive act of hypocrisy since such a law would
have been a bit too reminiscent of National Socialist legislation. Consider for instance the
exchange between colleagues discussing RIAS: the first asked why the party simply does
not prohibit listening to RIAS. The second colleague clarified: “That is a fascist method;
our method is to convince.”93 The approach generated by this mentality—which
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publically seemed to make little reference to the legal measures laid out in article six—
constituted an organized campaign of persuasion to deter those who tuned in to RIAS.
The SED hatched a major crusade against RIAS early 1952 that presaged the
party’s plan to accelerate the construction of socialism later that summer. In February of
1952, the Agitation Department resolved to unleash an offensive against enemy
propaganda and, above all, RIAS. Walter Ulbricht recommended that the mass
organizations and organs take leadership of the campaign. Under their direction, pilot
brigades that would serve as exemplary units with efforts focused especially in Görlitz
where “enemy propaganda continuously influenced a portion of the population with
criminal slandering of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Army, and supposed rabble rousing
concerning the Oder-Neisse border as the settled boundary.”94 It is highly unlikely that
RIAS called the border into question, but the regime often tied all types of potentially
devious talk to the work of outside agitators, especially RIAS. In cases where especially
dangerous lies, rumors, and defamations spread, the offensive would be more intense.
Functionaries working on the campaign also vowed to operate in public places such as
restaurants and workspaces where Dresdeners openly listened to enemy stations. Tactics
included confronting listeners on the spot and publicly shaming others through a
coordinated leaflet campaign, by word of mouth, and designating such people as

das Abhören des RIAS verbietet? Die Kollegen Schuler machten ihm klar, dass dies eine faschistische
Methode sei, unsere Methode aber die der Überzeugung ist.”
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warmongers in the local press.95 The second part of the campaign consisted of publicizing
the anti-RIAS efforts of the citizenry though the SED’s media channels.96
These efforts, initiated by seminars and publications, began in the spring of 1952.
The SED identified Görlitz, where “allegedly they only listen to RIAS…and RIAS
arguments circulated powerfully through the population” as one focal point for the
campaign.97 Propagandists led so-called seminars in various public spaces such as stores,
bars, and businesses, with one titled, for example “Who listens to RIAS lends an ear to
the mortal enemies of humanity.”98 In Dresden, propagandists swooped down on
Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz—a focal point of the unrest on June 17, 1953. During the
seventy-minute seminar workers seemed to either have played dumb with officials or
perhaps they truly had little knowledge of the party’s positions regarding RIAS.
Employees stated that only “class conscious” workers could safely listen to RIAS; that
listening was only a problem when one spread the information, and that one must listen to
better recognize one’s enemy.99 Did the seminar convince workers of RIAS’s political
noxiousness? Probably not, though the instructor reported that perhaps it helped and that
in subsequent “lessons,” he took every opportunity to point out the danger involved with
listening to RIAS. As a result, colleagues now discussed the anti-RIAS article hanging on
the factory wall during their breaks.100 This probably referred to an article entitled “Those
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who listen to RIAS help the war mongers!” published by the factory press.101 “Those who
listen to RIAS (and NWDR) and spread these lies help deliver the war mongers’
corrosive poison to our people” claimed the piece.102 This was, essentially—disregarding
the colorful wording and propagandistic adjectives—RIAS’s entire mission. When one
considers the resources used by the SED to counter that effort, one can deduce that the
station experienced considerable success in this regard.
The second part of the anti-RIAS campaign, touched on at the beginning of this
chapter and conceptualized in the previous chapter, involved the SED publicizing the
actions of those groups who volunteered to campaign against the station and other
Western outlets. In Dresden, the SED charged the Agitation Department with developing
two examples to publicize, one of which was the previously mentioned Grunaer Straße
housing community and the other was, not surprisingly in Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz.
The department secured pledges from workers—though not without facing questions and
considerable resistance from various brigades—and popularized the slogan “Don’t Listen
to RIAS - - All Strengths for Peace.”103 The story ended up in Neues Deutschland under
the headline “Mass mobilization smothers the poison of the station of lies.”104 It featured
the Hempel Brigade, which pledged to heighten their productivity—the infamous norms
that would become an issue in early June of 1953. But the article left out the numerous
problems that manifested themselves simply by attempting to convert RIAS listeners,
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notably the “organized enemy activity” in the sprawling factory discovered by the
propagandists and the threatening letters received by comrades.105
In the hotspot of Görlitz, a housing community sent a pledge (after government
prodding) to Radio Leipzig in which the residents of one building promised to refrain
from listening to RIAS and adorn the façade of their building with a banner to promote
the cause. In this case, the announcement came with a request for Radio Leipzig to
develop better programming for the working class and do something about the annoying
interference listeners experienced.106 Factory workers from LOWA Waggonbau
Görlitz—another prime source of unrest the following summer—sent their promise to
cease receiving RIAS broadcasts to Neues Deutschland and GDR radio and called on all
“peace-loving people to follow their example.”107

Other Elements of the Rival Public Sphere
The production and exchange of rumors and anti-party literature further evidences
the existence of a rival public sphere that functioned as a counterweight to state power. It
is noteworthy that in the SED’s record, party officials categorized such activity under the
rubric “enemy activity” which included “open sabotage.”108 Pamphlets and leaflets reveal
that groups and outside influences succeeded to various degrees in reaching Dresdeners
with anti-SED literature, though the penetration could not match that of radio. Rumors
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also represented an alternative form of political participation and an outlet for the
expression of hopes, fears, and desires. In this way, they offer us insights into the
political goals and doubts of East Germans as well as the reservations and critical
positions citizens often adopted concerning the ruling regime. The manner in which the
SED recorded these exchanges, overheard by functionaries or police, also reveals the
ways in which residents unofficially participated in government despite lacking
structured, democratic outlets.
The record detailing rumors and written dissent also presents a problem because it
is weighted toward the period following the Second Party Conference of July 1952. This
could mean that rumors and other dissident activity posed a greater threat to the regime in
this period, and this is quite plausible considering the economic suffering and political
pressure exerted by the SED, or it could simply mean that the party began taking rumors
and political attacks more seriously at this point. Possibly, too, it could mean that the
SED decided to begin collecting such data whereas before it dismissed it. Plausible as
well is the anticipation of an increase of activity in the rival public sphere. In other words,
one should consider the record here with some reservations in mind.
Following the Second Party Conference in July of 1952, the SED ordered State
Control to begin reporting immediately rumors, rabble rousing, and provocations.
Functionaries were asked to keep track of rumors, especially as they led to panic
purchasing and the withdrawal of savings.109 In December, some five months following
the initiation of Stalinist planning, the party recognized that dissident activity (the class
struggle, in its terms) had continued to increase), though one might note that leadership in

See the untitled document beginning “Ab sofort ist folgendes zu veranlassen,” [likely July 1952]
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Dresden demonstrated an awareness of known unknowns regarding enemy activity,
suggesting that the existing evidence is perhaps only the tip of the iceberg. By December,
1952, regional reports suggest that illegal pamphleteering had steadily increased in
Dresden as had illegal emigration. Conditions continued to deteriorate in the countryside
where farmers—especially large scale farmers—discriminated against the collective
farms. Rumormongers attempted to incite unrest among the population and class enemies
tried to exploit weaknesses.110

Leaflets
As it did with RIAS, the SED waged an ongoing battle against the distribution of
illegal pamphlets, leaflets, and literature that appeared in the region. Unfortunately, as it
did with rumors, the regime made no effort to systemically catalog these items, so it is
difficult to chart their availability or production, which, given their illicit nature, is not
surprising. Some of this literature arrived in Dresden via balloons, so the wind partially
dictated its destination. The number of balloons discovered by the authorities ranged
from single balloons to as many as 150.111 Occasionally party functionaries just noted an
empty balloon, while other times the leaflet from the balloon ended up in the hands of the
authorities.112 Some of these leaflets came from the Social Democratic Party in West
Germany. For example, a blue balloon that turned up in Kamenz with the address
“Freedom – SPD” accompanied by leaflets in the area that read “Administrative reform?

“Zusammenfassung der eingegangenen Berichte über Feindtätigkeit aus den Kreisen auf Grund einer
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111
“Aufstellung von uns zugegangenen Information über Feindtätigkeit in der Zeit vom 1.7.-19.8.52,” Bl.4.
112
“Aufstellung von uns zugegangenen Information über Feindtätigkeit in der Zeit vom 20.8.-30.8.52,”
Organizationskomittee der SED, Bezirk Dresden, Leitende Organe der Partei u. M., Sektor
Parteiinformation (SächsHStA 11857 IV/2.5. Nr. 107, Bl.10).
110

129

No, Sovietization is the goal. The German people greet Dr. Kurt Schumacher; The SPD
fights for German unity.”113 Another SPD balloon with “Unity and Freedom” written on
it appeared in Freital, with leaflets marking the contents’ origin with the SPD East-office
in West Berlin.114 The only other western group to sign its name to materials it distributed
in East Germany was the Fighting Group against Inhumanity and the Investigative
Committee of Free Jurists.115 In one case, functionaries were able to collect the leaflets of
a fallen balloon before they spread through the population.116
Quite often though, the source of leaflets remained unclear. The authors of these
leaflets attacked the GDR and its program in a number of ways while at the same time
serving as another connection between East and West. Some merely called for a “free
Europe” while others were more specific, for instance, attacking the GDR’s decision to
build up its armed forces: “Today it’s pellet guns, tomorrow real guns, the day after that,
mass graves – not with us.”117 In Zittau at the clothing factory, leaflets appeared asking
colleagues to refuse their work because the factory produced parachutes while another set
of leaflets pleaded with residents to avoid reporting to Service for Germany and the
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People’s Police.118 Other leaflets served as warnings, for instance, by suggesting that
authorities were listening in on conversations—“watch your conversations, the NKVD is
listening in.”119 Some leaflets targeted specific groups. For example, The European
Alliance of Youth (Bund Europäischer Jugend) claimed in their leaflets that Western
institutions like the European Community for Coal and Steel had now brought Europe
one step closer to integration as a “United States of Europe.”120 Another stated: “We
acknowledge all of Europe’s youth in a heartfelt bond – every postcard [leaflet] returned
is evidence of this solidarity.”121 As with RIAS, the goal always remained the same: to
maintain a connection between east and west while undermining the GDR’s legitimacy.

Rumors in the Rival Public Sphere
Rumors constituted a powerful component in the rival public sphere that revealed
authentic public opinion and functioned as an informal type of political participation.
Between the summer of 1952 and Stalin’s death, rumors dogged party officials and
undermined their attempts to build their new society. As was the case with leaflets, the
rumor record requires careful analysis. Whether rumors began as a backlash against the
accelerated buildup of socialism or had always circulated in a similar manner is difficult
to determine, because the record begins taking regular stock of their occurrence in the
summer of 1952. It is probably safe to argue, though, that rumor spreading intensified
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during this period and certainly rose following Stalin’s death, which, as this chapter will
show, engendered political uncertainty.
Rumors pertaining to food and goods were the most common prior to Stalin’s
death and reveal how Dresdeners explained and reacted to shortages and the economic
shortcomings of the newly introduced economic plan. Around Christmas in Meißen, for
instance, rumors circulated that white candles were no longer going to be produced and
that residents should stock up at the same time belief spread around Dresden that bakers
would not offer fruitcakes as that was now the domain of the state-run collective
stores.122 Rumor also explained that the shortage of canned fish could be traced to an East
German trawler that had been impounded by the Swedes.123 In a Görlitz factory, workers
spread the rumor—supposedly based on a RIAS report—that bread cards were to be reintroduced and that Leipzig had run out of eggs.124 These rumors seem innocuous, but in
a nation of true shortages, they could lead to runs on goods. For example, rumors that
butter would not be distributed in Großenhain in December resulted in a number of
women buying an entire month’s supply all at once.125 Similarly, a rumor that the price of
schnapps was to rise led to locals reportedly purchasing the drink by the backpack full.126
Sometimes consumers explained higher prices as a result of greater economic planning
hatched by the SED. In one area, residents attributed high coffee prices to the deficits
now run by the state—a reference to the national economic problems that led to
122
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significant consumer dissatisfaction.127 The real and perceived fragility of the GDR’s
economy would grow into a topic that would invigorate the rumor mill in the period
leading up to June 17. The party took these rumors seriously as the economic plan was so
closely tied to the political plan, and Joseph Stalin’s death in March of 1953stimulated
the production of improvised news as national and international politics assumed an
increasingly greater role in the rival public sphere.
Stalin’s Death
“RIAS hören – Stalin tot – jetzt mehr Brot”
- scribbled on a theater wall in Königsbrück, Dresden Region128
“The dog can go ahead and croak” quipped a young man and “active RIAS
listener.”129 Known by authorities to spread ideas gleaned from western radio stations in
his youth group, his subsequent arrest and the investigation into his comments serves as a
reminder of just how seriously the SED took RIAS’s potential to indirectly undermine its
leadership.130 Now, Stalin’s death on March 5 offered considerable political opportunity
for the station. The previous chapter showed that Stalin’s passing presented the SED with
an opportunity to demonstrate its legitimacy through a distinctly Cold War form of
representative or theatrical publicness. Choreographed demonstrations staffed by
functionaries and coerced workers and publicized messages of solidarity designed to
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create the impression of a community bound in solidarity through Stalin’s leadership
while grieving his death all represented the SED’s attempt to represent the unity of the
greater Soviet Bloc. Against this official public sphere, RIAS broadcasted a disparate
assessment of Stalin’s legacy and raised the possibility of real political change while
authorities fretted over rumors and jokes and unofficial celebrations that mocked the
former Soviet leader’s legacy, damaging the SED’s prestige and authority.
While the SED and other pro-Soviet outlets boasted that Stalin had bequeathed a
blueprint to the socialist lands that could leave them little doubt that prosperity lay in the
near future, RIAS asked more pointed questions and chipped away at the CPSU’s claim
to rule and, by extension, the SED’s claim to the future. What was to come after Stalin’s
passing? The station offered no clear answer, but the commentators largely framed the
situation as one in which a major geo-political shift now appeared possible. Above all,
the power vacuum meant that Soviet authority had waned, with RIAS commentators
arguing that Malenkov or Molotov, either of whom might have the last word, could never
project the authority of their predecessor whose clout simply could not be inherited.
Certainly, Stalin’s legend would inform their decisions, but they would also come to their
own decisions and they would do so without a good number of Stalin’s tactical benefits.
Among these was a widespread forced adoration and the confidence that had permitted
the Soviets to present any arbitrary decision as an unassailable interpretation based on
Lenin’s teachings. The superhuman splendor and image surrounding Stalin, an artificial
creation, and Stalin’s mystique that had formed the basis of a ritualized oath
(Eidesformel) for the Soviet people and the slavish (blindgehende) functionaries on the
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Volga and the Elbe also constituted part of the dictator’s strength.131 Even though all of
this had passed with Stalin, RIAS noted that the party bureaucracy would carry on and
the factories would continue to produce.132
In contrast to the SED’s commemorations and adoring speeches, RIAS offered a
review of the late leader’s crimes against humanity, likening him in one case to
Robespierre and the worst excesses of the French Revolution. The station claimed, for
example, that while Karl Marx had once quipped that violence had become the midwife
of a new society, Stalin “had made violence the mother of his dictatorship.”133
Commentators painted Stalin as a man without feelings or sentimentality, who had
secretly ordered the murder of Leon Trotsky in Mexico and Sergey Kirov in Leningrad,
before “quickening the guillotine’s pace” in 1936.134 The program concluded with eleven
million dead from starvation and political purges before commentators turned to Pravda’s
headlines, mocking the outlet’s claims of a “great unity between party and people.”135
And when the East Berlin press called Stalin “the greatest son in the history of mankind,”
the station reminded listeners just how powerful such adoration and “ritualistic
superlatives” had been.136
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Rabble Rousing and Celebrating
Consider for an instant the phrasing from an April 1953 report produced by
Dresden’s Regional Party Control Commission: “in the past month it was attempted
through rabble-rousing letters and rumors to influence the population.”137 The lack of an
easily identified actor or source here (which, of course, I have collectively categorized as
the rival public sphere) meant that the multitude of outlets from which the population
gathered knowledge presented a serious and somewhat abstract threat to the SED and its
control of information in an unstable political situation. So as RIAS speculated that a
geopolitical change might now be possible and whittled away at the prestige of Stalin and
by extension those who upheld his system in East Germany, the SED had to cope with a
rumor mill and anti-SED propaganda that undercut the Party’s official representations of
national unity following Stalin’s death. Some of this vitriol probably found inspiration in
foreign broadcasts and certainly the SED felt that they did based on numerous incidents
in the record. For example, on March 8, per a functionary based in Görlitz, a bakery
owner and three others gathered at a tavern in the town of Gersdorf. The barkeeper led
the group to a separate room where guests were listening to western radio broadcasts and
one of the listeners proclaimed “[the time has arrived] to string up the entire SED.”138
Authorities in Görlitz encountered more troubling developments when listening in on
conversations in the area. Workers at the Locomotive and Wagon Factory declined to
comment on political developments when prompted by functionaries as someone’s
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brother had reportedly been arrested after thanking God for Stalin’s death.139 An older
Christian told his colleagues that while Stalin had not been judged on earth, he would be
in heaven.140 And the churches became a potential thorn in the regime’s side as pastors
deviated from the SED’s script. For instance, the pastor in Kamenz who (reportedly) read
from his pastoral letter that “A great socialist leader has returned to Christendom. This
leader has also written a book in which he instructs all socialists to do the same.”141
Residents ripped Stalin’s pictures from the wall in Kamenz and other towns.142 Or
consider the anonymous letter received by the local SED office, wherein the author
reported that the residents of Seifenhennersdorf celebrated Stalin’s death as he had driven
them from their native Reichenau, forcing them to give up their houses and farms. “We
wish him good luck on his journey,” the letter stated, “now he can no longer plunder east
Germany.”143

A Wind of Change?
These conversations reveal that the uncertainty articulated by RIAS now
circulated though the population. On Sunday morning in Sebnitz a priest stated to his
congregation that God had willed Stalin’s death and Germany now found itself in a
“profound abyss and deep crisis.”144 This crisis, of course, stemmed from the very real
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question of political leadership in the Soviet Union and Germany, but the answers and
predictions harbored by the population in the Dresden region reveal that popular opinion
was quite often a concoction of reality and wishful (or fearful) thinking. Workers in the
LOWA factory in Görlitz discussed rumors of Malenkov’s resignation (not true yet since
this conversation occurred sometime before 3.22.53) while a worker at the traffic
enterprise joked to a colleague that he could now apply for Stalin’s job. Thus, rumors of
Malenkov’s abdication seems to have gained legs for several weeks in the region. Other
rumors circulated that claimed Malenkov would now do something about releasing
prisoners of war.145 Another theory in Riesa held that Malenkov succeeded Stalin because
he was his son-in-law and a Jew—neither of which was true.146 Workers in Pirna argued
that Stalin’s death and Malenkov’s succession would bring about more aggressive
policies.147 All counties in the region reported that the number of illicit pamphlets in
circulation increased in May.148 Some leaflets of indeterminate origin circulated in one
town (in Russian) that Russian soldiers were now demanding their freedom since Stalin
was dead.149 In the countryside around Dresden, leaflets in Russian were distributed by a
self-proclaimed “Revolutionary Staff” while in Obercunnersdorf, leaflets proclaimed that
“the emancipation from the Bolshevik yoke was getting close.” 150
It appears that during the months following Stalin’s death, the rumor mill became
more serious and increasingly took aim at the SED’s very existence as a state’s governing
145

Ibid., Bl.115-16.
“Gegnerische Tätigkeit: Zentrale Kommission für Staatliche Kontrolle, Bezirksinspektion Dresden,”
Dresden, den 18.3.53.
147
Ibid.
148
“Monatsbericht Mai 1953,” Bezirksparteikontrollkommission, Dresden. Dresden, den 9.6.1953 1953
(SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2.4 025, Bl.149).
149
“Aufstellung der in den Monaten Februar und März eingegangenen Informationen über Feindtätigkeit,”
Bl.118; Bl.120, picture ripped off wall here too.
150
“Monatsbericht für März, 1953,” Bezirksparteikontrollkommission, Dresden. Dresden, den 13.4..1953
(SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2.4 025, Bl.122).
146

138

party. The subject matter turned from the price of goods to the value of money, and for
instance, in Pirna and Heidenau the rumor now spread that money not in a bank would
soon become worthless.151 And more troubling for the SED, political leaders now found
themselves the subject of damaging rumors. The whereabouts, statuses, and health of
East Germany’s leading politicians increasingly drove public conversations in the period
prior to the uprising. For instance, in three counties already in the week after Stalin’s
death, the rumor and unofficial news, respectively, circulated that President Pieck had
moved to the West or had become quite ill.152 When Stalin’s heirs called on East German
leadership to retreat from the accelerated buildup of socialism in early June, RIAS and
the rumor mill would adopt an even more rebellious tone.

Conclusions
RIAS existed at the heart of the rival public sphere in Dresden and relentlessly
challenged the legitimacy, planning, and vision of the Socialist Unity Party. Through
targeted campaigns, the station influenced and mobilized workers in opposition to SED
policies and spread news that undermined the SED’s efforts. Indeed, RIAS openly sought
the dissolution of “the Zone,” and in the meantime established an nation of Germans
bound together by letters and popular programming. The SED’s determination to
diminish RIAS’s influence underscored the station’s effectiveness and the weakness of
the GDR’s media outlets and the state itself. This fragileness became increasingly evident
following the Second Party Conference and Stalin’s death, when the rumor mill, another
critical component in the rival public sphere, became ever more hostile toward the party
151
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as the political situation destabilized. A number of political missteps in the summer of
1953 would help turn the rival public sphere into a revolutionary public sphere—the
subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter Three
Legitimation Crisis, June 11-16, 1953

“It’s getting to be time that the red fat cats in the district also get liquidated.”
-Overheard in Sebnitz a few day before June 171
“Don’t you know that an uprising has already broken out in Czechoslovakia and it’s
going to kick off here soon, because the workers are only waiting until the revolution
comes.”
-A worker in Dresden, a day or two before June 172

On June 11, everything appeared to change. The SED published and aired a
Communiqué that announced the Party had made “errors” in the past, forcing the
Politburo to make sweeping recommendations to address social, economic, and political
problems. The explosive news was a key act in the events of June, 1953.
This chapter reasons that the SED’s decision (made for them in Moscow) to
abandon the hard-line socialist buildup and its weak public relations campaign to explain
the maneuver allowed rumors—improvised news—to shape public opinion. These
rumors, sometimes true, sometimes partially true, and sometimes false, which emerged
from collective conversations reveal a confused and disoriented public. As a result,
rumors swirled through rival public sphere explaining the present and presenting hope for
the future. Oftentimes these rumors were rooted in factual news but had taken on a life of
Sebnitz - 11,10 Uhr [likely June 14, 1953]: “In Unternehmerkreisen, besonders bei kap.
Blumengrosshändler wird diskutiert, endlich beginnt der Zuchthausstaat zusammenzubrechen. Es wird Zeti,
das die roten Bonzen im Kreis auch liquidiert werden.”
2
“Betr.: Wochen-Analyse zum Kommuniqué des Politbüros,” Dresden, 16.6.53, Abteilung: Sekretariat
(SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011): “unsinnigsten”; “Weißt du nicht, dass in der CSR bereits ein
Aufstand ausgebrochen ist, auch bei uns wird es bald losgehen und die Arbeiter warten nur darauf, bis die
Revolution kommt.”
1
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their own, reflecting official news sources’ lack of credibility among the reading and
listening public. The improvisational nature of the information also revealed the
ideological media polarization in the GDR during the Cold War. As Cass Sunstein notes,
rumors are often more prevalent in times of uncertainty. This certainly seems to have
been the case here during the week before the demonstrations, as functionaries often
noted the sheer volume and tenacity of the rumors in circulation. In other words, these
rumors “cascaded,” to borrow again from Sunstein. Furthermore, many of these rumors
contributed to a situation where an already-weakened regime became increasingly
challengeable and the existing political arrangement appeared evermore untenable.3
The period between the regime’s proclamation of the New Course and the events
of June 17 represented a crisis of legitimacy for the SED. The GDR’s legitimacy, which
opponents could never officially call into question, rested on the appearance of
communal, national, and international solidarity as well as the widespread belief in the
SED’s vision for the future. Thus, the regime was essentially self-legitimizing; it alone
needed to recognize itself as it did not acknowledge domestic political challenges. Once
again, dependence on the Weberian construction of a constitutional-rational state renders
the idea of a legitimation crisis unsuited for application to the former Eastern Bloc
nations and calls for modifications to the notion of legitimacy. Instead, we might
recognize “weak forms” of legitimacy behind the Iron Curtain: people did not like what
was happening, but they could not imagine things being different and therefore they
accepted their fate. Thus, such states only rarely suffered legitimacy crises except during
occasional public outbursts as it was during these moments when citizens did imagine

Sunstein, On Rumors, 1-15; Timothy Tackett, “Rumors and Revolution;” Tamotsu Shibutani, Improvised
News: 8.
3

142

their situation changing. Thus, this chapter will show that the rival public sphere,
increasingly energized by the announcement of the New Course on June 11, 1953, helped
make revolution thinkable and in some cases, appear imminent or even as having already
begun.4
Research based on the public “mood reports” (Stimmungsberichte) in Dresden
after the announcement reveals a regime that had lost its ability to effectively
communicate with the masses and found itself in a precarious political position.5 This
chapter will examine how this happened.

Background to the Resolution
The political background of the SED’s course change, formulated in the Soviet
Union by Stalin’s succession team of Beria, Malenkov, Molotov, and Bulganin, called for
a retreat from their predecessor’s hardline tactics. In early June 1953, they summoned the
East German leadership trifecta—Walter Ulbricht, Otto Grotewohl, and Wilhelm Pieck—
to Moscow where they received instructions for a new planning package that would
replace the accelerated buildup in the GDR that had focused on heavy industry.6
The East German government now found itself in the awkward position of
retracting its uncompromising mission statement and pronouncing a softer platform as the
way forward. The publicization of this political retreat proved perilous for the SED and it
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found itself needing to maintain legitimacy while simultaneously admitting that its
previous goals and tactics had been the wrong ones. The party thus put its
communications apparatus to work along with political agitators to promote the new line.
Nevertheless, this account was not the only information source available to East Germans.
RIAS and other foreign broadcasters supplemented the official news and much of the
population received a distorted edition of the SED’s official message. This was especially
true in the Dresden region, where the regime found it nearly impossible to convince
audiences of what it considered factual news. Instead, in mid-June, sudden political
change combined with rumors, misinformation, and genuine news of events, to create
widespread doubt of the regime’s viability.
At a glance, one might find it strange that unrest broke out in East Germany when
it did. After all, the policies that had produced the rather devastating effects on the social
and economic well-being of the country had been abandoned, and the regime fully
expected that its call to implement many of the policies that East Germans desired would
stave off attempts at revolution from below. But this was, of course, not the case.

The News
Despite announcing news of its own making, the SED probably found itself in
many instances “scooped” by the more popular RIAS. Early on June 11 the station
broadcasted the most important points of the reforms including the relaxed rules
regarding travel restrictions for both East and West Germans while noting the
unusualness of this new policy, pointing out that this would allow families to reunite.
RIAS also noted the new ability for those in the West to get a first-hand look at life in
East and vice versa—timed perfectly for the traditional holiday season that had just
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begun.7 “So what can the population do now?” queried the announcer. His answer was:
“in any case, more than before.”8 The station presented the New Course as a moment
when the SED lost political capital. Those who had been under the pressure of the SED—
the middle-sized farmers, private businesses, and Christian youth groups could now, in
the words of the station, again become active, and “insist the communists meet them face
to face/take a stand.”9 This initial assessment of the issuance concluded that it represented
a blow to the SED and offered East Germans an uncommon chance—one that should not
remain unused.10 The broadcast concluded with some advice for the station’s listeners,
urging them to get a hold of a copy of Neues Deutschland and read it closely.11
The Party revealed the resolution to its citizenry on the morning of June 11 on the
front page of Neues Deutschland and through the airwaves, the factory radio systems in
those workplaces that had them in place, and through the Stadtfunk. Those who
purchased or got hold of a copy of the Sächsische Zeitung or Neues Deutschland on June
11 learned of the regime’s change of course, which was the official version of what they
might have heard on RIAS. The announcement proclaimed the different efforts on the
part of the SED to improve the living standards of GDR citizens, while admitting that
errors had been made in the past with respect to taxes (too high), food rationing cards
(not enough), and the repression of targeted portions of society, including the
intelligentsia, individual farmers, and private merchants. Following this admission, the
Politburo reiterated its goal to unite Germany, which, it claimed, would require a
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rapprochement of both its halves. In connection with this statement, the resolution
pointed to a new, more relaxed approach to the policing of traffic between the two states
and offered those who had fled the GDR a chance to return to their homes and reclaim
their property or receive compensation for their losses. Other sweeteners included
lowered prices for marmalade, honey, sweets, and baked goods. Curiously, the hated
workers’ norms remained in place. Still, the resolution pointed to a radical shift in the
Party’s position. As the population came to recognize the gravity of what the regime had
proposed, everything appeared to change in the popular imagination.12 This is a
significant point because the New Course raised hopes for fundamental change, not
unlike the calling of the Estates General, which as George Lefebvre pointed out,
heightened expectations for positive changes among common people.13 Such a
development would seem to set the stage for the enactment of a revolutionary script.

The Receptions of the News, Nationally
Workplaces around the GDR buzzed with the news and what it all meant, with
workers even speculating whether the heightened norms would be revised. Some workers
now claimed that the Politburo had finally listened to its critics and accepted their
objections. Factory workers discussed the resolution’s importance in unifying Germany
and easing the restrictions on travel, which would now allow East Germans to personally
get in touch with their relatives in the West. Also, internal reports seemed to reveal that
colleagues regarded the Communiqué as a sign of the SED’s strength; the Party
publically admitted past mistakes raising hopes that the Party would build a stronger
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relationship with the masses.14 These mistakes, some argued, could have been avoided
had the Leninist theory of “an ear to the masses” been upheld.15 At the same time, rumors
began to swirl around the GDR: Pieck had fled the country; Ulbricht and other ministers
had been arrested; Pieck had died; and a range of other false reports that seemed to
undermine or counter what the SED was saying.16 Similar rumors would appear in the
communities in and around Dresden in the week leading up to the uprising.

Communicating the Resolution in the Dresden Region
A sense of elation and newfound hope appeared to grip the nation. The local
government in Dresden almost immediately began to receive reports indicating the
population took a keen interest in the news of June 11. People lined up at the newspaper
stand to purchase Die Union, Neues Deutschland, and other publications that published
the Communiqué.17 In the course of a few minutes, the post office recorded fifty-four
telephone calls with requests for the special edition of the Sächsische Zeitung presenting
the Communiqué.18 A newspaper saleswoman, whose stand was located at the
waterworks in Dresden-Tolkewitz heard the resolution on the radio and immediately
jotted down the news in shorthand so she would be able to read it to her early morning
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customers.19 The enormity of the news was likewise not lost on at least one worker in a
VEB, where someone recorded the wording of the Communiqué (as it aired over the
radio) and shared the news with the entire staff during the morning break.20 In nearby
Riesa, as in other locations, the factory broadcast system announced the Communiqué to
the majority of the factories while the same information went out over the SED’s radio
waves.21 This happened, for example, at VEM Transformatoren-und Roentgenwerk and
Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz early in the morning of June 12.22 As the news blasted over
the Stadtfunk system residents in Dresden and Bautzen gathered around the loudspeakers
and chatted about the details of the news—perhaps planning a visit to West Germany.23

Preparation and clarification efforts
After the Communiqué officially aired over the radio systems and through the
local party publications, the SED rushed to explain its political maneuvers to confused
party functionaries, deploying campaigners to explain positions to workforces and other
communities.
In a number of enterprises, the BPO (Betriebsparteiorganisation or SED party
representation in the workplace) gathered campaigners, instructors, organizers, and others
between the early hours of the morning and the afternoon on Wednesday to relay directly
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“Stellungsnahmen zum Kommuniqué des Politbüros des ZK der SED vom 9.6.1953,” “Nationale Front
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to them the Communiqué after it aired over GDR radio. In such meetings, the BPO
sought to convince those present of the measures’ necessity—particularly more abstract
concepts such as the renewed struggle toward a unified Germany and the establishment
of peace. Following such consultations, comrades in attendance received orders to visit
workplaces and generate reports that gauged opinion in the workforces.24 Additionally,
the consultations were to equip them with the arguments and knowledge necessary to
clarify any misunderstandings that arose.25 Similarly, functionaries throughout the
Dresden region received the party line on June 11 from county committees and
instructions to popularize it in key areas.26 As the various departments around the region
began attempting to defend and promote the regime’s new position and gather
information, the complexity of their task became apparent.

Approval and Relief
On one hand, the proposed measures spelled out in the Communiqué met general
approval, as after all, they seemed to rectify the most common complaints about the
SED’s governance of the GDR. Reports in Dresden declared that the majority of the
working class, members of the intelligentsia, artisans, and businessmen greeted the New
Course and the “self-criticism” of the Politburo as evidence that the government was
“Betr. Stimmungsbericht über die Empfehlung des Polit.-Buros und die Regierung vom 9.6.1953;
Stimmungsbericht zum Beschluss des Politbüros vom 9.6.1953, SED – Betriebsparteiorganisation, Rat des
Bezirkes Dresden, Dresden, den 12.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011); “Betr.: Diskussionen über
das Kommuniqué des Politbüros,” An die Abt. Leitende Organe - Sektor Parteiinformation - im Hause
(SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011); “Betr.: Situationsbericht – Kommuniqué vom 9.6. / 1.Bericht,” SEDStadtbezirk III Parteiinformation an die Kreisleitung der SED, Parteiinformation - Dresden-A17 den
11.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011).
25
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Dresden Stadt, Abt. P.u.M., Parteiinformation, Dresden, den 12.6.1953 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr.
IV/2/12/011); see the document beginning “Vom Kreissekretariat ist eine Besprechung mit den Genossen
Abteilungsleiter,” Freital - - Gen. Schossig – Kommuniqué Likely 12.6 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr.
IV/2/12/011).
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honest with the working people.27 In Riesa, the Communiqué had at first the effect of a
“cold shower” although comrades as well as the general population generally greeted the
Politburo’s resolution.28 In Kamenz, on June 12, many reacted positively to the news,
with the mayor noting that “now the masses could exhale.” 29 In Zeisholz, party officials
found that residents had argued “it was high time that one took into account the mood of
the masses.”30 District Committees reported similar news in Görlitz where workers
greeted the resolution’s call to end political persecutions.31 Still another comrade stated
on June 12 that she had heard the notification the previous day and was shocked, thinking
that the news suggested a political Wendung—a notion that would prove a double-edged
sword and recurring theme over the next week.32 After the resolution went out over the
radio, the Nationalrat der Nationalen Front der DDR (National Council of the National
Front of the GDR) noted that joy and approval dominated.33 Examples include one
politically unaffiliated worker at the chemical pulp factory in Pirna who reportedly wept
with joy, not only because sweets and marmalade would now be cheaper, but because the
resolution had been concocted in the interests of the working class and provided evidence
the SED would do everything possible to reunify Germany—a popular topic of
discussion in those days.34

“Operativ Information: Uber das Kommuniqué des Politbüros vom 9.6.53,” Bericht I.
See the document beginning “Kommuniqué anfangs wie kalte Dusche gewirkt” Kreisleitung Riesa
(Genosse Möbius, Information) 14.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011).
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See the document beginning “Das Kommuniqué des Politbüros vom ZK hat in der gesamten
Bevölkerung” Kreisleitung Kamenz - Gen. Zschornack (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011): “Es ist Zeit,
das Volk atmet auf.”
30
Ibid.: “es ist höchste Zeit, dass man der Stimmung in der Bevölkerung Rechnung trägt.”
31
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Economic concessions in the announced New Course meant that people now
expected more in the way of consumer goods and lowered prices. A number of Germans
greeted the lower prices the regime now planned for goods, as did participants in a
pensioners’ house meeting in Dippoldiswalde who anticipated cheaper marmalade, sugar,
and other privileges.35 The German Democratic Association of Women reported that
women dramatically rejoiced, stating that they had felt cut off from the regime due to
issues surrounding the ration cards. “We had lost faith in the regime” stated one
interviewee, “We wept at the radio as the new information aired.”36 Many were grateful
for the lower priced tickets for public transportation, while others did note that residents
expressed less interest in the cheaper sweets and more concern regarding the causes and
greater ramifications of the proposed political turn.37 Still, according to a math professor
at the Technical College in Dresden, he had, through conversations with the population,
come to believe that people reacted positively to the measures concerning price
reductions and the reintroduction of ration cards.38 Other reports out of Dresden note that
workers similarly took keen interest in the recommendations of the Politburo, and despite
a significant negativity toward the regime in these places, workers welcomed price
reductions for sweets.39

See the document beginning “Vor allem herrscht in den Betrieben noch ein Durcheinander” Kreis
Dippoldiswalde, Gen. Nitzsche, 12.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011).
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Reaction in the Workplace
As in most places throughout the GDR, the news, above all, created an
atmosphere of hope and confusion and encouraged conversations predicated on the
assumption that fundamental change now seemed possible. However, dissent also began
to percolate. At Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz, a number of politically unaffiliated workers
concluded that they no longer had confidence in the regime’s ability to run the state after
learning of the proposed measure. The infamous workers’ norms, a volatile point of
contention between labor and government remained unchanged from their existing levels.
As with most of the recommendations proposed by the Politburo, the issue took on a life
of its own. And at Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz, workers had become convinced as soon as
the Communiqué aired that the heightened norms would soon be revised in their favor.40
Elsewhere, workers took matters into their own hands, such as in Elektrowärme
Sörnewitz, where comrades from a range of departments drafted protest letters against the
heightened norms and took part in a sit down strike on Saturday.41 Sometimes, the
conversations that broke out in the wake of the news demonstrated the workers had
become more vocal, for instance, when a boisterous group declared that they had been
working on a “dictatorial basis, rather than a persuasion basis,” before leadership
intervened and brought order to the meeting.42
Already on Thursday, June 12, evidence of “serious” confusion existed in the
Meißen area factories, where reports indicated that many of the workers had no real
knowledge of the Communique’s content and knew “only the snippets of information”
40
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they get from colleagues. For instance, some argued that the Party had done a onehundred-eighty-degree turn or “the working class had handed over the reins of power.”43
Such reactions reflected the regime’s inability to adequately control the message and
therefore the situation—a serious problem that allowed the news to take on lives of its
own.

Communicating Power
Meanwhile, the SED attempted to present their political retreat as one that
demonstrated the Party’s strength. One tactic included admitting guilt as far as “errors”
related to the accelerated socialist buildup, while publicizing the regime’s forthrightness
in owning up to the mistakes of the past, and often claiming such a feat had no historical
precedent. A second tactic included drawing parallels to the Soviet Union’s triumphs,
which like the previous two claims, would hopefully shore up the SED’s waning
legitimacy and credibility.
The BPO council in Dresden, which oversaw SED political activity in stateowned enterprises, had a special meeting on June 12 with all party secretaries,
campaigners, and comrades after the Communiqué officially went out over the radio. A
number of functionaries looked to draw comparisons between the present situation in the
GDR and those in the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. One
contemplated whether the New Course might be likened to the Soviets’ New Economic
Policy or if one could speak, like Lenin, of a type of “Two steps forward and one step

“Betr.: Bericht über das Kommuniqué des Politbüros vom 9.6.53,” SED Kreisleitung Meißen
an die SED Bezirksleitung – Sekretariat – Dresden. Meißen, den 16.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr.
IV/2/12/011): “sie nur Auszuege von Kollegen erfahren; “die Arbeiterklasse hat das Heft aus der Hand
gegeben.”
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back” sort of progress.44 Another party member agreed, suggesting that in the creation of
a dictatorship of the proletariat they had taken two steps forward and had now taken a
step back, but also that, in a “struggle for peace” they had fallen a step back, but also
moved ten steps forward.45 The meeting’s report concluded that the majority of the
colleagues and comrades in attendance here quickly recognized the righteousness of the
Party’s line in connection with the international situation and its inherent political
strength.46
In reality, party departments and staff often told those gathering opinions what
they wanted to hear, likely contributing to a sense of false confidence within the Party.
The Organisation Instrukteur Abteilung, which since 1949 had been charged with
continuously controlling the implementation of resolutions while instructing lower
organizations and basic units, for example, expressed the view that the Communiqué
proved the strength of the regime and the SED; such an admission, the department’s head
manager averred, would never have been possible in a capitalist land.47 Elsewhere, the
chairman of IG Textil-Bekleidung-Leder agreed that the measures taken would
“strengthen the power of the Party” and the confidence (Vertrauen) of not only party
members, but the entire population.48 One comrade in Freital greeted the “open and
honest” position of the Politburo and the central committee while a leader from a

“Stimmungsbericht zum Beschluss des Politbüros vom 9.6.1953,” SED Betriebsparteiorganisation
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communally-owned factory stated that the party demonstrated “great strength and power”
through its openness and honesty, adding that, “Such a self-critical position had never
before been demonstrated and in doing so, a decisive step in the struggle for peace and
German unity had been taken.”49 The SED also promoted this position over the airwaves
as evidenced on June 11 at 7:15 A.M., when functionaries at Sachsenwerk Radeberg
gathered in the factory dining area where the functionary had stenographically recorded
the slogan as it aired over GDR Radio: only a regime of the working class could take the
position of openness with regards to its errors, something that hitherto had never
happened in Germany’s history—powerful claims indeed.50
In the days that followed, reports concluded that party functionaries could see the
strength of the regime and the party in such self-criticisms, the traditional communist
penance.51 In Dresden, the District Committee compiled evidence that the Communiqué
was generally greeted by party members, with one claiming, typically, that the Party’s
decision to ruthlessly post its errors showed the “strength and simultaneous growth” of
the Party, which could be tied to the experiences of the Soviet Union. “After all,”
commented one party member, “not for nothing had they coined the phrase ‘to learn from
the Soviet Union means to learn victory.’”52
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Things appeared to be going according to plan with the public, too. In Pirna,
residents were reported to have commented that they respected the regime’s admission of
guilt when it came to mistakes that had been made, but also that things were looking up
as the regime, after all, “had an ear to the masses.”53 Similarly, in the streetcars in Freital,
passengers discussed the correctness of the measures and that the population was
impressed that the errors had been dealt with in an open and clear way.54
Representing the intelligentsia’s opinion in these matters, Professor Dräger at the
Technical College in Dresden noted in his discussion with a party functionary that the
positives outweighed the negatives and that East Germans should have “complete trust in
a regime that has the courage to openly admit its mistakes.”55 Engineers at Sachsenwerk
Niedersedlitz discussed the political posture of the regime in conversations with
functionaries and agreed that a capitalist regime would either be forced to step down in
such a situation—or cover things up. The SED on the other hand, they continued, openly
admitted its mistakes and the people’s confidence continued to grow through such
actions—evidence of the regime’s power.56 The issue of the regime’s honesty became a
key issue for campaigners and Party members. For example, in Pirna, comrades reported
that while their clarification efforts had become easier since workers had been promised a
better living standard, it had also become apparent that many comrades remained
convinced that the Communiqué suggested the regime’s weakness. How, then, to set such
false views straight? The party members who led the consultations noted to non-believers
“Betr. Stimmungsbericht über das Kommuniqué dzk der SED v. 9.6.1953, Bezirksvorstand Dresden
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that the confession of errors “could only be strength for the Regime and the Party” as it
demonstrated honesty.57
But to turn the SED’s track record, which, in reality, exhibited little success, into a
source of political strength was easier said than done. Indeed, in some ways, the New
Course seemed to stimulate the wrath of the public. Some residents pointed out that if
they exercised criticism by earlier pointing to these mistakes, the Party designated them
as opportunists and conciliators and their criticisms were not recognized.58 In Dresden,
the public conversations reportedly revealed mixed opinions, where in the streetcars and
among those waiting in lines for goods, some now spoke openly of the “great
weaknesses.”59 Others, like the residents of Pirna, wanted to know why change took so
long. The region’s factory workers continued to question the Party’s tardiness in
admitting its mistakes and expressed confusion regarding the situation.60 In Freital,
unaffiliated teachers viewed the measures taken by the Party as a sign of weakness, with
one LDP member stating that while he greeted that Communiqué, he felt the errors had
been, sadly, recognized a bit late and that “open self-criticism” testified to the strength of
the working class rather than the regime.61 Still, some struggled to understand why the
party had not heeded the clues it got from the people earlier, further noting that had the
“Betr.: Bericht über das Kommuniqué des Politbüros vom 9.6.53,” SED – Kreisleitung Meißen an die
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58
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measures not been implemented an uprising would have broken out and those responsible
would have to be brought to justice.62
The SED also endured criticism from its supporters because of its admission of
errors. While a good number of comrades had fallen in line with the regime’s political
strategy, many remained skeptical of the situation and felt that the Party’s admission of
errors and its self-critical position revealed weakness and amounted to an admission of
political bankruptcy. Party members in the court in Dresden reportedly expected a
Slansky Trial, suggesting that those who deviated would be ousted from the Party, similar
to what had happened in the Czechs’ show trial.63 Similarly, in the Dresdner animal feed
plant, workers on Monday argued that those who make mistakes should find themselves
behind bars and wondered why those in the regime, having admitted mistakes, faced no
consequences.64 One worker at Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz, an alleged left-radical,
displayed disappointment from that side of the political spectrum and argued that the
resolution was RIAS rabble-rousing, since the SED would never allow such a thing.65

Explanations behind the New Course
The impetus behind the regime’s about-face remained something of a mystery to a
vast majority of the population. The radical change of course provoked a range of
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theories hashed out collectedly regarding just who or what might have been behind the
SED’s moderated position.
In Dresden, functionaries noted negative discussions in the city’s streetcars on
June 11, which, according to the responsible agent, were purportedly concentrated among
passengers who hailed from those strata of the population that were indifferent to
political developments.66 One politically unaffiliated shepherdess declared to the
strangers around her that now she could speak out and declared that the SED wanted
“Spitzbart (“pointy beard,” meaning Walter Ulbricht) out because he had been too eager
to follow Russian orders and that Malenkov was now calling for an entirely different
direction than the previous Stalinist line.67 It appears sometimes residents correctly
recognized that the SED had simply done what Soviet leadership demanded, but then
often put their own spin on the story.68 For instance, at a spinning and weaving mill in
Ebersbach, fifty kilometers from Dresden, workers discussed whether the Soviet Union
owed the U.S money and had taken out a new line of credit. This might have resulted,
they argued, in the High Commissar in the USSR ordering a change in its policy toward
Germany.69
Some believed the SED’s political retreat stemmed from foreign powers, but the
explanations voiced by ordinary people varied. On occasion citizens tied the change to
the Americans, as in Meißen, where functionaries reported a rumor circulating over the
weekend that the Politburo’s proposals only occurred because of pressure from the
See the document beginning “Der Anteil der Bevölkerung verstärkt sich laufend” des Demokratischen
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United States. This pressure, so the rumor went, included the American threat of military
intervention in the GDR should the regime fail to implement the proposals in the
Communiqué in short order.70 In Riesa similar rumors circulated, but here, some believed
that the Americans would arrive by the middle of the week.71 Along these lines, a
brigadier in Bautzen claimed to have seen an unmarked sedan on June 12 with American
flags on the fenders cruising through town, and he even produced for local officials a
sketch of the occupants, whom he claimed to have been dressed in both civil and army
uniforms. A later report revealed the car to have been from an Eastern Bloc state.72
Similar arguments also appeared in Dresden, where one worker argued the New Course
was the result of American pressure while other colleagues contradicted him, pointing to
the Russian “Peace Offensive” (Friedensoffensive) and argued that the Russians were
craftier than they (East Germans) were.73 In Görlitz, a housewife echoed these sentiments,
declaring that the New Course stemmed above all from Western lobbying.74 In addition,
as always, radio tied into perceptions, with some in Dresden arguing that since RIAS
aired the news of the Communiqué before the local stations West Germany must have
been behind everything.75
It should be noted that the party elected not to articulate or publicize the true
reasons behind the New Course, which was the poverty and unrest brought about by the
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accelerated drive to socialism. Furthermore, one could conclude that the party leaders
seemed to be interested in hearing what they wanted to hear—that they (and only a party
like their own) made the right decision to correct their “errors,” a catch-all phrase that
avoided any genuine political admission of guilt while opening the regime to criticism
and partially-informed speculation.

Heightened Expectations
It now seemed that everything was changing, and the future, which had seemed so
certain several days earlier, was once again an unknown. Although the announcement had
been rather explicit in certain areas, it left enough details to the imagination as that the
masses readily filled in the blanks. In place of concrete information, people began to
speculate as to what was happening or what the future held. Annelies Zickermann, an
employee at the Görlitz polyclinic, declared that the year (1953) would mainly see turns
for the better, since, one hundred days after Stalin’s death, something good had happened
(the Communiqué), and she prophesied that on August 8 Germany would be reunified. Of
course, she had apparently heard this from a fortuneteller, but, as we will see, rumor that
yet another major change would come in August circulated in other places.76 Others
predicted the end would come perhaps a bit sooner, such as the farmer in Kamenz who
stated in a public gathering that the SED was now hanging by a thread and it would not
be long until the time came when comrades had their party insignias ripped from their
lapels—which, according to him, had already begun in Dresden.77
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Economy and Currency
The announcement of the New Course raised expectations and sometimes rumors
carried specific suggestions about the nation’s future. As far as the GDR’s economic
future, residents imagined various scenarios. For instance in Großenhain a rumor
circulated on Saturday that currency needed to be spent quickly as it would soon
disappear. Later that evening, the local bank recorded only one deposit with every other
customer making withdrawals, demonstrating the potential of rumors to spread quickly.78
In Riesa, rumors circulated that the political situation had swept away the regime and that
the Americans were scheduled to arrive at the beginning of the week, all of which would
lead to currency reform after the borders fell.79 Rumor in Freital held that it was the
currency reform that would provide the necessary funds for the New Course.80 The New
Economic Policy of 1920s Soviet Russia helped convince a farmer in Löbau that, as in
that country’s past, the relaxation of economic controls would remain in place for only a
bit before the regime reinstated socialism.81

The Reunification Question: a Source of Power and a Source of Weakness
The Communiqué’s rhetoric regarding reunification raised hopes and inspired
visions of national unity. As Karl Fricke reminds us, Germans did not fully accept the
nation’s partition in 1953 and reunification remained a central part of the SED’s political
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discourse.82 The Communiqué reaffirmed this position and declared reunification
fundamental to the Politburo’s goals. Of course, little had been accomplished in previous
years aside from political posturing, so when the party announced the New Course, to
many it seemed that the moment for change had finally arrived. Some GDR citizens
welcomed looser border controls while others anticipated a unified Germany within days.
Perhaps fittingly, on the night of the Communiqué’s announcement, a Dresden resident
who lived across the street from a residence in which a radio was blasting the German
national anthem concluded it was “Probably RIAS.”83
The New Course stimulated national, all-German imaginings as residents looked
forward to relaxed border controls that would immediately soften Germany’s partition.
Reports indicate that these new rules became one of the week’s most discussed topics.
The morning of the announcement, an older woman expressed delight that she would
soon be able to visit her son in West Germany.84 Other East Germans similarly
anticipated the issuance of residence permits for stays in the GDR by West Germans and
the disbursement of inter-zone passes.85 The elderly discussed the opportunities they
would now have to get together with their children and relatives.86 A pensioner welcomed
the measures of the Politburo, proclaiming, “We’ve now been given a further possibility
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to take a concrete stance on the question of German unity.”87 Indeed, reports from the
countryside around Dresden alleged that residents were especially pleased with the
relaxed travel restrictions and they were ready to begin making plans of whom they
would visit first.88 In Bischofswerda, a master watchmaker felt that the resolution
represented a “new direction” in German national politics and that now, “nothing stood in
the way of reunification.”89 At least one comrade at LOWA Niesky “did not care as to
what, how, or why” the Communiqué emerged from the Politburo; he just knew that the
New Course was a necessary step toward the unity of Germany that had to be
implemented soon.90 The admission of errors seems to have led some to believe that the
GDR amounted to a failed, short-lived project, which disavowed by its architects,
brought German unification that much closer.

Eastern Issues
On towns near the Oder-Neisse line, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the
Communiqué raised expectations among residents of these areas in more immediate and
tangible ways. On a train between Ebersbach and Löbau passengers averred that it was
now “certain that they would get Silesia back.”91 Others believed they would now return
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to their old homes.92 Reports out of Zittau, Löbau, and Niesky also noted that residents
had now begun discussing what they saw as the very real possibility that the Oder-Neisse
border might be revised, which in many of these cases, meant potentially returning to
their homes that now sat in Poland. These conversations, which took place in inns and
other locales reportedly died down when party functionaries entered such establishments,
suggesting such ideas remained reactionary and dangerous ones in the eyes of the SED—
and that these conversations may have been more widespread than reported here.93
Conversations in the east of course further fed rumors of reunification. These
ideas circulated in the Dresden Theater and from the director of the Dresden Zoo, who
argued that the coming relaxation in foreign policy would facilitate negotiations in
connection with German reunification.94 The director also noted that members of the
intelligentsia, who had earlier expressed their desire to attend more conferences in West
Germany now believed the regime had responded to their wishes. In their opinion,
German-language scholarship would receive a boost from the proposed measures.95
Similarly, engineers from Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz imagined themselves reuniting with
West German scholars as well as the international scholarly community.96
By raising the issue of reunification, however hollow or symbolic it may have
been and presenting it in conjunction with a major political overhaul, the regime
Bezirksausschuss Dresden, Sekretariat, 15.6.53 an die Bezirksleitung Dresden (SächsHStA 11857 Nr.
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encouraged the population to imagine a unified Germany. Such imaginings threatened the
state’s legitimacy for, were Germany to reunify, the GDR would obviously cease to exist.

A Contentious Citizenry
While the party noted the happiness engendered by the announcement, “negative”
discussions also followed the publication of the Communiqué, and the rival public sphere,
driven by an increasingly confident and angry citizenry, became a clearinghouse for
criticisms of the government. Thus, in addition to expressions of hope and satisfaction
many now felt more comfortable airing their grievances—and demonstrating a newfound
political power.
On the day the announcement went out, streetcar passenger remarked that “had
the masses not complained, nothing would have changed.”97 Such complaints were
commonplace. Within days of the announcement, one employee in Sebnitz declared
“Now our time is here again,” while others discussed the “beginning of the collapse of
the prison-state.”98 Similarly, in the days before the uprising in Niesky, mood reports
indicated that while outspoken criticisms of the regime were little-known, some argued
that the regime “had waved the white flag and those in other nations are mentioning that
the regime has stepped down.”99 In Großenhain, an innkeeper rejoiced that she was no
longer a member of the “BDM,” or, the “Bund der Markelosen” (association of the
penniless)—probably a riff on the matching acronym from the Nazi period that stood for
“Betr.: Kommunique des Politburos vom 10. Juni 1953,” Abt Staatliche Organe, Dresden, am 11. Juni
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Bund deutscher Mädel.100 Furthermore, she reportedly uttered in a threatening voice,
“until now you all [the regime] have eaten the butter. Now it’s all gone; now we’re eating
it all.”101 The mayor of Rauschwitz in the same county fled to West Berlin early in the
morning with his family, likely after receiving a threatening letter.102 Some threats were
more cryptic, such as an incident in which a horse’s head was hung up in a concrete
factory by workers.103
High school students in Meißen became unruly and openly declared that they
would never engage socially. During lessons, a student, when asked to form a sentence,
stated, “I would like to know, which way the wind blows,” whereupon the other students
interjected, “from the West.”104 At this same high school, one teacher had apparently
claimed that all works from Stalin and Lenin were to be destroyed. Artisans in Meißen
also demonstrated stubbornness, arguing with party representatives that the German
question would need to be dealt with through a four power conference and that they were
waiting on free elections, which would decide just who would be in control.105 One
particular painter felt he could not forgive the regime for its transgressions, arguing that it
had ruined the lives of those who “tilled the soil through the generations and left their
100
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land because of fear and threats,” while pointing to “those who had been imprisoned for
up to three years because of economic misdoings.”106 He also brought up a former
professor, who, like many, had been silenced because of reactionary positions. And then
there were his neighbors, who had their market garden taken away, merely for failing to
meet quotas and purchasing from those who had overfilled theirs. “I am of the opinion,”
he concluded, “that it should not have been allowed to come to this!”107
In Dresden’s streetcars, passengers openly discussed who was responsible for the
regime’s errors—with many pointing their finger at Walter Ulbricht, “who is hated by the
entire German people because he is a radicalist.”108 Propertied citizens, when asked their
opinions, similarly argued that they could only have confidence in the regime’s measures
if Ulbricht was relieved of his duties, prompting the reporting functionary to note that, in
his estimation, Grotewohl and Pieck did not draw the same ire, perhaps because people
viewed the latter two as merely Ulbricht’s subordinates.109

Trouble in the Countryside
Following the announcement of the Communiqué on June 11, local government
leaders held meetings to gauge the mood of farmers in an attempt to clarify the
government’s current and future policies. In these meetings, the SED’s inability to
effectively communicate its position became a recurring issue as tempers flared and the
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collective imagination generated rumors that threatened the existence of the socialist
farming arrangement.
The Communiqué and all its promises posed serious problems in the district’s
LPGs as rumor often distorted genuine news. For example, the New Course proposed to
return the homesteads to those farmers who fled the GDR while those who could not
make it back due to exceptional circumstances would receive compensation.110 But this
spawned the rumor circulated by some farmers that they would soon have to give up their
farmsteads to the former great landowners (Grossbauern) who would be returning.111
This was the case in Bischofswerda, for example, where new farmers believed that they
would soon have to give up their farmsteads to these Grossbauern, whom they expected
to return in short order.112 And in Meißen , the announcement of the Communiqué
triggered considerable panic within the LPG as members now thought all Grossbauern
were returning and thus there was no possible way that things could continue as they
were.113 In the area around Dresden, one comrade was of the opinion that when it came to
the possible return of the Grossbauern, the Party would have to consider whether they
had left in order to sabotage the GDR’s food supplies or because of RIAS propaganda.114
And members of a motor and tractor station outside of Dresden were understanding of the
majority of the Party’s decisions, but questions regarding the Grossbauern remained as
did the issue of whether the LPGs would be diminished or totally dissolved,
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demonstrating how a single pledge led farmers to believe that the system might
collapse.115
Other forms of improvised news emerged in these farmers’ meetings, which the
SED labeled as “negative forces.” For example, some attendees claimed that the planned
economy had been a failure and soon the free-market economy would be reintroduced.116 In Freital rumor had it that the management of the LPG had recently fled to
the West.117 Such confusion may have stemmed from foreign broadcasts, as members of
an LPG in Sebnitz admitted misunderstandings regarding the regime’s measures and
claimed to have heard on the radio that the LPGs had been dissolved. Whatever the cause
of the misunderstandings, desires and fears sometimes mixed together with authentic
news.118 Within days, other regions reported similar situations in farmers’ meetings. After
the Communiqué went out, a rumor began spreading, which allegedly had its origins in
the Putzkau LPG with one Frau Eckert, that all the LPGs would be dissolved.119 In three
separate LPGs, members reportedly called for work stoppages as their efforts no longer
had any purpose. A fourth LPG declared that if any “Kulaks” returned they would kill
them.120
On Monday, June 15, reports out of Meißen noted that efforts to clarify the
Communiqué and the Regime had proved inadequate and this had led to panic in the
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population.121 In more than one LPG, re-settlers from the lost eastern territories
drunkenly celebrated what they believed to be the imminent return to their homeland.122
In Großenhain, serious alarm had also broken out after the Communiqué aired due to the
misapprehension that the Grossbauern had been notifying the LPGs of their coming
liquidation.123 The Party reacted to the situation here by initiating more group meetings
with the instructors in an attempt to clarify the situation.124
On June 16, the Regional Committee in Dresden reported to Berlin that problems
remained in the LPGs, where in addition to a lack of leadership, the population remained
anxious, especially the communal farmers. Members of various LPGs also expressed
interest in bringing hay to their own farmsteads and still others discussed packing up their
things, unsettling their neighbors. Still others drank in celebration of their “victory.”125
Functionaries continued to receive insults while one report noted that “in some cases it is
uttered, that such a breakdown of the government has never before happened.”126 In
Löbau discussions had taken on an aggressive character, especially within LPG meetings;
the farmers now exhibited provocative behavior as they believed the New Course
signaled the regime’s end. Farmers proclaimed that functionaries represented a party at
the end of its rope while one farmer taunted officials as “Lumpen, dogs, criminals, and
crooks.” And a barkeeper in Kleinmeritz told functionaries that any words from the SED
meant nothing since, as he told the regime representatives, “You are all are finished.”127
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Improvised News: Revolution Next-Door
By the time Soviet leadership moved to assuage the increasingly troubled
situation in East Germany in the spring of 1953, Stalinist policies had created problematic
situations throughout the Eastern Bloc. The proximity of the Dresden Region to
Czechoslovakia meant that when unrest developed in Pilsen in late May-early-June, East
Germans who listened to foreign radio broadcasts heard about it.128 Radio Free Europe
reported on the Czech events as did RIAS, with the latter noting that the East German
police had been called in to help quell the disturbances, in which the city fell to
demonstrators for two days before the government regained its footing. Forty protestors
died and the regime arrested hundreds in the days after.129 The reception (or ignorance) of
this story in Dresden illustrates how individuals could construe an event as genuine news,
improvised news, or (false) rumor, depending on their political orientation.
While police forces suppressed these riots by June 3, news of their occurrence—
always designated as rumor by reporting functionaries, regardless of the information’s
validity—continuously spread like wildfire in the area. These stories do not appear as
often in the reports from other regions sent to Berlin, which suggests that such
information circulated more frequently in the southeastern region of the GDR.130 It also
contributed to an atmosphere of political unrest in the Dresden region, helped generate
political instability, and revealed the hopes and fears of East Germans in the days before
the mass demonstrations.
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As mood reports piled up on the SED’s desks, the nature and scope of the “rumors”
regarding foreign upheaval became plainly evident to the regional directorate in Dresden.
These rumors appear to have been rather widespread in the region and not confined to
locations near the Czech border. In Dippoldiswalde, for instance, a functionary reported
that a comrade at the glassworks informed him that a “state of siege” existed in
Czechoslovakia, that chaos now reigned as the government there no longer existed, and
that the Americans had been called in to help. This comrade, when asked how he knew
this, cited the (Swiss) Beromünster radio station.131 In Heidenau, 13 kilometers south of
Dresden, the FDGB reported hearing more specific accounts of events in Czechoslovakia.
In the paper factory there, a rumor alleged that riots were soon to break out because of the
currency reform and the abolition of ration cards (true news, but it had already
happened).132 The FDGB functionary who recorded this rumor investigated the veracity
of the news by getting in touch with the factory manager, who happened to be in
Czechoslovakia at the time. This manager, according to the report, claimed to have
dispelled the “rumor” by recounting the “joyful approval of the Czechoslovakian people”
he personally met.133
But his story sounded little like the news that circulated in the rival public sphere.
In Riesa, rumors circulated that a state of revolution existed in Czechoslovakia as well as
in Poland—a rumor that also appeared in Dresden and held that street battles had broken
out there and that the Soviet Union and the SED had only issued the Communiqué to
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prevent such a situation from arising in the GDR.134 So-called class enemies in Sebnitz
inquired about the coup that had taken place in Czechoslovakia, and the Saxon troops
who helped contain the revolution—news they believed since they heard it on the radio
(the station is not noted). Again, this part is not too far off—though the rebellion had
ended almost two weeks prior. However, unverified rumors here also purported that
corpses had already begun floating down the Elbe.135 These alarming stories also
appeared in Dresden where residents argued that the situation was so bad in
Czechoslovakia that “corpses were now swimming along the river!”136 These rumors
were probably exaggerations and possibly fabrications.
In the countryside around Dresden, improvised news of large uprisings in
Czechoslovakia had persisted through the weekend and into the beginning of the week,
with people now (correctly) claiming that the East German police force had been enlisted
to help restore order.137 Improvised news continued to swirl elsewhere on Monday. A
woman in Dresden reported that Radio Prague had reported on the previous Friday that
authorities had cleared the streets in the capital at 9:00 p.m., leading Dresdeners to
conclude that there was indeed an uprising in progress (it had already ended, of
course).138 Another report from the countryside around Dresden stated that the news of
indeterminate Czech origin held that revolution had broken out and the police and
military had taken opposing sides.139 Other versions of this story circulated in Dresden
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alleging that the Czech uprising had led to states of siege in Pilsen and Prague and
thousands of party functionaries had been arrested (partially true).140 These rumors
surfaced at Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz where one worker reported hearing that there had
been multiple deaths at the Skoda factory, in this case a true rumor.141
By the beginning of the week, stories of sizeable uprisings in Czechoslovakia—
where the Volkspolizei now worked to restore order—continued to circulate in the
countryside around Dresden.142 It is possible that such information stemmed from earlier
Czech sources, which Dresdeners identified as the source of the news on June 15.143 The
same day, one disbelieving comrade in Riesa (45 Km northwest of Dresden) noted that
the “craziest” rumors in connection with the Communiqué circulated through the
population, above all, in places and factories where they listened to RIAS and other
foreign stations. These listeners, he added, were asking party members provocative
questions, as for example, in Lichtensee where a farmer stated to a functionary, “Don’t
you know that an uprising has already broken out in Czechoslovakia and it’s going to
kick off here soon, because the workers are only waiting until the revolution comes.”144
Similar news was also tied to RIAS by a comrade when a farmer from Kipsdorf
(Dippolidiswalde area) recounted to the secretary of the BPO that a broadcast had stated

“6. Lagebericht über den Beschluss des Politbüros vom 9.6.53.,” 16.6.1953.
“Informationsbericht am 16.6.1953,” SED-Betriebsparteiorganisation des Sachsenwerkes Niedersedlitz,
Dresden, den 15.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011).
142
“Betr.: Kommuniqué ZK vom 9.6 1953,” SED Kreisleitung Dresden Land an die SED Bezirksleitung,
16.6.1953.
143
Ibid.
144
“Betr.: Wochen-Analyse zum Kommuniqué des Politbüros,” Dresden, 16.6.53, Abteilung: Sekretariat
(SächsHStA 11857 Nr. IV/2/12/011): “unsinnigsten”; “Weißt du nicht, dass in der CSR bereits ein
Aufstand ausgebrochen ist, auch bei uns wird es bald losgehen und die Arbeiter warten nur darauf, bis die
Revolution kommt.”
140
141

175

that workers in the CSR had not received pay for four weeks and that four-hundred (an
exaggeration) were already dead.145
That this improvised news of violent upheaval continued to circulate even after
the events of June 17 in Dresden, and that the regime was apparently helpless to combat
such stories demonstrates just how powerless the government was in refuting information
circulated in the rival public sphere. Finally, such improvised news also suggests that the
idea of a revolution was not, in the minds of many, far-fetched, thus perhaps revealing the
collective hope and imagination in the days leading up to the June 17 events.
Chipping Away at the Leadership’s Prestige
Following the announcement of the New Course, rumors circulated that stripped
away the authority and prestige of the regime. State agencies such as the FDGB noted
that throughout the GDR, SED’s figureheads and architects of the state, Otto Grotewohl,
Walter Ulbricht, and Wilhelm Pieck, increasingly came under attack in the rival public
sphere. The rumors—once again, often in the form of improvised news—undermined the
SED’s credibility and bolstered the popular notion among the masses that everything had
begun to fall apart.
But when reports trickled back to Berlin that East Germans believed that President
Pieck had fled with his daughter to Switzerland and that Otto Grotewohl and other
ministers had been arrested, the SED appears to have accepted these rumors as mere
inconveniences or fallout from their about-face.146 Indeed, it was not until after the events

145

Kreisleitung Dippoldiswalde, Gen. Nitzsche, Kenntniz v.d. Bericht 1. u. 2. Sekretär.
“Thema: Kommunique des Politburos des Zentralkomitees der SED vom 9. Juni 1953,” FDGBBundesvorstand, Org.-Instr.-Abteilung, Sektor Information, den 12. Juni, 1953, Information Nr. 21
(SAPMO-BArch DY 30 4/2/5/543); “Thema: Kommunique des Politburos des Zentralkomitees der SED
146

176

of the following week that the Party’s inability to communicate its message clearly, and
thus project its power, became apparent. Only then did officials realize that these rumors
held the potential to incite unrest on a mass scale.
In the Dresden Region, rumors that damaged the prestige and “presence” of the
leadership began to swirl shortly after the announcement of the New Course had been
made. Surely these existed before June 11, but the surprise expressed by the authors who
generated mood reports and the evidence that these stories continuously grew and spread
through the population strongly suggests that the intensity of rumors surged in the days
before the demonstrations. In Kamenz, for instance, district leadership reported to
Dresden that a basic estimate regarding the mood of the population could not yet be
established on June 11, but that a “powerful movement” now affected the population and
the “wildest rumors circulated.”147
While the origin of these rumors is difficult to discern, the situation showcases the
inability of the government to shape the popular narrative through the official public
sphere. The authorities were unable to insert their version of the story into the public
discourse, thus the rumors persisted. These rumors, which were “quite hostile,” purported
that although the masses now seemed directionless, the opposition seemed to be
acquiring at least local “leaders” while the SED’s true leadership in many cases
“disappeared” in the collective imagination of the rival public sphere. Indeed, in Wismut
a comrade declared that all pictures of Walter Ulbricht and Wilheml Pieck were to be
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“removed and burned in front of the soviets”— excepting images of Stalin.148 Here,
Stalin’s picture remained in place, but all the symbols and slogans were reportedly taken
away, including the Soviet star.149 Reports from the factories in Wismut on June 12 noted
that chaos still reigned here and that the Communiqué had generated in the general
population a sense of victory. Furthermore, the people here—“Sitting on the high
horse”—were of the opinion that the GDR was soon going to collapse.150 In countryside
around Görlitz, “hidden” rumors appeared that attempted to stop elections for house and
farm communities and when functionaries chatted with school children, they revealed
that their teacher had told them images of Wilhelm Pieck should be taken down, while in
the LOWA factory rumors circulated that Pieck’s “books and booklets should be
burned.”151 The alleged order to remove the leadership’s images also appeared in schools
in Bautzen, where stories circulated that all pictures of Pieck had to be removed from the
schools.152 Similar rumors circulated in Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz at the beginning of
the workweek, where Pieck’s images had been disappearing. One comrade heard from his
mother, who had heard at the store that the Soviets had picked up Pieck and taken him
back to Moscow and that his image had been removed from the banks.153 Again, a kernel
of truth existed here: Pieck was in Moscow, but for physical rehabilitation. Whether
anyone had removed images at the bank is unknown and probably unknowable.
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In Sebnitz, functionaries heard the rumor calling for the removal of Pieck’s image
on the bus en route from Pirna, where workers reportedly awaited American intervention
and claimed to have heard orders to remove Pieck’s pictures from the Stadtfunk and
through party orders.154 This, of course, was highly unlikely. Three members of the forest
service who had been in Bautzen, where they had picked up rumors, now spread the “lie”
that all pictures of Pieck had been collected, signifying his removal from office.155 In
Görlitz, the order reportedly came from Wismut, while Pieck’s actual whereabouts and
status continued to confound the regime’s local functionaries.
Other rumors circulated that alleged leading comrades’ writings were to be (the
passive construction is necessary and intentional here and elsewhere when discussing
such rumors) removed from libraries and bookstores or destroyed. Thus, for example, at
the LOWA factory rumors had it that Ulbricht’s booklets and books were to be burned.156
The source of the news here might be traced back to radio; on June 12, a machinist at the
textile and rubber factory Neugersdorf declared that at 7:30 in the morning of the
previous day—the same time the Communiqué had gone out over the airwaves—he had
heard a “special announcement over the radio.”157 He did not identify a station, but
reported hearing that all of Walter Ulbricht’s writings were to be removed and that the
personal driver of President Pieck had gone to West Germany.158
The swift deterioration of public confidence in the regime became ever more
evident as a profusion of rumors about the exodus or death of its leadership spread. On
June 12, in Dresden, a party member heard from a coworker that Otto Grotewohl now
154
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found himself in protective custody (not true) and that Walter Ulbricht had retired from
his position (not true).159 Another party member added that he had also heard this, but
that he could not discuss it in public since the story could be true.160 In the countryside
around the city of Dresden the most prevalent report related the death or abdication of
Wilhelm Pieck, with variations that replaced him with Grotewohl or Ulbricht.161 In the
IFA Radeberg, for instance, Pieck had been shot during his escape, but the most popular
rumor alleged he had made it to Switzerland while his children were in Sweden.162
Sometimes the rumors held that the children had been apprehended before making it to
Sweden and had been found to be in possession of nine million Deutsche Marks.163 Other
rumors here alleged he had “had a leg amputated” while Grotewohl, at least according to
rumor in Pirna, had shot himself dead on June 10.164
Some of these rumors may have originated with foreign radio broadcasts. An
FDGB report from June 16 noted that in multiple factories discussions of Pieck’s death
were alleged to have stemmed from Swiss Radio (Sender Schweiz), while in some cases,
specific people were noted to have spread the rumor by word of mouth.165 A report from
the countryside notes that discussions inspired by an unnamed German station continued
to swirl around Pieck’s whereabouts, with one rumor alleging that Ulbricht had been
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placed on leave and that the regime was resigning.166 Meanwhile, a different rumor
surfaced in a tavern in Ottendorf-Okrilla, where “Londoner Rundfunk” was said to have
brought the news of a GDR bigwig’s death—by which at least the functionary deduced
this referred to President Pieck.167 Others in the bar claimed that Pieck had already been
dead for fourteen days, either shot during his escape or because he wanted to admit the
GDR’s bankruptcy. And there were reports that he was now in Mecklenburg “on ice”168
By the end of the weekend, reports out of Meißen indicated that rumormongers continued
to voice their “slogans” in discussions. And here, popular accounts alleged that Pieck had
been killed in the Soviet Union.169

Political Deaths and the Flight of the Comrade
Once again, some popular information was improvised news and Pieck’s health
made him a popular topic for improvisation in the rival public sphere. For instance, the
real news was that Wilhelm Pieck had fallen ill and missed Stalin’s funeral in March, but
had become the basis for rumor as East Germans attempted to make sense of their
political world based on hearsay, secrecy, and probably foreign broadcasting. Thus, it is
hardly surprising that some East Germans repeatedly asked what was going on with the
President and wanted to know why they rarely heard from him anymore.170 In Görlitz,
residents continued to ask about Pieck’s whereabouts and why no one had heard anything
from him while housewives out shopping wanted to know just who the “criminals” were
that had created the mess in the first place. They also argued that Pieck’s fate was
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banishment to the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, in Pirna, various accounts alleged Pieck was
now in custody after apprehension at the Swiss border while others believed he wanted to
flee to Switzerland with his daughter and large sums of money.171
Authorities and sources blamed some rumors on radio broadcasts. A version of
the Pieck rumor, overheard in a bar in Zschachwitz held that Pieck was in Switzerland
with three million marks and West German radio was threatening to tell the whole story
if East German radio failed to do so by Tuesday.172 One rumor had it that a British radio
station had given the GDR an ultimatum which allowed the SED until Sunday evening to
disclose the situations regarding Pieck and Ulbricht. If the SED chose not to, foreign
states would inform the population of the GDR of the situation on Monday.173 Another
case of foreign radio influencing the conversation occurred in Kamenz.174 W. Schwede
from Panschwitz stated that his boss had heard from London Sender that “Wilhelm Pieck
wanted to flee to Switzerland, but was apprehended by Soviet occupation forces.”175
“That he has been on vacation since the end of April is only a cover-up,” stated the
worker, who had also heard from his boss that Pieck’s daughter had spoken on the radio
in Switzerland.176
A report from Tuesday, June 16, out of Riesa noted that in this area, rumors
continued to spread: Pieck was “on ice” in Moscow; Pieck had been arrested and put on
trial; Pieck had been shot near the Crimean Peninsula; Grotewohl had been arrested;
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Ulbricht was no longer in power and his writings had been removed from libraries.177 By
June 16 in the countryside around Dresden, the rumors continued, as always, with Pieck’s
death reported in various ways—sometimes via his daughter in Switzerland, sometimes
aired by Londoner Rundfunk, while sometimes he had been caught crossing the border
and arrested carrying large sums of money. Sometimes Ulbricht replaced Pieck in these
stories. Meanwhile, the functionaries tried in vain, without, it seems, the help of mass
media, to convince residents that such news represented hoaxes concocted by RIAS.178
Rumors connected to Walter Ulbricht and Otto Grotewohl also circulated,
reflecting residents’ hopes for change. Some were simple, such as in Bertheldorf, where
an older woman claimed that she had heard on the radio the night before (probably the
night of June 13), on a station that she did not recall, what she herself wanted to hear: that
Ulbricht had stepped down (not true).179 More specific rumors appeared on the streetcars
in Dresden where passengers suggested that Grotewohl had figuratively “put a gun to
Ulbricht’s head” and taken over the political decision making (certainly not true).180
Other passengers affirmed that the Communiqué signified the end of the regime’s
policies (partially true) and thus President Pieck would never again return (not true),
while Grotewohl was “up to his neck in water” (not true).181 Locals in Görlitz supposed
that Walter Ulbricht would be “brought to justice” and “Pieck had been banished” (not
true, see above).182
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It is difficult to gauge the effectiveness of local authorities’ efforts to counter
rumors and alternative news, but it is likely they had little effect, considering that reports
from June 16 mention that the same rumors persisted and as we will see, some still
circulated in the weeks after the June 17 events. In nearby Löbau, for example, where the
Party made efforts to explain the “triviality” (Haltlosigkeit) of the rumors spread by class
enemies regarding the alleged arrests of Pieck and Ulbricht, they still noted on Sunday
that such information was current throughout the entire district.183
Groups continued to discuss the apparent dissolution of various parts of the state
and of the GDR itself in the days before the demonstrations.184 News of the dissolution of
the KVP (barracked police) continued to spread through at least Freital and Dresden.185
This may have originated with RIAS, which had guessed that the SED would perhaps
dissolve the People’s Police when reporting on the Communiqué.186 Indeed, RIAS
continued to influence locals’ perception of events. Passengers on a train traveling
through the Görlitz countryside claimed that “[the SED] still had to go back [politically],
and go back even further.”187 These passengers also felt that the West German course was
indeed the correct one while other travelers discussed how they “now had to listen to
RIAS to know what exactly was going on.”188 One report concluded that it would be the
task of the local press to stomp out these types of rumors as quickly as possible, so that
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“class enemies and RIAS-listeners along with their hostile arguments are annihilated.”189
Indeed, during these times, outside news continued to be a problem, with this report
noting that, “The population, during the current situation, is especially receptive to the
lies of RIAS and the rest of the Western stations, and those that do listen largely spread
the lies further.”190

Conclusions
In the absence of accurate political polling, the mood reports do much to reveal a
regime that had lost its connection to the masses and to a certain extent, its own
functionaries. RIAS’s announcement presaged East Germans’ reception and acceptance
of the Communiqué. The station’s prescient remark that East Germans could now
confront functionaries face-to-face came to pass as emboldened residents openly
challenged SED functionaries, who now confronted the masses from a point of weakness.
An ascendant public, to be sure. Meanwhile, the SED failed in its quest to present its
political retreat as a maneuver that reflected its sincerity and courage. The weakness of
the regime that its critics sensed in the withdrawal from accelerated socialism was
similarly regarded as a failure by those functionaries who might be labeled true believers.
The question of German unity, central to the Politburo’s Communiqué, became a
predominant theme in not only conversations that praised the regime, but in those that
called for, or planned for, the SED’s demise. The Communiqué’s vague references to
reunification and the practical considerations concerning inter-zone traffic inspired
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grander hopes and ideas. Real news and rumors that reflected the hopes of East Germans
energized the rival public sphere and raised expectations. What once seemed highly
unlikely now seemed probable and even imminent, representing a legitimation crisis for
the government.
Rumors and improvised news severely undermined the government’s prestige and
authority. To suggest Pieck, Ulbricht, and Grotewohl garnered approval ratings before
June 11 that could have supported the popularity they claimed to enjoy would be false,
but the mood reports, if considered as a barometer of public popularity for the East
German leadership, reflected an almost impossibly low approval rating. Rumors
eviscerated the leadership’s socialist biographies that the party crafted (not that they were
fiction, of course) as the basis for the power they represented, and the three became
corpses, prisoners, or crooks on the run in the popular imagination. The rumored call for
the removal of the leaderships’ images from public spaces—an ersatz statue toppling—
signaled the masses’ sense that the regime was on its last legs. That the regime and those
who heard and repeated these rumors often tied them to radio broadcasts suggests that the
line between credible news and incredible news often blurred. Perhaps this should not
surprise, as the bifurcated media spheres served in many ways to reinforce political
preconceptions.
Above all, the regime had become challengeable and the exchanges within the
rival public sphere made revolution thinkable. That the population often relied on RIAS
for what they believed to be real news also meant that a localized rebellion the regime
might otherwise keep secret, could, in the rival public sphere, find a global audience. This
is the subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter Four
The Wildfire: Transmitting Political Power on June 17, 1953

“Today is the first time in a long time we can again freely and openly express our
opinion.”
-Wilhelm Grothaus, in a speech to workers in Dresden on June 17 as quoted by a Stasi
agent1

Workers’ strikes occurred in the GDR sporadically in the weeks before and after
the June 17 demonstrations, but the occasion’s name has always been tied to a single day.
On that Wednesday in 1953, nationwide public demonstrations unfolded in the GDR and
briefly appeared to threaten the nation’s existence.
What follows is less an investigation into what happened on June 16 and 17 than
it is an inquiry into how East Germans and RIAS experienced and communicated the
days’ events. In other words, it is an exploration into how participants and observers
heard about what was going on. Historians have largely pieced together the narrative, but
analysis of certain aspects of the June 17 events remain inadequately studied or disputed,
particularly the roles of nationalism and radio in shaping the occasion.
This chapter advances several arguments. First, contrary to what many have
argued, the events of June 17 were not entirely spontaneous. The localized
demonstrations that unfolded in Berlin on June 16 could probably be categorized as such,
but that evening, RIAS spread the news of their occurrence. Of course, since the
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announcement of the New Course, RIAS programming and improvised news had
diminished the prestige, legitimacy, and credibility of the government and rendered it
challengeable. So that Tuesday night when RIAS broadcasts discussed the Pilsen
rebellion and the mass demonstrations unfolding in Berlin they helped make revolution
thinkable throughout the GDR. Indeed, the station reported declarations of solidarity
from East and West Germany that endowed the occasion with national imaginings and
stirred hopes for reunification. In short, RIAS helped transform protest related to workers’
norms into questions that revolved around East Germany’s future. These broadcasts
stimulated conversations in the rival public sphere and came close to openly encouraging
protest. When employees arrived at work the next morning, they arrived armed with a
script for action and things unfolded nationally at a never-before-seen pace—radio had
changed everything. Throughout that morning, workers and residents gathered in public
and private spaces, aired grievances, and debated the nation’s economic and political
course. That afternoon, mass demonstrations marked the occasion when large sections of
the East German citizenry exercised “open, critical reasoning as an instrument of public
self-assertion.”2
This chapter will argue that the events on June 17 represented a distinctly modern
occasion as mass demonstrations endowed and guided by national imaginings. The
modern public demonstration, defined here as the occupation of public (or private) space
by a group of people that express political opinions—had its origin in the nineteenth
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century.3 Contrast this with the early modern riot where the collective action often took
place at the site of the perceived offense. In these cases, observers would likely identify a
direct link between cause and objective and the actors typically operated at the scene of
the offense. Modern demonstrations, on the other hand, feature collective action that
affirms a group’s identity and demonstrates strength while communicating political
demands. Another development to consider, according to Fillieule and Tartakoswky, is
that the demonstration “implies the existence of organizations that have, if not a strategy,
at least some capacity to control what is no longer a mob, and authorities prepared to
acknowledge its specific nature, or at least the existence of a public sphere.”4
Modern communications thus helped rally popular discontent so quickly as to
create the illusion that a nation erupted in a unified and “spontaneous” fashion. RIAS
allowed listeners to anticipate and envision collective action when it publicized and
helped nationalize the demonstrations in the days and hours leading up the seventeenth.
Radio broadcasts, rumors, telephone calls, and “whisper campaigns” characterized the
rival public sphere during the events in Dresden. These whisper campaigns, or
improvised news often unfamiliar to functionaries, circulated in the rival public sphere as
Dresdeners discussed the news out of Berlin and deliberated action.5
Internally, evaluations by the regional SED leadership in Dresden of the situation
argued that the West had planned the provocation well in advance. 6 Enemies, they argued,
had skillfully exploited the crisis of confidence that existed between the workers and the
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party in order to call for strikes and demonstrations.7 The SED insisted that the rapid
spread of the unrest, especially in Dresden and Görlitz, could be attributed to the longterm discontent among the workers, the weak ideological influence the Party had on these
workers, the Party organs’ lack of a foundation of trust with the masses, and functionaries’
inability to stem the tide of events during morning meetings.8 Among other methods,
according to the party, demonstrators used the telephone system, delegations, and strike
committees to attempt a fascist putsch.9 State security analysis noted that the tactics and
methods of the demonstrators [enemies] followed a consistent pattern. Ringleaders and
their helpers organized meetings whereby they spread the news that strikes had broken
out throughout the GDR. Then, workers’ rabble-rousing speeches called for abdication of
the regime and free elections and other similar demands. Organizers and speakers then
led marches to a particular location in the city where they incited the crowds with more
speeches and banners. Demonstrators called neighboring workforces to join by
demanding solidarity with striking workers and those who had been wounded in Berlin.
Youth reportedly went from workplace to workplace organizing the general strike. Interworkplace telephone calls and the notion of solidarity helped bring more demonstrators
into the fold and misleading rumors regarding the GDR’s leadership continued to
spread.10 The regime’s characterization of the demonstrations as the long-term work of
fascists remained the party’s official line until the 1990s.11 Considering these supposed
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preparations and tactics, it is little surprise that the notion of a “spontaneous uprising” did
not correspond with the SED’s interpretation.

News from Berlin
The June 17 demonstrations in Dresden had their immediate roots and inspiration
in the workers’ protests that began in Berlin several days earlier. The workers here, like
elsewhere in the GDR, took considerable issue with their norms, which remained
heightened (essentially the communist version of a pay cut) despite the New Course’s
generally lauded concessions. Demonstrations, some of which brought around 5,000
workers in Berlin into the streets, began in earnest as a response to the norms. During a
weekend retreat, a number of workers planned further demonstrations for the coming
week. When the SED held party meetings at several work sites on Monday, June 15, to
adopt “resolutions of gratitude” for raising the norms, protests broke out. By Tuesday,
June 16, an article in Die Tribüne, the state-controlled union paper of East Germany,
doubled down on the heightened norms and restated their importance to the East German
economy, sending workers streaming toward the center of Berlin. Carrying banners and
employing the use of several trucks with loudspeakers, the workers called for a general
strike and planned a demonstration for June 17, the next day.12 That evening, the SED
revoked the heightened norms. RIAS had carried the news of the June 15 and June 16
demonstrations and the protest resolutions that workers in Berlin had drafted and
forwarded to the East German government.13 A commentary by Eberhard Schütz pointed
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to the recent anti-government demonstrations in Pilsen, Czechoslovakia, which, he noted,
many at the station had been reluctant to discuss because of the events’ seeming
impossibility. But now, it seemed possible, according to those at the station, for
fundamental change to take place behind the Iron Curtain. Without explicitly calling for a
general strike, the station, as Christian Ostermann notes, “came close to open
encouragement” of protests.14 In an interview thirty years later, Schütz (correctly) noted
that the station never uttered this word[s] “General strike.”15 In fact, according to Schütz,
the station carefully guarded against fabricated slogans and reports. No one who visited
the station from East Berlin asked the staff to call for a general strike, and Schütz stressed
that broadcasters avoided word. Rather, RIAS reported only news of protest strikes and
work stoppages. Still, despite the word Generalstreik’s absence from RIAS broadcasts,
the idea that such an event had been planned or was imminent began to make its rounds
on June 17.16 For instance, the SED’s statement that the demonstrators in Dresden that
“marched in unison under the slogan: ‘General strike,’” suggests that such participants
had certainly adopted the idea.17
That evening, RIAS began to see in the demonstration’s potential for change in
Germany and broadcast declarations of solidarity. Schütz noted the recent victory
regarding the norms was one that the East Berlin workers shared with the entire East
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German population.18 “We feel bound with our listeners in East Berlin and throughout
East Germany in the effort to accomplish the most possible; to exploit the insecurities of
the [SED] functionaries.”19 Following Schütz’s commentary on the night of June 16,
Jakob Kaiser, Minster for All-German Issues (Minister für gesamtdeutsche Fragen)
reminded listeners in East Germany that “everyone in West Germany, just as in the entire
free world, is bound in solidarity with you.”20 “We appreciate the meaning and the
courage of your demonstrations,” he continued, “and we appreciate your demonstrations,
but please, trust in our solidarity and remain prudent.”21
At ten o’clock that evening, RIAS offered short reports on the various
demonstrations that had occurred throughout East Germany that day.22 From eleven P.M.
through six-thirty A.M., the station repeated the East Berlin workers’ (from all branches
of industry) call for a demonstration on Wednesday, June 17 at seven A.M. at
Strausberger Platz.23 These broadcasts repeated the above message while adding
numerous declarations of solidarity from West Germany, West Berlin, and West Berlin
workplaces.24
“Workday in the Zone” aired between five and six A.M. on June 17 and reported
on the struggles of the East German workers: “In the previous weeks we’ve reported to
you, dear listener, about the work stoppages in all districts of East Germany…because of
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these protests the regime [that is, the SED] has been driven back, step by step.”25 The
station also declared that on June 16, the protests, having gotten the norms lowered, had
now turned political and workers had begun demanding free elections and the resignation
of the regime. According to RIAS, the day’s “spontaneous” protests had produced a
slogan: “Tomorrow it continues.”26 From 5:36 until 5:42 A.M., Ernst Scharnowski,
chairman of the Berliner DGB (the West Berlin Workers’ Union), characterized the East
German workers’ democratic actions to improve their lot as “A natural right belonging to
all oppressed people.”27 Scharnowski concluded by stating the FGB’s solidarity [WC]
with the East German workers’ struggle to secure basic rights.28 This broadcast aired
again from 6:40 to 6:45 while the station also began reporting Wednesday’s planned
demonstration that began, on time, at 7:00 A.M., at Strausberger Platz.29
At 7:20 on Wednesday, June 17, “Berlin Speaks to the Zone” aired on RIAS and
recounted once again the protesters’ actions in Berlin from the previous day, which,
intentionally or not, served as a script in other areas of the GDR. Listeners throughout the
GDR learned from the station that “[workers] formed discussion groups and communist
functionaries were shouted down.”30 The reporter noted the demonstration columns
formed by the workers that subsequently moved through the city while protestors ripped
down communist slogans and carried their own banners. As the demonstrators moved
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through the city, Berliners jammed the streets and expressed their solidarity with the
workers with shouts of encouragement. Listeners heard of the demonstrators’ demands—
lowered norms, cheaper goods, resignation of the regime, and free elections. Finally, the
demonstrators commandeered two sound trucks that demanded the protestors disperse
and used them to broadcast their demands: “If you are a son of the nation [Volkes], join
us!”31
While the demonstrations prior to June 17 in Berlin might be considered
spontaneous, June 17 was different; specific criticisms, general themes, a place, and a
time had been set the evening before. The demonstrations that unfolded in Dresden, while
not planned in the same way as those in Berlin, should be understood as deliberate events,
prompted and inspired by the demonstrations in the capital. The rival public sphere
produced critical debates, whisper campaigns, speeches, written demands, or shouts in
unison, showcase the character of the demonstrations. In addition to undermining the
regime, unsanctioned communications confirmed communities—workers; East Germans;
Germans—that desired the same political changes, namely revolutionary change in the
governance of the GDR. These imagined communities, often expressed explicitly (and
ironically) with the term solidarity, formed the building blocks of a modern, nation-wide
demonstration.

In the Dresden Region
While authorities in Dresden regularly commented that functionaries and officials
were caught off guard by the sudden collective action they faced on Wednesday, this
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would seem to speak largely to the weak inter-governmental communications. Telephone
calls from the Central Committee in Berlin in the early morning hours warned the police
in the region that there were forces out of Berlin—probably referring to the Western
half—that planned to provoke unrest with the norms.32 The chief of police in Dresden
also received a call at four o’clock in the morning that ordered a state of preparedness
among all comrades in Dresden due to unrest in Berlin and various other regions.33 This
suggests that while the party’s intelligence had been outdone by the rival public sphere—
namely RIAS—the likelihood of something resembling a massive, nation-wide uprising
was not totally out of the question.
In retrospective testimonies, some conceived of the June 17 events in terms that
suggest things had been planned or expected. Of course, memories are imperfect
sometimes apply a teleological reasoning to historical experience so in one way such
claims must read with caution. Thus, we should maintain a skeptical stance when
witnesses claimed to have heard rumblings that something was going to happen. For
example, the party member who later stated that when his wife was on the streetcar the
previous Saturday, a passenger said to his daughter, “Well, little one, on June 17 this train
will head for a better future.”34 Or the functionary who confessed that he had heard from
another colleague at the hospital in Görlitz that “Something big was going to happen” on
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June 16, but he could not say exactly what.35 And in Meißen, the review noted that
workers had held an “illegal meeting” and that a worker claimed that he heard from the
Secretary of State that the time had come for everything to change.36 Such memories are
probably examples of retrospective determinism but they helped convince the SED that
the demonstrations had been secretly in the works for quite some time.
An analysis by the Department of Propaganda and Agitation in Dresden noted that
those who took to the streets and protested employed, as a rule, RIAS slogans, which
appealed to the workers. As for the period before demonstrations broke out, the review
noted that the provocateurs themselves remained out of view, where they operated a
whisper campaign.37 These records fail to mention the specific content of the so-called
whisper campaigns, perhaps because the officials were not privy to such insider
information. Either way, workers met in private spaces where they discussed national
policy and courses of action and in these spaces, revolution became thinkable.

Focal Points
Historians recognize large enterprises like Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz and the
LOWA works in Görlitz as origin points for the demonstrations in the region. Heidi Roth
has argued that the reason workers in these large-scale enterprises—who enjoyed
economic privilege when compared to those workers in other sectors of the economy—
rose up first was that they were employed in the largest enterprises in Dresden and had
strength in numbers. Furthermore, she suggests that these workers had experienced
“Situtationsbericht aus dem Bezirk Dresden der Gewerkschaft Gesundheitsw.” Gewerkschaft
Gesundheitswesen, Bezirkvorstand Dresden, Dresden, den 27.6, 1953 (SächsHStA 11857, IV2.12 Nr. 10).
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organized labor as an instrument of action and protest over the last thirty years.38 On the
other hand, Andrew Port has found these explanations problematic. He contends that they
do not explain why in many other cases these same workers opted not to take part in the
collective action, concluding that historians should guard against making generalizations
about what happened on June 17.39 One could add to Roth’s interpretation that workers
knew they had support not only within their own workplaces, but in Berlin as well, and
therefore it was extremely likely that a good number of workers recognized that a mass
movement was developing. One should also point to what are, perhaps, obvious
circumstances that proved conducive to collective action: these workers represented a
massive, routinized, and intimate labor force where rumor and secretive news traveled
faster than authorities could act.40 As noted earlier, RIAS’s role in the events remains
contentious among historians and witnesses who still debate the extent of the station’s
role on June 17. Roth has downplayed the role of foreign broadcasting, pointing out that
demonstrations also occurred in places where the station’s signal was quite weak. While
she notes that workers in these places listened to RIAS, it remains peripheral to her
interpretation. Another way to understand what happened in Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz
and other work places in the region is to consider that the RIAS broadcasts accomplished
several things.
First, RIAS had already endowed the demonstrations with national imaginings.
While the norms still figured into workers’ demands, RIAS had, since its broadcasts of
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the Berlin demonstrations, helped change the conversation from one centered on
localized economic concerns to one with national and international implications. These
broadcasts in turn stimulated workers’ conversation and helped generate conversations
and criticism of the government. Thus, smaller workers’ meetings helped individuals
become aware of a larger dissident community that could take action. So while RIAS
commentators never actually called for a general strike, they played a central role in
nationalizing the movement and must bear considerable responsibility for what happened
on June 17.
Hans Hundhausen, a worker at Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz, recalled that during
the previous week, workers discussed the existing problems in the GDR and railed
against those in power, but that in workers’ meetings (here meaning unofficial meetings)
strike threats had been unknown as of the morning of June 17. Reports suggest that a
“state of angst” existed in the workplace and that “RIAS slogans” had become
widespread.41 Hundhausen also recalls in his memoir that Berlin had only given the
“signal” [to strike] and that since the same conditions existed throughout the GDR, the
work stoppages developed “spontaneously.”42 More revealingly, Hundhausen notes that
during the morning hours at Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz, a “whisper campaign” notified
workers that they should meet at 9 A.M. at the coalbunker.43 This story is corroborated in
the SED’s record, which suggests that plans for the meeting had been hatched by the
workers’ beforehand and without official knowledge. One party member [Klengel]
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recalled that during the breakfast break, a colleague [Kühn] suddenly declared, “Now we
are going to a meeting,” authorities later confirmed that the workers had earlier been
working on a subversive plan of sorts.44 Five days later, the police would report that in
Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz, an address had gone out over the factory radio system that
morning slightly before workers met in the court of the factory.45 The first secretary of
the BPO had addressed the workers’ complaints regarding the heightened norms via
Betriebsfunk and, according to the police report, workers subsequently assembled in the
courtyard to protest. The regime announced that quotas had been made voluntary, which
like in Berlin, proved too late.46 It is unclear here whether the whisper campaign or the
radio address compelled the workers to gather and one must also consider that officials
might not have been aware of rumors or perhaps that the timing could simply be a
coincidence. Either way, hundreds (or perhaps even 1000, the exact numbers range,
depending on which source one wants to believe) of workers now stood in the courtyard
of Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz at approximately 9:30 in the morning.47 A makeshift
banner appeared in the assembled crowd, emblazoned with the word “Generalstreik.”48
Workers demanded discussions with officials, again noting that the regime had made
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mistakes and nothing had been done.49 A number of workers also struck out toward
Heidenau and the nearby ABUS factory.50
On the evening of June 16, Wilhelm Grothaus, who would act as a strike leader at
the ABUS Niedersedlitz (approximately 1.5km from Sachsenwerk), heard what he
remembered as a call for a general strike by the Berlin construction workers via RIAS
broadcasts. Again, we should remember that RIAS did not explicitly call for a general
strike, so he could either have misremembered this point or RIAS’s language could have
been close enough to such an appeal that the recollection serves to implicate RIAS in
spreading the demonstrations. Regardless, Grothaus recalled deciding that night that he,
along with his friends, would call for Dresdeners to strike in solidarity with those in
Berlin to fight against the “the system.”51 On the morning of the seventeenth, they formed
a strike committee and convened 1600 workers in the assembly hall where they
deliberated for (according to official reports) one and a half hours. They emerged from
this meeting and demanded access to the radio system, which they were unable to use.52
News did spread, however, with the help of the factory radio system that Otto Buchwitz,
a member of the Central Committee, and a respected figure with ties to the region, would
soon speak to workers at the courtyard of the nearby Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz.53 This
news then drew workers from ABUS to the courtyard.
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Several thousand had assembled in the courtyard sometime in the early afternoon
at Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz when Grothaus and the workers from ABUS arrived.54 By
now, the factory leadership at Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz had received a phone call from
the leadership at ABUS and knew of the approaching demonstration column—the
colleague who answered the phone reportedly saw between five and six hundred workers
approaching before he even hung up the phone.55 Upon his arrival at 13:30, Otto
Buchwitz noticed in several places placards calling for a general strike.56 Buchwitz spoke
to the assembled crowd of the problems surrounding German unity, but was unable to
garner sympathy from the workers for the regime’s position. He instead found himself
forced to debate the vastly more popular Grothaus. Grothaus stepped up and articulated
the demands of the “political struggle:” removal of the regime, elimination of
communism, release of all political prisoners, free and secret elections, and the
reunification of Germany. Most importantly, Grothaus’ words, roughly transcribed here
by a Stasi functionary, reinforced the ascendency of the rival public sphere on the
morning of June 17:
Today is the first time in a long time we can again freely and openly
express our opinion. True, we have a constitution that affords us certain
rights to speech and freedom of conscience—but that’s only on paper.
When have we ever been able to actually do so? We had no opportunity to
do this. The upper-level functionaries are supposed to indeed have their
ears to the masses, but if they had done that, they would have learned the
true opinion of the masses. I would like to know, just where they had their
ears until now. Well, they have been hovering in higher regions [not been
station’s words had such an effect that they might as well have. The ABUS plant is today Sächsischen
Brücken- und Stahlhochbau.
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listening to the masses], and for that reason, they couldn’t know. I believe
that there is no one among us who doesn’t want the unity of our fatherland
and peace, but we reject a unity and regime with moral constraint.57
The assembled workers greeted the list with applause.58 Grothaus repeated the
demands, and after Buchwitz claimed that Grothhaus had betrayed the working class,
Grothaus responded that the only way he could betray the working class, would be to
“abandon the workers who were now protesting in all cities.”59 Buchwitz urged the crowd
to return to work, but those gathered announced their plan to march to downtown
Dresden; they had already received reports—though it is not clear how—that
demonstrations had begun in the inner city.60
Similar scenes unfolded in workplaces around the Dresden region. Factory
courtyards became spaces of civic debate after rumors and reports regarding the “strike
movement” in Berlin spread among the workforce.61 In places where unrest developed,
the party continuously noted that various discussions led to work stoppages and,
according to the Regional Party Control Commission, the “organized work of the

“Sinngemässe Wiedergabe der Hetzrede des Grothaus, beschäftigt in VEB “Abus” Dresden-Niedersedlitz
am 17.6.53 zwischen 15,00 und 16,00 Uhr auf dem Werkhof im N.S.” Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz,
Dresden, den 19.6.53. Pg. 18 (BStU MfS, BV Dresden, AU 239/53): “Heute ist seit langer Zeit zum ersten
Mal wieder Gelegenheit seine Meinung frei und offen zum Ausdruck zu bringen. Wir haben zwar eine
Verfassung die uns Rede-und Gewissensfreiheit zuerkennt, aber das steht nur auf dem Papier. Wo konnten
wir bisher davon Gebrauch machen. Wir hatten ja bisher keine Gelegenheit dazu. Die hohen Funktionäre
sollen zwar das Ohr an der Masse haben, aber wenn sie das gehabt hätten, dann wüssten sie die wirkliche
Meinung des Volkes. Ich möchte wissen, wo sie bisher ihre Ohren gehabt haben. Aber sie schwebten ja in
höheren Regionen und darum konnten sie es auch nicht wissen. Ich glaube, es gibt keinen unter uns, der
nicht die Einheit unseres Vaterlandes und den Frieden will, wir lehnen aber eine Einheit und Regierung mit
Gewissenszwang ab.”
58
Karl Wilhelm Fricke, 17 Juni 1953, 115; “Situationsbericht über die faschistischen Provokation von
17.6.1953”
59
Ibid., 115, “Wenn ich jetzt die Arbeiter, die in allen Städten aufgestanden sind, im Stich lassen würde.”
60
“Situationsbericht über die faschistische Provokation von 17.6.1953.”
61
Bezirksbehörde der Deutschen Volkspolizei (SächsHStA 23/18 Bl.49; Bl.8).
57

203

enemies” was palpable even where they were not successful in initiating provocation.62 In
Görlitz, official analysis pointed to the rumors that had been circulating there in the days
prior that called for the removal of President Pieck’s images. 63 These types of discussions,
generated by the Resolution of June 11 again, at least according to one report, became the
topic of debate on the morning on June 17 when groups of colleagues gathered. Before
the demonstrations began, there were conversations pertaining to the working conditions,
which had not improved since the announcement of the New Course, but rather, had
deteriorated.64 In the LOWA factory in Görlitz, 600 employees stopped working at 9:45
and marched to other factories where workers joined their demonstration. The workers by
that time, according to police reports, had planned a demonstration to take place at
Leninplatz, under the slogan, “We declare solidarity with the Workers in Berlin.”65 In the
nearby VEB Feinmechanik und Optik, the issue of the norms had become a subject of
serious debate and as such, inspired the workers join in the LOWA workers’ protest
march.66
Not all workers chose to take to the streets. In a number of enterprises, workers
debated the effectiveness of the events in Berlin and Dresden, sometimes electing not to
strike. The news of unrest at Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz reached the gas works in Löbau
around noon—basically as events unfolded. Those at this factory learned that the workers
at Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz had resolved to strike and had begun marching toward the

“Bericht über Verhalten von Partei und Leitungsmitgliedern während der faschistischen Provokation und
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city center. The news reportedly triggered considerable debate among the workers at the
gas works whether such measures were necessary. In the end, the workers reached a
nearly unanimous decision to refrain from demonstrating based on the regime’s
recognition of its past mistakes.67
In the VEB Phänomen-Werk 1 in Zittau, a truck factory, 2,000 workers put down
their tools and demanded that factory leadership immediately organize a meeting in the
courtyard of the factory. Management here granted permission and promptly fielded
questions from the assembled workers concerning what was transpiring in Berlin. The
answers provided, whatever they might have been, failed to pacify the workers. Several
workers stepped to the microphone where they stirred up the crowd and called for a
demonstration. Workers also approved a resolution, which, according to party
functionaries, had been prepared beforehand. The resolution called for the overthrow of
the regime, increased wages, lowered HO prices, and the release of all political
prisoners.68 The demonstration never took place, as news of the state of emergency made
it to the factory.69
Some workers learned of others’ demonstrations before arriving to work in the
early afternoon. In the Oberlausitzer Textilveredlungswerk the early shift went as
expected. Those who arrived to work the second shift at 2:00 P.M. already knew of the
events in Berlin and now, Görlitz.70 Before beginning their shift, workers congregated in
the courtyard in the factory to discuss the news. Functionaries’ attempts to confront the
“Betriebsfriedenrat Gaswerk Joliot-Curie Dresden,” 19 Juni (SächsHStA 11857, IV/2.12 Nr. 8).
Volkspolizei-Kreisamt Zittau an die Bezirksbehörde der Deutschen Volkspolizei Operativ-stab, Dresden,
N 15, 27. Juni 1953 (SächsHStA 23/18 Bl.227).
69
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Löbau (SächsHStA IV2.12 Nr. 10).
67
68

205

workers in the courtyard failed as they discussed their solidarity with Berlin and Görlitz ,
and the five-point program for which they now (allegedly, according to the SED)
fought.71
In Meißen, discussions in the morning hours at the Kabelwerk factory revolved
around the heightened norms, which had since been reduced to the previous (accepted)
levels. Sometime after lunch, a workers’ meeting revealed that workers no longer
concerned themselves with the norms, but rather, bigger issues, or as one worker put it:
“Germany.”72 This worker called for a “sympathy strike” for their “brothers in Berlin,”
which met applause from his fellow workers.73 Still surprisingly, at least to the
functionaries present, the workers went back to work after this episode.74
At one school in Görlitz, a students’ meeting unfolded and a drafted resolution
that called for East Germans to live in peace with Czechs and Poles, who, like themselves,
lived under Soviet repression. This, they argued, bound them together more closely than
the nearby border [the Oder-Neisse] separated the two groups.75
The organized and deliberate meetings held by workers the morning of June 17
suggests that the demonstrations had an (at least partially) a deliberate and scripted
impetus, rather than a spontaneous generation. Critical resolutions and declarations of
solidarity undermined the SED by not only attacking its program, but by recognizing the
presence and activity of other dissident movements. Within these discussions, workers
became involved in critical debates with a national scope. The discussions and private
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meetings also underscore the deliberations that took place before a consensus was
reached as far as how those present would act.
Radio’s Reach
One of the more difficult questions to answer pertains to RIAS and other Western
stations’ reach on the morning of June 17. In a number of cases, the party later identified
those who had taken part in the demonstrations as enthusiastic RIAS listeners, such as
one dockworker (employed in a factory besieged that morning by RIAS rumors/news)
who demanded the Soviets’ removal from Germany.76 Or consider those workers who
left a courtyard after a meeting instigated by known RIAS listeners.77 Another noted
RIAS-listener in Dresden had established himself as a rumor mongerer by informing his
co-workers of Pieck’s “timeout” and, according to officials there, “probably” spread the
rumor that there would be a new regime in August. He had heard this from another
colleague who had, according to reports, either regularly listened to RIAS or knew of an
“underground movement.”78 While there is little doubt that RIAS could claim a wide and
enthusiastic listenership in Dresden, such incidents might also shaded by the SED’s
insistence that the West used foreign broadcasting to help carry out an orchestrated
rebellion in the GDR.
When referencing RIAS or others in regard to the events of June 17, functionaries
often claimed ignorance of the station’s broadcasts, but also recognized the influence and
tactical advantage they provided critics and dissidents. As one SED official put it:
“Bericht über Verhalten von Partei und Leitungsmitgliedern während der faschistischen Provokation und
über typische Einzelfälle.” BPKK Dresden, den 28.6.1953, Ull/b. (SächsHStA 11857 IV/2.4 Nr. 60 Bl.7).
77
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Juni 1953, Ha/Ro. (SächsHStA 11857, IV2.12 Nr. 10).
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….I must be totally clear and plainly stress that, yes, there were errors, that
certainly we must discuss, and there were inadequacies in our own
factories and in the city that were irresponsible. [But] I would like to
remind everyone that, regarding the conditions on 17 June in Berlin, only
those who listened to RIAS, NWDR or other western stations were in the
know.
I myself have a radio, but I can’t hear because of [SED-induced]
interference. But, when I arrive at work and no one [appears to] know
anything, and then suddenly everyone is in the streets and martial law has
already been declared, that’s a problem and the functionaries and the
factory leaders have already failed. Those who are not informed of the
truth about events and only find out days later what’s really going on, are
angry when they don’t learn the true facts from those who are
responsible.79
In some cases, those who later claimed not to have taken part in the strikes or
demonstrations merely asserted that the discussions stemmed from the reports that came
“from outside.”80 For example, at the power plant in Dresden, one functionary claimed to
recall that in the early morning hours, he overheard a teenager in the coat closet openly
declare, “Today it’s to be decided whether the East German construction workers will
strike.”81 In the RFT Funkwerk (a radio and communications firm) in Dresden,
functionaries noted that “continuous listening in to Western radio stations” along with
telephone calls and messengers “continuously kept negative forces informed of the events
“Betr.: Protokoll der Diskussion anlässlich der am 22.7.1953 stattgefundenen Belegschaftsversammlung
unseres Werkes,” SED Betriebsparteiorganisation VEB Trafo und Röntgenwerk Dresden, Dresden den
23.7.1953, S.16 (SAPMO-BArch DC 1/1829): “Aber ich muß hier ganz klar und deutlich betonen, dass es
Fehler gab, über die wir ganz besonders sprechen müssen und das es auch bei uns im Betrieb und in der
Stadt Unzulänglichkeiten gab, die unverantwortlich sind. Ich möchte daran erinnern, dass über die
Zustände am 17. Juni in Berlin nur diejenigen Bescheid wussten, die RIAS, NWDR oder einen anderen
Westdeutscher Sender hörten. Ich selbst habe ein Radio, mit dem ich vor Störungen nicht hören kann. Aber
wenn ich auf Arbeit komme und man weiss von nichts und dann geht man auf die Strasse und der
Ausnahmezustand ist schon verhängt, so ist das schlecht und die Funktionäre und die Betriebsleitung haben
versagt. Ein Mensch, der über die wahren Dinge nicht unterrichtet ist und erst nach Tagen erfährt, was los
ist, ist ungehalten, wenn er nicht den wahren Sachverhalt von den verantwortlichen Menschen erfährt.” The
interference (Störung) referred to hear made the station more difficult to tune, but still accessible to anyone
with a bit of patience. In the wake of the demonstrations, the SED would increased the level of interference.
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in Dresden and Berlin.”82 Here, these dissident workers who had been listening to
Western stations (unnamed, but probably RIAS or maybe NWDR) took control of the
house radio system and tried to seize control of the situation by urging part of the
workforce to take to the streets. Such efforts reportedly failed after functionaries stepped
in.83 According to the official report, the Western stations demanded that the workforce
strike and demonstrate, a request followed by a number of workers and comrades. Other
groups stayed behind in the factory and in a workers’ meeting, elected a commission
charged with formulating the demands of the workforce. This led to political demands
that called for the regime to be overthrown.84 Similarly, in a shop, two men called for a
staff meeting, apparently with little regard for keeping their intentions secret. Officials
noted that they shared information gathered from RIAS, including a five-point-program
that served as a basis for the discussions. The two men reportedly argued that for eight
years they had been cheated and that it (likely meaning the SED’s brand of socialism)
was all a scam.85
The workers’ meetings in the morning and early afternoon of 17 June represented
the inability of the SED to restrain an emboldened rival public sphere at this point. In
these spaces, often courtyards, workers did not spontaneously initiate strikes (as opposed
to the work stoppages necessary to hold such meetings), but rather deliberated and
debated not only the perceived injustices facing workers, but also the discussions
pertaining to national issues that the rival public sphere had inspired. By drafting
“Bericht” SED Kreisleitung IX Dresden KPKK, Vertrauliche Verschlusssache Tgb 602/nr. 259/53,
Dresden den 22.12.53. (SächsHStA 11857 IV/2.4 Nr. 061 Bl.42): “Durch ständiges Abhören von
Westsendern, durch Anrufe von Außen und durch angesandte Kuriere hatten sich negative Kräfte im
Funkwerk weitgehend über die Vorgänge in Berlin und Dresden informiert.”
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resolutions and proclaiming solidarity with other protest-minded workers, they imagined
communities of dissidents throughout the Dresden region and the GDR. The methods of
communication also changed. The whisper campaigns of the early morning hours became
louder as the number of workers aware of what was unfolding in Berlin, the region, and
perhaps other locales, grew.
The SED’s Radio Address
Sometimes rumors and misinformation stemming from the GDR outlets
influenced participants’ vision of what was unfolding in Dresden. Lothar Besser, a
student at a vocational school recalled a run-in with two Soviet soldiers, one of whom
knocked a fellow student from his bicycle with the butt of his rifle. The soldiers
apparently believed that the demonstrators were American saboteurs, a story spread by
GDR radio at the time.86
As the SED’s power and credibility ultimately rested in the appearance that a
unified community of East Germans supported its existence, GDR presented the uprising
as the work of outsiders, namely foreign agents and fascists. These forces, according to
the SED’s official line, now reacted to the SED’s efforts (meaning the New Course) to
improve living standards.87 Others who might have been skeptical of the news—often
perceived as rumor—might have been swayed by the GDR’s radio address, which
admitted that unrest had become widespread. In an unsent letter he composed to a friend
in Munich, Gottfried Schmidt arrived early to his office and heard discussions
surrounding the reports from Berlin. This seemed unlikely to him at the time, but when
GDR radio reported the unrest, he knew something was happening. By early afternoon,
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reports had trickled in that similar unrest had spread to other cities and telephone calls
confirmed the rumors.88

The Soundscape of Protest and the Reach of RIAS
Radio, rumors, whisper campaigns, chants, and a distinct buzz rounded out the
soundscape of revolt through the morning hours of June 17. The pattern unfolded
throughout the region and the GDR; radio waves carried the message into private homes
and establishments and workers and residents spread the news at work in private
meetings. In these audible spaces, dissidents challenged the regime’s authority and claim
to the future. Around noon, marching workers had begun to stream into the city center of
Dresden and the small towns in its orbit. Meanwhile, those outside the factories learned
of the events that had been unfolding locally and throughout the GDR in a number of
ways. A number of witnesses note that Wednesday, 17 June 1953 was a beautiful, hot day
in East Germany and some claim that “something eerie” could be sensed in the air that
day.89 Others, like housewife Hannelore Kuhn, already knew about the strikes developing
in Berlin by listening to RIAS, but recalled thinking that Berlin was quite far away and
Dresden seemed peaceful. Still, everything seemed so quiet that afternoon that she had
become uneasy. She remembered that the normal cacophony created by the workers—
hammering, knocking, a cement mixer, men on scaffolding—was missing and the
scaffolds were empty. She then heard a Soviet tank rumble into the intersection, which
pleased her little boy. Still, Hannelore found the tank a bit unsettling so she walked to the
park with her son where other mothers watched their children.90 She soon learned that
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strikes and demonstrations had broken out “everywhere” and the prisons had been
stormed. Those who were closer to the city center began hearing the chants of protest
after lunch or an “exceptional din” emanating from the streets.91
News reports and the news of news reports—sometimes RIAS, sometimes
others—helped bring groups and individuals to places of protest. Such information,
although its origin is unclear, brought Klaus Lindner, for example, to his job at
Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz early (around noon) on June 17. Upon his arrival he found the
crowd assembled in the factory yard.92 Elsewhere in Dresden, Siegfried Bannack, a metal
worker in Dresden recalled the strange feeling in the air as he walked through Platz der
Einheit (today, Albertplatz) and Nord Platz (Olbrichtplatz today) after work. The usual
passersby now stood in small groups and spoke insistently to one another. Bannack
suggests that by this point—probably early afternoon—even those without access to
Western radio stations knew something unusual was happening as tanks rumbled through
parts of town. He set off toward home and passed groups of residents in the city
cloistered together, discussing the news. He ran into a neighbor who explained to him
that Berliners were striking. Bannack quickly tuned into RIAS, where a reporter in Berlin
excitedly stated that gunfire had forced him to take cover behind a tipped over
construction trailer. He immediately called his brother and father from a payphone and
told them the news before meeting up with a friend.93
Information spread quickly that morning, often reaching students in the classroom
in the early morning hours and demonstrating just how quickly the news spread from
RIAS to public places. In Dresden, for instance, a student stormed into his classroom and
Ibid., 178: “außergewöhnlichen Lärm”
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informed his classmates that the workforce of a local factory had gone into the streets to
demonstrate—and that it had something to do with the events transpiring in Berlin.
“Imagine,” said the student who brought the news, “if our regime has to resign, perhaps
we are a bit closer to German reunification.”94 The teacher appeared and told the students
to immediately take the street car home (which probably no longer operated), and to stay
away from the Postplatz.95 Perhaps not surprisingly, the students headed directly to the
Postplatz.96
Radio also informed residents in the Dresden region’s smaller towns of the
demonstrations and potential for national change. Exactly how many people listened to
these reports is probably impossible to ascertain, but as in other locales, residents often
assembled in the streets and began to strengthen their numbers as they marched to the
town squares.97 Ingrid Anders in Hoyerswerda recalled that everyone in her office had
grown restless wondering what was going to happen, as they had learned from the radio
that something was going on in Berlin.98 In Zittau, Gottfried Schinke, a metalworker
remembered that there was a certain tension in the air. He noted that the adults/senior
colleagues (he was an apprentice) had apparently heard a lot to talk about that morning as
they stood around in groups talking amongst themselves. A student in Niesky recalled
that some reports regarding the actions in Berlin made their way to the town in the
morning and “awakened hope for a change.”99 In Radebeul, Barbara Mohr, an assistant
surgeon at the hospital noticed that in the morning hours, as the staff began its
Ibid., 154-55: “Stellt euch mal vor, wenn unsere Regierung zurücktreten müsste, vielleicht wären wir da
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consultation hour (Sprechstunde) the waiting room was empty. She went outside the
hospital with several co-workers and took in the morning sun, but slowly become more
unnerved as the usual patient load failed to materialize. Finally, someone informed them
to tune into the radio which was reporting the strikes in Berlin in the Stalinallee along
with the news that the Russians were soon going to impose a curfew. A nurse who lived
close by procured a radio and with some difficulty, tuned into a Western station. They
listened to the movement in Berlin and recalled hearing that the Russians looked to move
in with tanks.100
Günter Jarzombek in Löbau had received a call from his colleague in Görlitz in
the evening on June 16. He had told him that demonstrations had begun in the streets and
in the Neumarkt. The next morning, Jarzombek called his colleges in Görlitz and asked
what was going on. His colleagues there told him that Stalin busts and pictures of
Ulbricht and other leaders were being tossed into the streets.101 Elsewhere in Löbau, a
curious man first heard it from the local butcher who informed him that something was
going on in Berlin and that announcements centered around HO prices while reports (of
an unknown origin) discussed free elections and political prisoners that had been released
in the GDR. The woman next to him suggested such news could be RIAS-hoaxes. Shortly
after he came across a meeting in which workers demanded to know what was
happening—especially in Görlitz where they heard shots had been fired and workers
were dead.102 By noon in Görlitz, demonstrators had begun to appear at Leninplatz.
Hartmut Jatzko, then fourteen years old, had been at school reciting the lessons of the
great October Revolution when the school suddenly sent the students home around noon.
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His brother rode by on his bike and shouted that they were “cleaning out the Party
Palace.”103 Things seemed to be happening quickly, and it took several minutes for the
young man to understand that a demonstration was unfolding. He tuned into RIAS and
raised the volume. The station had by now reported that an uprising existed in Berlin and
other cities. After hearing the news, he immediately headed to the city center.104 Bärbel
Timm, another student in Görlitz arrived at school to find her classroom empty. She
returned home early and her father, who lay sick in bed excitedly called Bärbel into the
room. “Listen to this!” said her father as his radio aired the RIAS broadcasts, “there’s an
uprising in Berlin!”105 Then her grandmother, who lived in the back of the house called
him: “Listen—what is that—the clamor outside?”106 Cases also existed in which family
members living in other cities relayed RIAS news by telephone. Functionaries observed,
for example, a worker in a textile factory receiving calls from his father, who listened to
RIAS. He then passed on the information, shouting that, “Yeah, if they want to go ahead
and allow free elections, then they’ll really get a sense of how things are.”107
Werner Herbig described a nascent unrest among the population in Görlitz as a
nascent one, wherein residents had begun to tell each other that things simply had to
change.108 The workers had grown restless in the area and now an “Uprising was clearly
in the air.”109 Herbig recalled that RIAS had been hesitant the day before (June 16]) when
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reporting on the strikes in Berlin, because, according to him, the Americans did not know
how the Berlin strikes would develop. He tuned in early on the morning of June 17 before
heading to the police station to pick up his disability pass (he had been shot through the
shoulder in the war) when the police suddenly distributed steel helmets and sent officers
into the city.110
In a 1983 interview, program director Schütz recalled that throughout that
Wednesday, RIAS received a continuously growing number of reports that underlined the
extent of the protests. These reports came from cities and towns, large and small
throughout the GDR. Schütz noted that the activities in the provinces seemed to reflect, in
certain ways, what had happened in Berlin. For example, he remembered that when
demonstrators stormed a prison in one city and freed the prisoners word got back to the
station where the event was reported. Shortly thereafter, in another town a prison would
be stormed, suggesting to those at the station that they were indeed responsible for
inflaming the demonstrations. Unfortunately, no record exists of the information that
made its way from the regions to RIAS headquarters. Those participants and observers
who did share information with the station probably did so by telephone.111

Efforts to get Control
Hannah Arendt has referred to public places where collective action takes
develops as “spaces of appearance,” which represent areas of political freedom where
individuals come together and act in concert. The space of appearance is where
participants can, through their collective and public visibility, reactivate their citizenship,
110
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neutralize inequalities and, at least temporarily, generate political power—a useful
description for the demonstrations on June 17 in Dresden and elsewhere in the GDR. One
can recognize that urban marches and the occupation of public space represent key scenes
in the modern revolutionary script, whether the march to Versailles in October, 1789, or
through the streets of Dresden in 1848.112
Such spaces also became official spaces of surveillance, wherein the state
attempted to disband the groups of demonstrators that had congregated in public spaces
by forbidding foot and automobile traffic.113 Such a state of emergency had existed in
Berlin since 1:00 P.M.114 RIAS interrupted their reporting at 1:44 P.M. to announce the
Soviet Military Commandant’s declaration of a state of emergency in Berlin. In Dresden,
from 2:00 P.M. on, authorities enforced a similar state of emergency and requested that
citizens behave peacefully and quietly return to work.115 This categorically forbade
demonstrations, meetings, congregations, and imposed a curfew on locales such as
theaters, bars, and museums, that would begin at 9:00 P.M.116 The order, which forbade
groups of more than three from gathering in streets and spaces and public buildings,
sought to dissolve the so-called discussion groups that had formed in the streets.117
Functionaries with megaphones continuously ordered the demonstrators to scatter.118
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Soviet forces deployed loudspeaker cars to repeatedly broadcast the orders.119 The news
did little to dissuade demonstrators and potential demonstrators, while functionaries often
received the information over the radio and had little idea how to act.120 As demonstrators
continued to stream into city centers in the early afternoon hours, the measures appeared
futile for the time being.

Spaces of Appearance: Postplatz and Theaterplatz in Dresden
As workers and residents occupied public spaces, they realized the potential for
collective action. Significant places where protestors gathered included market squares in
the city of Dresden and popular urban crossroads and traffic interchanges, most notably
Postplatz. At the state theater in the heart of Dresden, so-called reactionary elements had
already begun to challenge the regime and exacerbate a negative mood by spreading socalled RIAS-slogans among the workforce, according to the regime. During a meeting,
workers here received word that a large portion of the workforce of Sachsenwerk
Niedersedlitz and other factories were moving toward the middle of the city. Those
present drafted a resolution and elected to strike. Workers at the neighboring Zwinger
Palace had also called a solidarity strike.121 The information received proved correct, and
workers and residents from the region began converging on the city center, chiefly in the
Postplatz and Theaterplatz.
In Dresden, public transportation had stopped running sometime earlier in the
morning. Streetcars rested in a long line that extended from the Postplatz over the river to
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Neustädter Markt.122 Now, public address vehicles allegedly communicated an order that
groups of more than three persons disband or be shot.123 Trucks, motorcycles, and armed
soldiers weaved through the crowd in attempts to prevent demonstrators from coagulating
into a core of greater density and number.124
The rumors from the week before, which claimed that the pictures and works of
socialism’s leading men—Pieck, Grotewohl, Stalin, and Ulbricht were to be removed
(and often were)—led to the same thing happening in the Postplatz. Next to the Zwinger
Palace, a large steel frame supported an oversized effigy of Stalin. Demonstrators
climbed the structure and yelled down to those below: “Should it come down?”125
According to one witness, this was the moment when things turned rowdy as the crowd
tore down the image.126
A motif of the June 17 demonstrations included the protestors’ desire to connect
to other dissidents, whether in the same factory, in the same city, or nationally, and
continue to organize and inspire collective action. With several thousand demonstrators
occupying the heart of Dresden, a group seized control of the city’s Stadtfunk sometime
in mid-to-late afternoon (around 4:00 P.M. according to comprehensive FDGB report.
Stasi reports suggest this happened earlier and Roth makes no mention of the incident).
According to another witness, this radio system was actually used by the
Verkehrsbetriebe in a pavilion at the Postplatz.127 An unidentified individual gave the
announcement that a state of emergency had been declared, but no demonstrators should
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go home, along with “fascist slogans” and announcements critical of the regime.128
Instead, the radio announcement invited protestors to a demonstration at Grunaer Street
(Dresden’s first socialist street!) along with instructions to assemble “not in small groups,
but in lines.”129 Anti-regime proponents gathered in small groups at the Postplatz and
continued planning. In one group of youths, word circulated that the demonstration would
continue on June 18 and that the Fernmeldamt (telegraph building) would be stormed
then, too.130 Located next to rubble heaps that supplied demonstrators with rocks to
bombard police forces, the Fernmeldamt (also referred to as Telegraphenamt by
Volkspolizei) came under attack of the demonstrators. They ripped down the political
slogans and wrangled with the police.131 Ultimately, the barracked police were able to
secure the building by firing warning shots as a demonstrator in the crowd with a
megaphone shouted at the police not to shoot.132 The deployment of the police and Soviet
forces prevented planned demonstration from fully materializing.133 At this point another
memorable tone entered the soundscape of the demonstration, as the rumbling of tank
treads could be heard in the distance.

Radio in Görlitz
In Görlitz, the soundscape of revolution evolved from whisper campaigns and
private meetings in the morning to discussion groups in public spaces while assembled
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crowds sang songs and chanted slogans. As in Dresden, residents, often informed by
RIAS broadcasts, occupied public squares and the demonstrators’ voices occupied
audible space, forcing the regime to deploy loudspeaker trucks and disperse the
discussion groups. Roth notes demonstrators in Görlitz achieved a higher level of
rebellion, which she attributes to a number of factors, most notable, the city’s location
next to the Polish border (residents could actually see their old houses across the OderNeisse border!), which had incensed residents for years, housing shortages, and higherthan-average unemployment.134 While these factors surely contributed to the level of
unrest in Görlitz, radio transmissions contributed to the popular belief that events in
Görlitz were part of a national demonstration.
As students headed home from school in the early afternoon, the chants and calls
from the city center could be heard in the distance.135 This helped draw thousands to the
market square where witnesses recalled that they had never seen so many gathered in this
space.136 An electrician, likely in league with the demonstrators, had connected a
microphone to the city public address system.137 The system’s speakers hung throughout
the inner city and early in the afternoon broadcasted the demonstration taking place in
front of the town hall. Those present discussed how quickly a new and legitimate regime
could be erected and the possibility of German reunification.138 Demonstrators grabbed a
table from an Aufklärungslokal, which they then used as a speaking platform for what
had evolved into a sort of provisionary government.139 Of course by now, the reports
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from Berlin had been circulating and the crowd would not settle for small-time demands:
instead, it seemed to those present that the time had come to remove the ruling regime
and dissolve its apparatuses.140 A young student elsewhere in the city recalled suddenly
hearing the “Deutschlandlied” blasting from the speakers: “That truly gave us the feeling
that things had reached a turning point.”141 Others echoed this sentiment, with one
participant later claiming that “The highpoint was probably when demonstrators sang the
great chorus of the true German national anthem.”142 A good number present found
themselves moved to tears, while for some younger residents, singing the national anthem
in such a context provided a new type of experience. “It was the high point for me when
everyone sang the national anthem… I knew such a song existed and was familiar with
the text and melody because of my mother, but now I truly heard it, meaningful and
fervent.”143 Benedict Anderson suggests that national anthems, when sung, allow for a
singular occurrence of community and simultaneity; an impression of unisonance, full of
national imaginings.144

Rumors
It remains difficult to determine what, exactly, individuals knew of events outside
their locales as events unfolded throughout the GDR. As before, rumor often contained a
certain amount of truth. For example, analysis of June 17 produced by the local SED
noted that rumors regarding the abdication of the regime and the police (who, it was
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claimed, stood with demonstrators) helped provocateurs gather support for their cause.145
In other cases, local news deviated wildly from what historians know to have transpired.
As one intern in Dresden later put it, “A lot of rumors circulated, but no one truly knew
what was going on.”146 Of course, the young man does not speak for everyone and many
likely unknowingly mistook false rumors as true news.
The SED classified such communications as disinformation. Records and witness
recollections indicate that a number of residents felt the GDR was in the midst of a
political turn on June 17. In other words, to a number of onlookers and participants, the
moment for change had arrived. Werner Stoll, a student at the time, remembers that
rumors whirred through the decks of the steamboat he traveled on between Riesa and
Dresden, but always in low voices in order to keep things secret.147 The source of the
rumors came into focus when the steamboat docked and it became apparent that the
streetcars and busses no longer ran. Other rumors, which might seem ridiculous or
innocuous still reveal the confusion and anger present on June 17. Rosemarie Ulbricht, a
young girl in Görlitz at the time, remembered hearing that a revolution had taken place or
the currency had been demonetized, prompting her to close her bank account and buy a
watch before she even saw a protest march.148 An example of a more foreboding rumor
arose in Görlitz, where Georg Walter arrived early to work and heard right away that a
dead dog hung in the Obermarkt and underneath someone had written, “That was the first
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dog that died a terrible death!”149 He claims he was never able to confirm the validity of
this rumor.
The whereabouts and status of the SED leadership remained a hot topic on June
17. RIAS addressed this topic sometime in the mid-morning during an interview with
Otto Nuschke, representative of the Council of Ministers of the GDR and leader of the
CDU (GDR). When asked where the three leaders were now, Otto Nuschke claimed
truthfully that Pieck was recovering in the Soviet Union and the other two remained in
Berlin.150 One might also note that such a question posed by RIAS, in an underhanded
way, suggested that the SED’s leadership situation remained hazy and seemed to give at
least some credence to the improvised news that circulated widely enough to prompt the
question. Indeed, the destruction of the party’s leadership through rumor mongering
seems to have continued unabated. At the Trust Company in Dresden, the managing
director was seen removing Pieck’s image from the wall and remarking, “He is dead
anyways!”151 And in nearby Löbau, reports indicated that images of Pieck, Stalin, and
Grotewohl were removed at the town pool.152 Elsewhere in Dresden, a functionary at the
public prosecutors’ office stated that GDR radio carried the news that Pieck was dead,
Ulbricht had been arrested and that 20,000 workers were now striking.153 Only the last bit
of information here was true. Of course, this news probably stemmed from RIAS and
earlier improvised news as the domestic GDR stations mostly played music that day, so it
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is likely this information stemmed from a rumor. 154 In Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz
workers had continued to discuss the alleged the various fates (death, arrest, abdication)
of party leadership to the extent that the Party Secretary of the BPO countered these
“baseless” rumors over the factory radio system, suggesting that functionaries here
recognized the pervasiveness of improvised news.155
It seems that no locale was immune to rumor. Rumors also swirled in Oberschule
West in Dresden. Here, students claimed that the regime had fled, the Russians had
attacked the Germans, striking was now permitted and democratic rights had been
introduced, that the Russians had used bloodhounds, and that Otto Nuschke had left.156
Only the last bit of information had some truth to it: Nuschke had indeed been
apprehended at the West German border in Berlin—as reported by RIAS at 3:00 P.M.157
At the trade school in Dresden a rumor circulated that Otto Nuschke had fled to the West
and Walter Ulbricht had been shot.158 The latter was a persistent (false) rumor appeared
elsewhere in the June 17 reports. Similar rumors circulated at the schools in Görlitz.
Erika Morgenstern, a schoolgirl in Görlitz remembered the superintendent storming into
her classroom and telling students to collect the portraits that hung on the walls. “Should
these images be thrown away?” she wondered, “but these were the holiness of the
GDR?”159 In Meißen, party officials found themselves dealing with “enemy activity” that
spread a number of rumors: war was just around the corner (a potentially true rumor); the
154
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regime had fled or been neutralized in some fashion or another (this could be construed
as correct, at that moment), and that the Americans had already mobilized, presumably in
preparation for a GDR invasion (false). The later rumor (or hope)—that help from the
Americans was imminent—also appeared in Görlitz, when a crowd assembled in front of
the town hall, one of the chants called for the regime to open the western border because
the Americans were “with them.”160
Local and national information, appearing as rumors to some, and good news to
others, even penetrated the walls of the prison in Bautzen. Two prisoners remembered
sympathetic guards keeping the prisoners abreast of the strikes in the capital as the
construction workers in Berlin protested the norms: “I could hardly believe
it…something was up, here we go!” he recalled thinking.161 But it was not clear exactly
what, aside from a chance for a revolution and it seemed likely that in such a case, the
Americans would have to intervene. Beck recalled that messages reached the inside of the
prison on June 17 and informed inmates that the “uprising had spread throughout the
larger cities in the GDR and even, to some degree, the provinces.”162 News that probably
stemmed from RIAS broadcasts continued to make its way to the prisoners. By now, the
guards allegedly stood “on the side” of the prisoners and news continued to detail what
had become a national uprising, with prisons stormed in Cottbus and protestors fired
upon in Berlin. Beck recalls wondering how the Allies would react: were they willing to
risk starting a war? Another prisoner remembered little in the way of sounds from the
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uprising from outside the prison walls, but rumors circulated throughout the prison. For
others, the sound of tank treads signaled something was up.163 That evening, inmate
Hans-Georg Güntzel claimed to recall that prisoners could hear the chants of
demonstrators calling for freedom. The next morning, prisoners noted that rumors
continued to swirl through the prison.164 Such rumors—partly true, partly false—would
continue to beleaguer the SED throughout the following weeks and draw more attention
from party officials.

Re-writing Revolution: Banners and Placards
Despite the quasi-makeshift nature of the June 17 events, the methods by which
demonstrators communicated revolution and power reveal that some protestors probably
anticipated a public demonstration. This happened in several different ways. The first
resolutions and lists of demands found inspiration, if not their content, in the demands
aired in Berlin. Banners and leaflets appeared from the early morning hours, through the
events of June 17, and into the following week (which will be discussed in chapter five).
Finally, the destruction of SED slogans, banners, and insignias represented another way
in which protestors demonstrated power.
The lists of demands, which had their origin in Berlin, emerged in a number of the
workplaces in the Dresden region. Subversive, anti-SED ideas that originated as rumors
and whispers made their way into written form as workers became aware that a local and
national movement had begun to unfold. As dissidents hoisted or distributed their
messages, they also continued, as noted in several cases already, to tear down the signs
(and images) of the SED. These actions, of course, did not go unnoticed by the regime.
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Written or printed materials appeared early Wednesday morning in a number of
places, suggesting that at least some East Germans arrived at work with a revolutionary
mindset and the intent to follow the script from Berlin and protest the regime. Often these
materials reflected the slogans aired in Berlin over RIAS and expressed by residents in
the days after the communiqué aired. As early as six in the morning on Wednesday the
police in Görlitz had come across residents with placards printed using India ink. The
posters called for a reduction of the workers’ norms, free elections and the removal of
Grotewohl’s “criminal regime.”165 By seven o’clock, a fifty-centimeter poster hung in
that town’s post office urging the “People to fight for truly free elections” and the
removal of the Ulbricht clique.166
Banners represented another method by which demonstrators publically
communicated demands for change and connect with, and motivate, other demonstrators
and potential protestors. Little evidence exists as far as when demonstrators created the
banners. In their review of the situation that unfolded in Bautzen at Ifa-Phänomen Zittau,
district leadership tried to pin anti-regime banners that appeared on June 17 on a young
man known for his anti-Soviet attitude.167 The demands became the slogans of the event
and participants claimed to easily recall those decades later. “I can still remember the
banners,” noted one resident in Dresden [Frank R. M.], “We Sachsenwerkers [the
Sachsenwerk workforce] demand a retraction of the heightened norms” and “down with
the Ulbricht regime.”168 Workers at the Sachsenwerk and Abus grounds had drawn up
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other banners that morning calling for German Unity, freedom, “Ulbricht to the gallows,”
and “down with Grotewohl.”169 A number of protestors at the Postplatz carried placards
that called for new elections and those that held such signs, according to one witness, also
called for representatives to appear in public and answer questions.170 The construction
factory on Grunaer Street joined the protests and its workers carried banners that called
for a general strike.171 The scenes were similar elsewhere. In Görlitz the workers carried
banners thinking the workers of Berlin. They demanded that the HO prices be lowered
40%, that immediately all-German elections take place, that the Oder-Neisse border be
abolished, and that the KVP and the regime be abolished.172
While one analysis by the regional leadership office in Dresden noted that
surprisingly few leaflets appeared, quite a few letters threatening functionaries had been
sent, especially in Görlitz.173 Other reports suggest that handwritten leaflets had been
found containing death threats to local functionaries. Leaflets at MTS Taubenheim
reportedly called for a “return to fascism” (though this could have been a call for a range
of more innocuous things) and removal of the hated state-run Konsum stores.174 Meißen
appears to have been an exception to the rule regarding leaflets. Police records note that
the “enemy” attempted to incite the population through the spread of inflammatory
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pamphlets that had been typed up and posted on advertising columns in the city spreading
rumors concerning leadership and the collapse of the GDR.175

Party Badges
Dresdeners’ removal of their party badges represented the emblematic destruction,
or even a reversal, of the SED’s essential political community. Removing one’s badge
appears to have been a popular form of protest on June 17 and records and eyewitness
reports suggest that the number of East Germans who removed their regalia was
significant. On her way to the park, Hannelore had picked up a red SED badge, known
colloquially as an “existence badge.”176 Later she showed the badge to another woman in
the park, who pointed out that she had found three such badges already: “They are
throwing away their existence.” Hannelore remembered thinking that perhaps the GDR
was at its end, and everything was changing.177 One comrade in the city of Dresden
noticed that workers who had gone to work as comrades, were suddenly no longer
comrades and a large portion of the workers had removed their party insignias.178
Eyewitness Hans Hundhausen recalled that as the streetcars came to a halt, demonstrators
called on passengers to join the protest and several comrades ripped off their party
badges.179 This is partially confirmed by an SED situation report that the next day,

“Betr.: Auswertung der reignisse vom 17.65.53,” Volkspolizeifreisamt Meissen Politabteilung Meissen,
d 3.7.53 (SächsHStA 23/18 Bl.207).
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Lange and Roß, 17. Juni 1953, Zeitzeugen Berichten, 165.
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179
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Dresdeners were overheard discussing the “hundreds of Party badges that remained [on
the ground] at the Postplatz.”180

Solidarity in the Airwaves
In the evening, as the demonstrations waned, Western observers and transmitters
continued to endow the June 17 demonstrations with national imaginings. The FRG for
instance, called for, “all of us [to] stick together, without differences of political opinion,
until we reach the great and common goal.”181 While some commentators, either
mistakenly or as a sort of shorthand, continued to refer to the day’s events as
predominately a Berlin event, the messengers intended to reaffirm an imagined
community of all Germans. Furthermore, while listenership is impossible to determine
with any precision, RIAS’ longstanding popularity and the tumultuousness of the day
meant that in all likelihood, a good number of Dresdeners tuned in that night.182
Shortly thereafter, at 20:19 and 20:57, RIAS broadcasted to East Germans the
speech of Ernst Reuter (mayor of Berlin), speaking at a solidarity demonstration in
Vienna. Listeners heard Reuter note that, “no power on earth can hold the German people
permanently in bondage…we are determined to reach our goal…of national unity.”183 In
the next hour RIAS broadcasted solidarity demonstrations held by the DGB and the SPD
in West Berlin. The station stressed, too, that the demonstrations had unleashed strong
feelings of sympathy for the GDR demonstrations along with a keen interest to learn of

“Situationsbericht des Genossen Kempt,” SED 8. Stadtbezirk, Dresden, Den 18.6.53, K/Sch
(SächsHStA 11857, IV/2.4. Nr. 60, Bl.93).
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FRG Ministry for All-German Questions, It Happened in June 1953: Facts and Dates (Bonn: WeylerDruck, 1966), 52.
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RIAS also notes that they received thousands of extra letters from throughout the GDR following the
demonstrations, which suggests heightened listenership.
183
FRG Ministry for All-German Questions, It Happened in June 1953, 52; “Der Aufstand der
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what happened in the “free world.”184 RIAS also used the opportunity to position June 17
as a significant international event in the Cold War, noting that President Eisenhower
argued the day represented an “extremely momentous event” and a “demonstration of
communist lies.”185 The station passed on to East Germans that night that an American
Senator (Alexander Wiley) considered the demonstrations a “symptom of general unrest
in the communist sphere of control.”186
RIAS also repeated some of the broadcasts from earlier in the day. One comrade
in Löbau, the factory foreman, noted to party officials that he did not usually listen to
RIAS, but that on the evening of the seventeenth he tuned into hear the reports of the red
flag being torn from the Brandenburg Gate. “I also heard that some police have come
over to the side of the demonstrators because they were fed up with it all,” he declared,
“It was really a factual report because you could hear the ruckus on the street, cars
honking and so forth.”187 The preference for RIAS broadcasts as sources of (trusted
information) and the lack of faith in GDR news sources, along with rumors and
misinformation, would continue to beleaguer the SED in the coming weeks. This is the
subject of the next chapter.

“17.6. rk Abgeordentenhaus – Demonstrationen” Approx. screen 330 (DRA Potsdam, B203-0002/0001).
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Conclusions
While historians are fond of mentioning the ways in which revolution sweeps
across space like “wildfire,” an examination into the June 17 demonstrations reveals that
the diffusion of revolutionary ideas unfolded more quickly than anyone could have
anticipated. In this way, the June 17 events represented a new type of demonstration,
wherein mass media broadcasted the story in real time and mass demonstrations could
unfold simultaneously, but not necessarily “spontaneously,” throughout a nation state.
While historians like to point to the “signal effect” of RIAS, the station also mobilized
the GDR’s citizenry, stimulated protest-minded conversations in the rival public sphere,
and provided the revolutionary script. RIAS programming also endowed the
demonstrations with national imaginings by broadcasting declarations of solidarity.
Workers and residents listened to radio broadcasts the evening of the sixteenth or tuned in
Wednesday morning. So-called whisper campaigns, private workers’ meetings, and
discussion groups that formed in the streets served as places individuals to share
knowledge or debate politics. In these spaces, individuals shared knowledge of the
situations and deliberated courses of action. Public spaces became spaces of appearance,
where individuals, through collective action, openly criticized the regime. Demonstrators
attempted to connect with other demonstrators through radio—successfully in Görlitz. In
Dresden, efforts to commandeer the telegraph building failed, though the Stadtfunk
briefly fell into the hands of protestors. While some historians have argued that RIAS
created and controlled the narrative of the demonstrations, the prevalence of rumors and
misinformation indicate that this was certainly not always the case, at least as events
unfolded. One can be certain, however, that RIAS essentially turned what might have
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been a localized event in Berlin into a nationwide demonstration, full of national
imaginings.
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Chapter Five
The Embers of Unrest

“Our press represents an instrument of power, but we must correctly exploit this
instrument of power.”
-The Socialist Unity Party in Dresden, a week after the demonstrations1

Though public spaces had been largely cleared of demonstrators by 18 June, the
situation remained tense in Dresden. Tanks rumbled through the city and parked in
strategic places, often outside factories where workers occasionally went on strike.2
Soviet troops occupied and regulated other strategic points of transmission, exchange,
and assembly such as bridges, the telegraph bureau, and the Postplatz.3 Soviet
motorcycles lined the perimeter of the Zwinger, another area that demonstrators had
occupied the day before.4 But witnesses remember that a relative calm quickly fell over
the region and as party symbols resurfaced—for example, a bust of Stalin in a
classroom—the SED appeared to regain its footing. Students recalled that classes
resumed after a couple days, although instructors avoided discussing recent events. One
witness described the scene on the streets and in the city squares as normal, aside from
the occupation.5 Still, in the days and weeks following the demonstrations, protest
continued, if not in the streets, then through the airwaves and by hearsay and ephemeral
public exchanges in spaces difficult for the state to regulate. Thus the rival public sphere
“Lagebericht vom 24.6.53 – 10,30 Uhr,” SED Kreisleitung Dresden Stadt, Abt. P.u.M, Parteiinformation
Dresden, den 24.6.53 (SAPMO-BArch DY 30 IV/2/5/553 Bl.54): “Unsere Presse stellt ein Machtmittel dar,
aber wir müssen dieses Machmittel richtig auswerten.”
2
Lange and Roß, 17. Juni 1953, Zeitzeugen Berichten, 372-4, 376.
3
Ibid., 373-4.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
1
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and the popular opinion it generated continued to undermine and challenge the regime in
a variety of ways.
This chapter re-examines the rival and official public spheres and assess their
roles in the aftermath of the demonstrations. In the weeks following the June 17
demonstrations, the status and future of the GDR and even the entire Soviet satellite
system appeared to many to hang in the balance. In this way, the aftermath of June 17
mostly supports the historical axioms that wars, revolutions, and mass upheavals rarely
have tidy endings. While governments, media, and military authorities on both sides of
the Iron Curtain announced or recognized that the nation-wide public demonstration had
been extinguished nearly as quickly as it had detonated, the situation, as popularly
conceptualized, often appeared in flux and it seemed that for the time being, the SED had
been outflanked—with the aid of foreign broadcasting—by an ascendant public. Thus the
first part of this chapter examines how, through the rival public sphere, participants,
witnesses, and commentators publicly communicated protest and imagined communities
of support after the June 17 demonstrations. These communities of support had an
international dimension, bringing to light the polarized political situation, centered, not
for the last time, in East Germany. The second half of the chapter will show that the SED
pushed back by communicating stability and representing through the official public
sphere its own imagined communities of support, domestic and international, to enhance
its legitimacy. Taken together, the evidence presented here amounts to a case study of the
intersection of distinct Cold War nationalism and internationalism, modern mass
politicking, and the power of public opinion in divided Europe.
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Part One
The Rival Public Sphere

The Popularity of News Sources
In the weeks after June 17, reports from the regional governments to Berlin noted
that RIAS’s audience throughout the GDR continued to expand, with some listeners now
even letting the broadcasts blare out of their windows. For example, in the town of
Werdau (not in the Dresden Region), officials noted that whereas RIAS had previously
been listened to privately, it could now be heard in public.6 June 17 also emboldened East
Germans to publicly criticize the regime: consider for example the factory leader who on
June 18, tuned into RIAS, cranked the volume up for all his co-workers, and announced,
“Listen to this, the party bigwigs are driving cars while we push bicycles.”7
One reason for RIAS’s sustained popularity rested with the weakness of the
official public sphere, which, in the eyes of many, failed to reflect popular opinion and
did not deliver credible news. Furthermore, the SED came to the realization that it did not
have its finger on the nation’s pulse in the wake of the June 17 events.8 Indeed, Berlin
received reports from every regional office that the population became increasingly more
likely to dismiss the reporting from domestic radio and press as phony news in the weeks

“Betrifft: Situationsbericht aus den Konsumgenossenschaften der DDR zu dem Kommuniqué des
Politbüros und den Beschlüssen der Regierung vom 17. bis einschließlich 20.6.1953,” Kurt Preikschat,
Berlin, 22.6.1953 im Verband Deutscher Konsumgenossenschaften e.G.m.b.H. an das ZK der SED,
Abteilung Information (SAPMO-BArch DY 30 IV/2/5/544 Bl.127).
7
“Neue feindliche Aktionen und Gerüchte,” Nr.8 Berlin, den 24.6.1953, Rauchbach (SAPMO-BArch DY
30 IV/2/5 547 Bl.125): “Guck mal, die Bonzen fahren mit dem Auto und wir müssen die Fahrräder
schieben.”
8
See for example, “Bericht an das Sekretariat über die Geschlossenheit, Aktivität und Kampfkraft die die
Partei entwickelte, zur Zerschlagung der feindlichen Aktion.” Abt. Leitende Organe Dresden, den 20.6.53
(SächsHStA 11857 IV/2/12/009).
6
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after June 17.9 In Dresden, in one instance, the party found itself forced to send a
delegation from a factory to Berlin for clarification on the political situation as they
refused to believe the official GDR broadcasts.10 Other East Germans blamed East
German programmers’ decision to play serious music when they simply wanted
something lighter—which forced them to tune in to RIAS.11 Some listeners complained
that the foreign broadcasters delivered news quickly while the GDR’s stations lagged
behind.12 These negative assessments of GDR programming persisted through at least
mid-July (and probably thereafter), prompting one functionary from Görlitz to write,
“They [the residents] still say the programming [of GDR radio] has not really changed,
and it is no wonder that people listen to RIAS.”13
The SED’s press fared little better in the aftermath of June 17 and incurred similar
criticism that found its way back to the regime. On June 19, residents bought up all the
copies of newspapers, reportedly ripping them from the hands of the sales people to the
extent that the district asked for extra copies of Neues Deutschland.14 As the regime
chose not to address the demonstrations on June 18, this likely presented locals the first
opportunity to see what their government had to say about recent events. Dresdeners

“Zusammenfassung der wichtigsten Fragen aus den Berichten der Bezirke vom 25.6.1953,” Abteilung
Leitende Organe der Partei und Massenorganisationen, Berlin, den 25.6.1953 (SAPMO-BArch DY30
IV/2/5/547).
10
Staatliche Organe, Dresden, am 18.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857 IV 2.13 Nr. 6). The factory was IFA-Werk II
in Seifhennersdorf.
11
“Zusammenfassung der wichtigsten Erscheinungen aus den Berichten der Bezirksleitung vom
28.6.1953,” Abteilung Leitende Organe der Partei und der Massenorganisationen, Berlin, den 29.6.1953 (SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV/2/5/547 Bl.183); Bezirksleitung Dresden, Gen. Kröger, 2.7.53, 11:50 Uhr,
(SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV/2/5/553 Bl.99).
12
“Informationsbericht,” Nationale Front des Demokratischen Deutschland, Bezirkausschuss Dresden,
14.7.53 (SAPMO-BArch DY6 5006).
13
“Agitationsbericht für die Zeit vom 10.7. bis 16.7.1953. SED Betriebsparteiorganisation – EKM
Görlitzer Maschinenbau VEB,” Görlitz, dem 16.July, 1953 (SächsHStA 11857 IV/2.9.01 Nr. 40 Bl.55):
“Zum Funk wird noch gesagt, dass er sein Programm noch nicht wesentlich geändert hat und sich keiner
wundern soll, wenn einer RIAS hört.”
14
Bezirksleitung Dresden, Genn, Elli Schmidt, 19.6 (SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV/2/5/535 Bl.57).
9
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criticized the narratives postulated by their local press, which tended to localize and
diminish the event. Some complained, for example, that the local press reduced the
geographic scope of unrest to Dresden and Görlitz while ignoring demonstrations that
had unfolded in the counties.15 Other condemnations centered on the press’s
misrepresentation of the current state of affairs and government’s lack of a “connection”
with workers and rural populations alike. Workers in Transformatorenwerk complained
about Neues Deutschland’s assertion that “All [East Germans] stood united behind the
regime;” a dubious claim that proved the regime continued to “whitewash” the situation
through the official public sphere.16
The weaknesses in the domestic press meant that Dresdeners, like those in other
regions, tended to rely on the rival public sphere instead, which of course included news
from RIAS. Reports from regional authorities to leadership in Berlin noted that in every
county in the Dresden region RIAS continued to gain listeners.17 Officials in
Dippoldiswalde confirmed that residents often listened to RIAS and believed the
reports—a potentially serious problem in their minds. After all, the SED had concluded,
and not entirely incorrectly, that RIAS had given the signal for the demonstrations to
begin, and the peace that settled over Dresden could again be shattered should RIAS set
things off once again. “It is indeed ‘peaceful,’ but one gets the feeling that some are
merely waiting for a signal to start rioting,” noted one official.18 The belief that the

15

Ibid.
“Lage im Bezirk Dresden,” Telefonische Durchsage BL Dresden (Gen. Wurzbacher), 25.6.1953/17.20
Uhr/Aufgenommen: genn. Arnold (SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV/2/5/553 Bl.75): “Das ganze Volk steht
geschlossen hinter der Regierung”; “Schönfärben” – a term that occurs frequently in this context.
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“Bericht über den Instrukteur Einsatz im Bezirk Dresden von 7-11 Juli,” Instrukteure Gründen und
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(SächsHStA 11857 IV/2.0.01 Nr. 38 Bl.61): “Es ist zwar alles ‘ruhig,’ man hat aber den Eindruck, dass
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demonstrations could and should and might continue, although they had their origins in
rumor rather than RIAS despite what SED functionaries believed, proved problematic for
party leaders. In sum, the weakness of the domestic media organs and the strength of
RIAS together represented a serious threat to the regime’s tenuous hold on public
tranquility and its ability to regain its political footing.
RIAS’s Interpretation
RIAS established the popular version of events. The station characterized the
demonstrations as spontaneous, which became a keyword to designate the event as one
that represented genuine or authentic protest, rather than the orchestrated demonstrations
staged by a government.19 On the evening of June 17 and during the days after, RIAS
continued to frame the demonstrations as popular uprisings motivated by nationalism
(based especially on the desire for reunification) and a spirit of revolution that reached
across the GDR and cut across class lines. As the demonstrations had waned in the
evening of June 17, RIAS had reiterated that, contrary to what SED officials might try to
promote, reports had streamed in from cities throughout the GDR where citizens had
demonstrated.20 Interviews with West German political leaders punctuated conversations
that noted, “the last two days of demonstrations are a grave reminder to the entire world
that the German Question demands an answer sooner rather than later.”21 On June 18,
RIAS had broadcasted a commentary by Egon Bahr that continued to reinforce the
national imaginings that the station had conferred on the June 17 demonstrations. Taking

“Der Aufstand der Arbeiterschaft.” See especially pg. 16, “Kommentar,” Egon Bahr. See also the
evaluation from Matthias Walden (pg. 17-18) which attacks the SED’s claims.
20
Nachrichten. alt. mat. 18.6/ko. (DRA Potsdam B203-00-02/0001 S.26). Precise time not noted.
21
Ibid., “Die Demonstrationen der letzten zwei Tage seien zugleich eine ernste Mahnung an die gesamte
Welt, die Deutschland -Frage einer beschleunigten Lösung zuzuführen”
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240

stock of what had transpired the previous day, he stated: “What people in the West had
probably considered impossible: the working class and people from all strata of society
demonstrated on their own will. They demonstrated not only against the norms and high
cost of living [in the GDR], but for something else, too—for their reunification with the
rest of Germany, for freedom.”22 RIAS also portrayed the demonstrations as a moment
when residents of the GDR became aware of their ability to effectively test state power:
“The people have measured their strength against the regime,” claimed the station, “the
workforce and the masses are aware of their power. They’ve handed the SED the biggest
defeat of its existence.”23 In the coming weeks, SED functionaries would find themselves
contending with an active and hostile public sphere despite their efforts to prevent
dissident exchanges, notably by jamming RIAS and prohibiting public assembly.
Dresdeners, and other East and West Germans who tuned in to RIAS between
7:20 and 7:30 AM on June 18 heard the program “Berlin Speaks to the Zone” transmit
the sentiment of citizens and governments in the Federal Republic and Western Europe
where special editions of newspapers reportedly flew off the presses to tell the story of
June 17. Likewise, they heard that declarations of solidarity for the demonstrators came
out of the various West German workplaces in telegraph and telephone exchanges. One
notable trait of broadcasts is the tendency of the commentators to concentrate on the
Berlin demonstrations, though this seemed to have little to no effect on listeners’ opinion

“Der Aufstand der Arbeiterschaft,” 15: “Was wohl kaum jemand im Westen für möglich gehalten hat:
die Arbeiterschaft und sich anschließende Menschen aus allen Bevölkerungsschichten haben aus eigenem
Willen demonstriert. Demonstriert nicht nur gegen die Normen und die hohen Lebenshaltungskosten,
sondern für etwas, für ihre Vereinigung mit dem übrigen Deutschland, für die Freiheit.”
23
“Der Aufstand der Arbeiterschaft,” 16: “Die Bevölkerung hat ihre Kräfte mit dem Regime gemessen. Die
Arbeiterschaft und die Bevölkerung sind sich ihrer Kraft bewusst geworden. Sie haben die SED die größte
Niederlage seit ihrem Bestehen zugefügt.”
22
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that June 17 represented a national event.24 And at the same time, RIAS just as often
noted that the demonstrations took place throughout the “Soviet Zone of Occupation” so
listeners probably merely considered Berlin the epicenter of events.25 Regardless, RIAS
transmitted a Cold War nationalism based on empathy and reunification that dominated
the airwaves before, during, and after June 17. RIAS noted “the sympathy expressed by
those in the Federal Government, and the parliament of the German Trade Unions
Federation for the [East Germans’] struggle for freedom.”26 The station broadcasted that
leaders in Stuttgart passed a resolution that looked to foster human rights in the GDR:
“The Parliament from Baden-Wuerttemberg salutes in this hour of hardship, those who
fought for freedom as citizens…in East Berlin and the entire eastern Zone.”27
On the morning of June 18, RIAS reported to listeners throughout East Germany
that an “exceptionally strong echo” reverberated throughout through the world’s media
and that the GDR dominated the headlines of the world’s press as it had done during the
blockade.28 The June 17 demonstrations constituted an international media event and a
sympathetic community of support transmitted public opinion from European and other
western nations. RIAS broadcasted western communications, sympathies, and reactions
to the June 17 demonstrations, which represented a distinctly modern and international
public sphere that challenged the SED’s version of events and the SED’s claims of
popular support. RIAS described similar scenes throughout Europe where citizens
24

In an interview years later, station director Gordon Ewing noted how much this upset him.
“Sowjetische Besatzungszone” Recall that one tactic employed by RIAS to undermine and challenge the
legitimacy of the SED included referring to the GDR as “die Zone” or the “Pankower System,” among
other monikers.
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“Der Aufstand der Arbeiterschaft,” 12: “Die von Bundesregierung und Bundestag und vom Deutschen
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consumed news that told the story of East Germans’ courage. For example, the station
reported to listeners that in Holland, the nation’s largest daily newspaper, the socialist
Het Vrije Volk (A Free People) reported as early as Wednesday afternoon what had
unfolded in Berlin. Copies of the paper reportedly “sold out in a heartbeat.”29 RIAS
reported to listeners in the GDR that radio stations dedicated the largest part of its nightly
news broadcast to the demands for freedom heard in Berlin and East Germany.30 News
transmitted by outlets in the United States also found its way into Dresdeners’ homes via
RIAS. “As in Europe the public is focused on the events in East Berlin,” the station went
on to report that “Radio and TV stations reported intermittingly in several minutes on the
newest developments in the Soviet Zone.”31 At noon, RIAS reviewed the opinions
published in the foreign press.32 “Western Europe and the entire world will never be the
same,” proclaimed the New York Herald Tribune, while RIAS broadcasted the New York
Time’s commentary which suggested that “the German people will not tolerate
oppression forever.”33

Making Connections to Women in the GDR
RIAS also aimed to create an imagined bond between West and East German
women in particular by airing the program “Women’s Voices” (“Stimme der Frau”). “In
these hours we women of West Berlin and the entire free world feel bound especially
closely with you,” noted the commentator who also stated that “Your husbands and sons,

Ibid.: “im Nu vergriffen.”
Ibid.
31
Ibid., 13: “Wie in Europa konzentrierte sich auch in den Vereinigten Staaten das Interesse der
Öffentlichkeit auf die Ereignisse in Ostberlin. Rundfunk und Fernsehsender berichteten in Abständen von
wenigen Minuten über die neueste Entwicklung im Sowjetsektor.”
32
Ibid., 14.
33
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and not least, yourselves, have demonstrated against the power that has repressed you for
years.”34 The station also framed the prior day’s event as a decisive moment when
women publically announced “where they really stood.”35 West German public opinion
found transmission inside further commentary by the (female) secretary of the (West)
German Salaried Workers Union (Deutsche Angestellten-Gewerkschaft), who told East
German women that the organization called on them to “have faith!”36 The program
noted that they had received word via telegraph that afternoon that the women of West
Germany were aware of the difficulties and oppression faced by women in the Soviet
Zone and that they stood ready to take all necessary steps to assist and help those in the
GDR.37 Another female commentator from the FRG told listeners that the demonstrations’
power became evident to her as she read the stories in newspapers. Referring to the
public actions that unfolded in cities she concluded: “here’s to our courage for
solidarity.”38

News in Neighboring States
In some ways the demonstrations foreshadowed the political events leading up to
the fall of the Wall in 1989, as the idea of change swirled through the satellite states
behind the Iron Curtain. Officials in these nations had to deal with this problematic
information that trickled in through unofficial conduits with care. News of the East
German demonstrations represented an existential threat to communist party leaders
behind the Iron Curtain where according to commentators, this news, a concoction of
Ibid., 13: “In diesen Stunden fühlen wir Frauen Westberlins und der ganzen Welt und besonders eng mit
Ihnen verbunden. Ihre Männer und Söhne und nicht zuletzt Sie selbst demonstrieren gegen eine Macht, die
seit Jahren unterdrückte.”
35
Ibid., 13: “wirklich stehen”
36
Ibid., 13,
37
Ibid., 13.
38
Ibid., 14: “Auf unseren Mut zur Solidarität!”
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rumor and foreign broadcasting, typically “spread like wildfire.” 39 On June 18, Czech
police, for instance, had begun to take precautions against the “provocations” in the
neighboring GDR.40 The Czech government noted that news had quickly spread into the
country and some “reactionary elements” and “entrepreneurs” had quickly become
convinced that the time had arrived for privatization.41 Officials identified the source of
this news as “Voice of Free Europe” (so probably either Voice of America or Radio Free
Europe), which had been broadcasting the “most senseless speeches.”42 Indeed, the news
of unrest in the GDR spawned a number of rumors in Czechoslovakia, one of which held
that revolution had seized Germany.43 In Poland, state security aimed to prevent unrest in
the GDR from spilling into their state. At least one report (on June 19) suggested a
storyline similar to the one constructed by SED authorities: that imperialist agents and
spy circles from the U.S. and West Germany would attempt to foment unrest, particularly
in former German territories and Upper Silesia.44

Rumor in Dresden
Evidence of the widespread circulation of rumors helps explain Heidi Roth’s
contention that the Dresden region achieved a higher level of rebellion than elsewhere in
the GDR, as her study does not analyze public opinion as I do here. As rumors and
improvised news regarding June 17 swirled through the Eastern Bloc in the weeks and
months after the demonstrations, so did speculation about events in these neighboring
39
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states circulated in public conversations in Dresden, prolonging revolutionary fervor.
Once again, we can explain these phenomenon as “imaginative works built out of social
materials,” that help us understand how residents in the GDR, at least in the Dresden
region, conceptualized the world around them in a turbulent and confused situation.45 As
noted in previous chapters, rumors regarding unrest, rebellion, and revolution in these
areas helped create a more volatile situation in Dresden before the uprising and probably
after, too.
Indeed, improvised news that circulated in the rival public sphere exaggerated the
state of unrest in Dresden, the GDR and the East Bloc states. Locally, the Young Pioneers
spread the news that the Americans would soon arrive in downtown Dresden and that the
Red Army had supposedly been driven from the northern part of the GDR (not true). 46 In
some towns in the Dresden region, residents discussed revolts that had begun in Hungary
(not true), as refugees from that state who now supposedly began arriving in the GDR
(not until 1956).47 At least in the Dresden region (and once again, this is probably due to
geographic proximity), functionaries overheard residents throughout the region
discussing what they believed to be a revolutionary situation in Czechoslovakia: there
were reports of numerous dead in different cities, including Prague, which was said to be
in flames and rumors that along with the Skoda Automotive works, an automobile factory
that burned as unrest continued to spread.48 The unrest here had ended weeks prior. In
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Pirna residents demanded that the press and radio of the GDR address this development.49
Here, residents discussed the causalities there and asked for the newspapers to publish
information about this.50 Residents in Freital believed an event similar to that of June 17
had transpired in the CSR and that 800 had died (an exaggeration, but not entirely
untrue).51 In Löbau, residents claimed according to a “completely reliable source” that
airplanes were transporting the wounded from Prague and Warsaw to Dresden
(unconfirmed).52 In towns along the Elbe River, residents wondered about the veracity of
the information circulating about Czechoslovakia as they had heard bathing in the river
was forbidden, because after all, rumor had it that corpses had been floating downstream
from Prague (highly unlikely).53 In other towns, functionaries noted that residents
believed Warsaw was now engulfed in flames.54 That the functionaries labeled such
claims as rumor also speaks to the polarization of news, and thus reality, at the time.
These rumors, along with RIAS news stories, prompted listeners to imagine
themselves as part of an international rebellion whose adherents both commiserated in
their oppression (those in the West who kept them in their thoughts) and joined them in
the struggle (the eastern bloc residents rumored to be in revolt) for liberation. This
created a dangerous situation for the SED and thus the week of June 17 became an
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20.6.1953, Kurt Preikschat im Verband Deutscher Konsumgenossenschaften e.G.m.b.H. Berlin w.8.,
Stresemanns. 128 an das ZK der SED Abteilung Information (SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV/2/5/544 Bl.121).
50
“Betrifft: Situationsbericht aus den Konsumgenossenschaften der DDR zu dem Kommuniqué des
Politbüros und den Beschlüssen der Regierung vom 17. bis einschließlich 20.6.1953.”
51
Information vom Rat des Bezirkes, 1.40 Uhr, Staatliche Organe, Dresden am 19.6.53 (SächsHStA 11857
IV/2.13 Nr. 06).
52
“Aus dem Bericht der Bezirksleitung Dresden u.a. wie hervor,” Simon: 22.6.1953, 15.45 (SAPMOBArch DY 30 IV/2/5/553): “ganz sicherer Quelle”
53
“Bericht über die Lage am 4.7.53,” BL – Dresden – Genn.Schulz, 17.00 Uhr (SAPMO-BArch DY 30
IV/2/5/553 Bl.120).
54
“Aus dem Bericht der Bezirksleitung Dresden u.a. wie hervor,” Durchgegeben: Gen. Hoffmann,
Aufgenommen: Genn. Olia 22.6.1953, 15.45 – Simon (SAPMO-BArch DY 30 IV/2/5/553).
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important moment in GDR history as the SED realized just how weak its efforts to
communicate with the masses had been.

The Continuation of Dissent
While mass political action in the streets dissipated after June 17, protest activity
continued throughout the GDR in the form of workers’ (anti-communist) resolutions,
leaflets, rumors, various forms of rabble-rousing (Hetze), letters that threatened officials,
and, of course, more rumors. While leaflets and other forms of written protest had been
rare on June 17, they increased in the weeks afterwards and challenged the regime’s
legitimacy and authority. One should also note that this time lag probably reflects the
very modernity of the event, as radio broadcasts that shaped the demonstrations largely
outpaced the ability of demonstrators to produce written communications, though they
certainly appeared on June 17.
Resolutions from workers’ meetings continued to serve as a form of expression in
the rival public sphere. On June 18 and 19, workers in the region continued to hold
private meetings where they drafted, read, and dispatched letters demanding various
actions by the regime. For example, in Radebeul, workers called on the SED to lift the
state of emergency, arrange for all-Germany elections, and release the prisoners taken on
June 17.55 Nearby workforces gathered and drafted similar lists of demands that they then
forwarded to the regime. In the countryside on June 19, officials discovered leaflets that
read: “Our general strike must continue until the political prisoners are free; until the
regime is removed from power, free elections are introduced. If we don’t succeed the

“Resolution,” Das Gewerkschaftskollektiv Rapido Radebeul an die Regierung der DDR Berlin. 18.6.53
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party big wigs win and our sacrifice will have been in vain.”56 Polish authorities shared
information with their East German counterparts regarding leaflets that appeared near the
border suggesting that the GDR was the intended target for the balloons that carried them.
One such leaflet supposedly read: “Through this leaflet we pronounce our slogans, we are
known throughout the entire world, in Germany, in Russia, etc. Down with communism,
fight the Party and socialism. Pass this on and take action. More leaflets to follow.”57
In Dresden and other cities including Berlin, Magdeburg, and Potsdam, residents
argued that the strikes were not over yet and a general strike was still to come. In Dresden,
some contended that the regime had only changed course to calm down the population
and that the money to keep up such programs simply did not exist.58 Indeed, one of these
seemed to be a popular belief that the seventeenth had merely been the opening salvo in
what was to be the eventual destruction of the regime.59 Although Heidi Roth and others
note that work stoppages continued sporadically for some time throughout the GDR, the
Dresden region had, more or less, gone back to work in the week following the
demonstrations. But workers still continued to publically criticize the regime by forming
discussion groups and composing resolutions that they then forwarded to local or national
authorities.

“Tel. Durchsage von der Bl. Dresden am 19.6.53 um 19 Uhr, Aschwemmer/Wagner (SAPMO-BArch
DY30 IV/2/5/535 Bl.56.): “Unser Generalstreik muss weitergeführt werden, bis die pol. Gefangenen frei
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Authorities charged with surveying the public mood took stock of the general
attitude and conversations held by residents. Confusion still reigned in places, they found,
and at least one worker claimed to have heard radio reports of the regime’s demise,
declaring in response “It’s high time the regime is gone.”60 More typically, general
reports noted that many expected the New Course to be put in place quickly and in an
“un-bureaucratic manner,” so that faith in the regime could be restored.61 In some places,
such as in the countryside around Dresden and in Freital, officials noted that many
workers refrained from discussing politics, which the report suggested likely stemmed
from fear of arrest.62 In general, the population appeared to profess little faith in the
regime and officials noted that it seemed like supposed party members had been working
more for the enemy than the regime might have previously thought.63 Central to the
argument here, a report from June 24 that noted that the local population was less
concerned with the recent decrees of the Central Committee and the most recent
resolutions of the regime, and more concerned with the events of recent days and the
“rumors spread by enemies.”64 Even almost two weeks later, officials commented that the
population remained critical of the regime and especially the sentiment that the regime
had no real connection to its citizenry as lowly party members got lost in the
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60

250

paperwork.65 In other words the regime lacked a true democratic connection, a feeling
shared by one worker in Gröditz who argued that “we have a dictatorship from above, not
a dictatorship of the proletariat.”66 This repeated the criticism of the SED explored in the
run-up to June 17, that the party had become distant, not to mention corrupt and bankrupt.
If our digital-age contemporaries refer to a story (or any such item transmitted
electronically) that spreads rapidly and widely as something that “goes viral,” then the
stories, true or not, surrounding the event of the June 17 proved hardy and potentially
dangerous contagions that further threatened an already weakened regime. Indeed,
improvised news, whether totally fabricated or mostly accurate, found a place in official
SED records in Berlin. Thus, the participants in the rival public sphere gained a unique
form of indirect political participation.

Desire to re-create the Space of Appearance
One particularly resilient, and for the SED distressing, rumor in the days and
weeks after the uprising was popular view that another massive demonstration lurked just
around the corner.67 This represents a larger theme running through this study that East
Germans desired to reestablish contact with what they imagined—especially now owing
to June 17—as a vast community of dissidents.
Already during the afternoon and evening hours of June 17, protestors in the city
of Dresden had openly called for the demonstrations to continue the next day, as did
workers in Kamez, who had planned intra-factory demonstrations for 10:00 A.M. on June

“Betr.: Bericht über die durchgeführten Mitgliederversammlungen, Belegschaftsversammlungen usw.”
Durchsage der Bezirksleitung Dresden, 30.6.53, 11,45 Uhr Genn. Hoffman/Klauder (SAPMO-BArch
DY30 IV/2/5/553 Bl.89).
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18.68 Sometimes workers spoke only of further demonstrations to support the workers in
Berlin, while a number of rumors proclaimed that a sort of Sorelian general strike would
commence the following day. In the town of Kamenz, for instance, word had already
arrived at the central leadership in Dresden on June 17 that another demonstration for
June 18 had been planned under the slogans “free elections” and “lowered prices.”69 In
the village of Großenhain, rumor spread in one factory that workers in Wismut had
formed a marching column and headed toward Dresden, where they would topple the
local party regime.70 Reports appeared Sunday, June 22, that on the following day
workers in a number of larger factories in the region (Elbtalwerks, Pirna Sachsenwerk NS
und Kunstseidenwerk Siegfried Rädel, Kreis Zittau at the Phänomen Werk) would
resume strikes if political prisoners were not released.71 Such rumors also appeared in
Dresden and Sebnitz (Sachsenwerk Radeberg).72 It seems that some residents were
willing to at least attempt to take matters into their own hands; on June 23, for example,
“unknown elements” called the Fernmeldeamt and informed them that the strike in
Dresden was to begin at 2:30.73
Reports from regional governments throughout the GD around June 25 noted
rumors of a renewed general strike expressed the sentiment that the revolution had not yet
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ended.74 Dresden was no different. The supposed dates for the new strikes varied by
region. In one county, a rumor circulated that the general strike would break out on June
25 and the regime would fall.75 It remains difficult to discern where these rumors started,
though a report produced by the department of press and radio regarding enemy radio
activity on June 27 suggests that NWDR may have been responsible. The report claimed
that the station broadcasted throughout the GDR that on June 25 in Dresden (along with
several other cities), new demonstrations were to have taken place. But was the station
simply passing on a rumor that developed within the GDR and communicated by a
source? This is more likely.76

Atrocities and National Imaginings
In the weeks following June 17, improvised news circulated in the GDR of
atrocities not only in the GDR, but throughout the Eastern Bloc. It remains unknown
exactly how many died in the events, but the number is at least 55.77 The situation was
even more unclear in Dresden in the weeks after June 17, though the public knew that
there had been death and violence. Officials, for instance, noted one slogan in Para (Riesa
County): “We won’t forget the blood of workers that flowed on June 17; we’ve long
since given up on the government.”78 Leadership in Berlin received reports that in some
counties, RIAS had allegedly spread the “rumor” that Soviet tanks had repressed East
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German workers (this was true, of course).79 Workers in Dippoldiswalde heard that
twelve of their colleagues at Wismut had been shot.80 Functionaries in Dresden who had
been stationed aboard ships traveling the Elbe River overheard discussions of those that
had been killed in Dresden (there are two known deaths) and other cities, while in the
countryside around Görlitz residents discussed the alleged massacre of political prisoners
in a Gestapo-like fashion in Dresden and other cities (this probably did not happen
though there were, of course, hundreds of arrests).81 Sometimes acts of later protest
pointed to atrocities. In the week after the demonstrations, young people in Görlitz wore
white armbands in public, although officials in the area argued these had nothing to do
with the wounded (their reasoning here is unknown).82 This is part of a general belief in
Dresden and perhaps elsewhere in late June that rebels had been shot. Understandably,
East Germans demanded answers. District reports from Dresden to Berlin note, for
example, that a number of residents from Löbau requested information regarding what
had happened in Görlitz and other cities. Residents of Bischofswerda, for instance, had
heard that fifty people had been shot in Dresden (an exaggeration) and sought to learn
more about events in the regional capital.83 In all, these tales paint a picture of a confused
scene in which popular sentiment found expression in violent and turbulent tales. At the
same time the situation reminds us that neither the official public sphere nor the rival
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public sphere had a monopoly on truth or totally controlled the story of the June events.
Alternative news concerning atrocities, factual or not, only added to the SED’s growing
list of items that would require political attention.
As perhaps the most famous non-official in the June 17 story, West Berlin
resident Willi Göttling achieved notoriety among communist officials and provoked
sympathy among West and East Germans alike. Göttling demonstrated with East
Berliners on June 17 before East German police arrested him in the early afternoon.84
Sentenced to death by the Soviet Military Commander of East Berlin, General Dibrowa,
for organizing the provocation that had taken place, radio reported that his execution took
place on June 18.85 GDR officials also transmitted news of the sentence by leaflet in
Dresden, though with presumably different intentions and the expectation of different
reactions.86
RIAS used Göttling’s execution to emphasize, in its words, the all-German
“solidarity” evident in the demonstrations, noting that this word probably seemed
“suspect” to listeners in the Zone: “How often has the East German regime spoken of
solidarity [in the past],” stated an evening report, “how often has this word sounded
absurd…. Solidarity cannot be commanded,” the station continued, “genuine solidarity
manifests itself in a spiritual bond…and it’s been a pleasure to report to you [East
Germans], such demonstrations of solidarity that were not organized by any
government.”87 The SED, according to RIAS, had been calculating the construction of
“Willi Göttling, 14.4.1918 - 18.6.1953, hingerichtet am Nachmittag in Ost-Berlin an unbekanntem Ort,”
http://www.17juni53.de/tote/goettling.html.
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solidarity based on “mere words,” rather than active aid, and proclaiming solidarity based
on artificial compassion, rather than authentic connections.88 The family of Willi Göttling,
since his recent execution, had become a beneficiary of such genuine solidarity, receiving
aid, according to RIAS broadcasts, from supporters within hours of his execution.89
While it remains a bit unclear why the SED helped publicize Göttling’s execution, the
SED-issued leaflets circulating in Dresden proclaiming that all workers found the death
sentence justified suggest that the SED aimed to drum up and publicize support for his
death sentence.90 At least some residents in the Dresden region disagreed after coming
across the leaflet, claiming to authorities that it would have made more sense had General
Dibrowa been shot.91
In addition to the continuous reports of West German solidarity demonstrations
broadcast from RIAS, the station helped East Germans collectively and subversively
mourn the victims of June 17 as part of an imagined community with the West. The
obsequies and moments of silence (Trauerfeiern and Gedenkpausen) that paid respect to
the victims of June 17 created moments of national and international imaginings,
transmitted to all Germans. On Tuesday, June 23, between 3:00 and 3:46 P.M., RIAS
broadcasted the demonstration of sorrow from Rudolph-Wilde-Platz in Berlin-Schönberg
to memorialize the victims of the June 16 and 17 demonstrations.92 A contribution from

Regime von Solidarität gesprochen, wie oft hat es dieses Wort ad absurdum geführt….Solidarität aber kann
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the program Zeit im Funk described the previous week’s uprising in heroic, national
terms, noting that the “uprising of the entire German population [of the GDR] had
claimed victims.”93 The number of demonstrators murdered by the Volkspolizei or the
Soviet Standgerichte remained, according to the commentator, unknown at that point, but
the moment had arrived for Germans to pay their last respects.94 Tens of thousands West
Berliners converged on Rudolph-Wilde-Platz, forming a “sea of people.”95 Konrad
Adenauer spoke and paid tribute to the unknown demonstrators:
Our hearts are full of sorrow as we think of our dead, those deceased, who
gave their blood for freedom—whose blood was spilled by a brutal and
cruel ruling regime, in order to preserve their reign of tyranny. Millions of
Germans mourn with us and so do those [people] in other lands, who
despise slavery and love freedom…. From a wave of unrest at the
construction site at Frankfurter Allee came a tremendous wave of anger,
the desperateness, that spread over the entire region, over East-Berlin,
over Magdeburg, Brandenburg, Leipzig, Chemnitz, Dessau, and Gera,
over the area of the uranium mining sites, through the population of the
countryside in Saxony and Mecklenburg—it moved through the entire
Soviet Zone….The entire German people behind the Iron Curtain have
called on us not to forget, and we swear to them in this solemn hour: we
will not forget. We will not rest—I pledge this for the entire German
people—until they again have freedom, until all of Germany is again
united in peace and freedom.96
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Jakob Kaiser, Minister for All-German Questions, and West Berlin mayor Ernst Reuter
spoke thereafter. The crowd sang Guten Kameraden, which rang from the square, and
thanks to RIAS, “out into the world.”97 The moment, noted RIAS, “was recorded and
carried on, to Magdeburg and Chemnitz, to Schwerin and Görlitz, to Frankfurt and
Dresden.”98 At the border between the two Germanys, the song would be intercepted at
the “hermetically sealed” border, thanks to the “merciless” martial law put in place by the
Soviet military commanders.99 Still, the station stated that, “here too, the song would be
heard—the song that accompanied the victims of June 17 on their final journey.”100 At
that moment, Germans in the east and west simultaneously listened on the radio to those
in attendance share moments of silence and song. Certainly, it would be difficult to
envisage a scene more beset with national imaginings.101
In the Dresden Region, it is challenging to estimate just how many workers or
individuals remotely took part in the RIAS-led national mourning demonstration as most
listeners probably did this in private. Thus, evidence is scant, though general listenership
levels would suggest that a significant number of Dresdeners had their radios tuned in for
the broadcast. Also, SED officials did occasionally note when workforces listened to
RIAS for these moments of silence. In Niesky, for example, we know workers
simultaneously took part in a sympathy demonstration for the victims of June 17 on June
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23 at 3:00.102 And at the leatherworks in Zittau, the RIAS Trauerkundgebungen blared
from the communal radio, despite the presence of the factory workforce leadership.103 A
similar situation occurred at VEB Fortschritt, where authorities noted that a moment of
silence was held for the “so-called victims” (in SED parlance) of June 16 and 17.104 At
the Feinmaschinenbau in Dresden, officials recorded a moment of silence for the victims
of June 17.105 And on June 22 in Riesa, workers had discussed a sympathy strike based
on the “commemoration hubbub,” which authorities noted, they prevented from
occurring.106 For those who did listen, the broadcasted mourning demonstration
transmitted a moment of national and international imaginings that contributes to our
understanding of the role of nationalism and June 17, 1953.
Ten days later on July 3, RIAS broadcasted that the Bundestag was to meet and
consider a proposal that would officially proclaim June 17 as the “Day of National
Unity.”107 On August 7, the Bundestag made the resolution law, and June 17 became the
official “Day of German Unity” until 1990.108
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Public Opinion in July and August
Public polling conducted by DIVO- Gesellschaft für Markt- und
Meinungsforschung m.b.H., Frankfurt am Main, the German survey organization under
contract with the Reactions Analysis Staff of the U.S. High Commissioner for GermanyOffice of Public Affairs sheds some light on the thoughts of East Germans following the
June 17 events.109 These results should be read with caution because they reflect the
views of interviewees who had fled to the Federal Republic from the GDR and such
individuals may have been more likely than the average East German citizen to hold a
negative view of the GDR and a positive view of the West. The institute conducted these
interviews between August 6 and August 15 at three food distribution points in West
Berlin and interviewees represented all regions of the GDR.110 Most East Germans
showed up at these food distribution points after learning of the program through RIAS
announcements and 75% of those surveyed knew that the food came from the United
States. The majority of these participants felt that the food represented humanitarian
concerns rather than political gamesmanship.111 So while problematic (though what
survey is not?), these statistics offer some insights into the general, national public
opinion that can be weighed against rumor and the “official” public opinion in the GDR
and the Dresden Region.
East Germans including those from Saxony and the Dresden region, were, by and
large, pleased with the way the West acted with regard to the June 17 demonstrations.
Only 23% of East Germans polled felt that the West had acted incorrectly. Residents of
“East Zone Views on the June Riots, Food Aid, and Current Political Issues,” Report No. 185, Series
No. 2, August 27, 1953, HICOG 185, U.S. Information Agency, Office of Research and Analysis: Research
Reports on German Public Opinion, 1949-1962 (NARA RG 306, A1 1005, Box 5).
110
Ibid. The West provided food aid for East Germans after the demonstrations—mostly in Berlin.
111
“East Zone Views on the June Riots, Food Aid, and Current Political Issues.”
109

260

the Saxon region (from a sample of 67 cases/interviews) largely (76%) felt that the West
had done nothing wrong. This probably meant that the United States they had not acted
incorrectly, raising hopes or choosing not to intervene before or during the Uprising. This
is likely related to the popular opinion found in the surveys that two-thirds of East
Germans interviewed felt that the demonstrations (referred to as riots in the study on this
occasion) had achieved positive results. Again, a sample from the Saxon region (140
cases) found that 75% of the interviewees—this is 5-10% above average when compared
with the other four areas in the GDR—felt June 17 had achieved some positive outcomes.
While reference to what these positive results constituted is not broken down by region in
the survey, interviewees argued that the demonstrations provided a referendum on the
SED that allowed or encouraged the population to become more outspoken (35%).
People also became more hopeful (16%) that the government would have to be more
willing to accommodate demands in the future, that consumer goods would receive more
attention, and that the world now understood what East Germans thought (5% of 876
cases divided almost evenly between males and females).112 A majority (63%) of the
interviewees felt that nothing had gotten worse since June 17, which perhaps suggests
that a good number of East Germans believed the political landscape remained far from
settled.
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Part Two
Representing Publicness

In the wake of the June 17 events, the SED looked to reestablish its authority
while coming to terms with the failures and shortcomings of its media outlets. First, the
media in the GDR broadcasted, at least in the days immediately following the
demonstrations, a message of peace and order. Additionally, the SED hastily put together
a public relations campaign whereby the imagined GDR community, represented by the
SED—and at the time quite obviously in tatters—would be reconstructed in several ways.
These included: 1) constructing an official storyline for what had occurred on June 17
that painted the demonstrations as the work of outsiders; 2) publicizing domestic and
international communities of support; and 3) attempting to re-establish, through mass
media, a connection with the citizenry of the GDR.113 As one party secretary noted in the
aftermath of June 17, “Our press represents an instrument of power, but we must
correctly exploit this instrument of power.”114 Indeed, the realization that the party had
indeed failed to use the press to its fullest extent became a focal point for the regime in
the months after June 17.
The SED’s Interpretation (X-Day)
While RIAS and other western commentators branded June 17 as a country-wide
demonstration with popular support that stemmed from national imaginings and disdain
Heidi Roth’s survey of the official demonstrations that followed June 17 examine events in Leipzig,
which unfolded similarly to those in Dresden (see Roth, 17 Juni 1953 in Sachsen, 410-413). For her survey
of the mass-political work see pgs 414-30, wherein she again primarily focuses on Leipzig with little
discussion of mass media and the international and national dimensions of the situation.
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113

262

for the socialist system, the SED countered by publicizing popular opinion that helped relegitimize its rule. One method employed by the SED included crafting a version of
events that cast demonstrators as outsiders.
After June 17, GDR radio worked to re-establish the country’s national
community by presenting demonstrators as foreign agents, sometimes in imaginative
ways. Thus, at 9:55 in the evening of June 19, Radio Berlin interviewed a woman from a
publishing house in the city who recounted the events for listeners. She recalled how
“construction workers” (quotes in original used for inference) rushed to disperse before
the approaching tanks and one of these “construction workers” lost his construction pants
because they were too big. As soon as this happened, his “western style” pants under his
worker garb became visible. This could be explained according to the broadcast, by the
fact that the American clothing distributor in Berlin had supplied the western agent with
the wrong size pants. Thus the true identity of June protestors became clear for the
witness at this moment.115
Another explanation offered by the SED over the airwaves for the mass
demonstrations insinuated that confusion probably led to the sheer number of individuals
in public spaces. For example, GDR radio interviewed one worker from Hennigsdorf who,
when asked whether he had taken part in the demonstrations, stated that he was
discussing events with his colleagues, when someone, from somewhere, called over and
claimed everyone was taking to the streets to protest for “peace and the like.”116 Thus the
interviewee and his cohort joined the protestors without actually knowing what the

“Zu den Ereignissen vom 16. und 17. Juni 1953 und den dazu erfolgenden Stellungnahmen und
Maßnahmen,” 7.1.1953 (SAPMO-BArch DY 30 4/2/5/542 Bl.170).
116
Ibid.: “für Frieden u.ä.”
115

263

demonstrations were all about!117 While the veracity of the specific story is questionable
(some individuals probably did get caught up in the confusion of June 17), it shows the
need of the SED to publicize and represent the existence of its popular support by placing
the responsibility for the demonstrations on a few bad apples and western agents.
In the days and weeks after June 17, GDR radio also attacked RIAS for its
involvement and distortion of events. On June 21, Radio Berlin broadcasted:
“X-Day….Western intriguers, under U.S. leadership, had thought the
moment favorable and had struck at the GDR, since they could no longer
tolerate its shining example of prosperity, progress and humaneness. The
spearhead of the fascist adventure, meant to be another Sarajevo, which, it
was hoped, would touch off a mass attack not only on the GDR, but on the
Popular Democracies in general, was of course, RIAS, which, throughout
the demonstrations, steadily issued directives to its agents at work in the
East Sector, which were composed of Jakob Kaiser and Ernst Reuter terror
bands trained in the postwar years with the aid of American
subvention…118
The SED and leadership in Moscow broadcasted a version of events that also attacked
the Western—above all U.S. and West German—presses at the same time. On June 23,
Radio Berlin publicized the story that appeared in Pravda describing the West’s
“propaganda campaign” to obscure and cover up, for the public, what had really
transpired in Berlin while at the same time the article ignored the national dimension of
the demonstrations. The Pravda article also noted that the alleged Western plot stemmed
from the provocateurs’ fear of a peaceful solution to the German question and their desire
to worsen relations between East and West Germans. This was all quite typical of the
general approach behind the Iron Curtain.119
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GDR radio also claimed on June 24 that demonstrators had, as early as June 13,
collaborated to outline a plan of attack, though such a meeting does not appear in any
historical record discovered thus far.120 Still, as discussed in the previous chapter, though
RIAS did not explicitly call for a mass-demonstration or uprising, this is essentially what
happened. Also notable here is the SED’s claim that the goal was to destabilize the region,
which, as we have seen, in popular opinion seems to have actually been the case. The
station argued that “throughout the night from June 16 to 17, RIAS broadcasted directives
on positions and meeting places for agents who were sent to the democratic sector.”121
Such accusations by the SED are invariably dismissed by historians, but deserve a second
look. As noted in the previous chapter, June 17 represented a new type of mass
demonstration, supported by radio which, by transmitting a dissident voice into volatile
spaces did function as an agent of unrest. The SED’s inaccurate claim that there existed a
vast conspirator network of agents deployed to undermine the GDR reflected the inability
of the SED (and most nearly everyone else, to be fair) to understand a fundamental shift
in how a modern protest, aided by modern communications networks, might unfold.122

Crumbling Communities
In Dresden following the events of June 17, the SED found itself forced to deal
with an alarming number of individuals leaving the party and party-sponsored
organizations that formed the building blocks of the socialist state. By June 24 it had
become apparent to party leadership that comrades had begun to distance themselves
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from the party, often choosing not to wear their party insignias.123 Leadership in Sebnitz,
for instance, noted that a number of party members always claimed that they had lost
their party emblems or forgotten them at home.124 Functionaries also noted that in several
counties, including the city of Dresden and Riesa, the Society for German-Soviet
Friendship was losing members.125 The statistics that came in from the counties began to
back up these observances. The number of persons officially tallied as leaving the party
around June 24 included:
Dresden – City 46
Zittau 35
Dresden Countryside 9
Riesa 12
Niesky 1
Görlitz Land 6
Görlitz Stadt 5
Sebnitz 14
Löbau 1
Bischofswerda 3
Dippoldiswalde 7
Kamenz 1126
Using a small SED sampling from Riesa County we find examples of reasons
members gave for leaving the party included excuses ranging from health considerations
to miscommunication and confusion regarding the party’s future plans.127 Following June
17, communal farmers in the countryside began to leave the LPGs, or at the very least,
publically declared their intention to leave. For example in LPG Kreckwitz in Bautzen
sixteen of forty-eight farmers announced their withdrawal from the unit, leading officials
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there to believe that class enemies had been at work, indeed leadership was shocked
because in the past this LPG had been well supported and already had a radio system in
place broadcasting the party’s messages.128 That party leaders found their organizations
losing members and sought at least one quick fix in published propaganda. Consider, for
instance, the newspaper headline that boasted, “Party-less colleagues strengthen[ed] the
SED with their entrance into the party of the working class.”129 This type of news became
part of a larger effort to represent a community of support through the official public
sphere that demonstrated the regime’s popular support and legitimacy.

Transmitting Stability
Whereas RIAS, dissidents, and demonstrators had transmitted the idea of
revolution and popular protest, the SED’s effort to communicate a state of calm became
one of the GDR media’s essential tasks in the days following June 17. Internally, the
regional leadership in Dresden received news from Berlin that the workforces in all
public institutions and workplaces had returned to their respective jobs and that the
fascist provocation had been terminated. Regional leadership then transmitted the news
via telephone to local party secretaries.130 Not until Friday, June 19, however, did the
local and national media apparatuses began to cover the demonstrations in any depth.
Nationally, on June 19, Neues Deutschland proclaimed that workplaces in Berlin
had resumed normal operations and it was becoming apparent that even those workers
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who had participated in the demonstrations now felt shameful of their actions.131 Even
those workers at the Stalinallee in Berlin, the origin of the demonstrations, had, after
lengthy discussions, reportedly opted to begin working again. The local press in Dresden
echoed the stories of Neues Deutschland, informing local residents that the fascist agents
had been defeated and that in Berlin, life had “again taken on its normal course.”132 The
article called on residents to help get the situation back to a normal state of affairs by
countering those who attempted to incite unrest and supporting the efforts of the
apparatuses of state power in re-establishing peace. Only in this way could East and West
Germany be re-united.133 The local news reported that an overwhelming number of
workers had heard the regime’s appeals, and that even those who had taken to the streets
on June 17 had done so in a misdirected quest to express their requests to the regime.134
Out of Sachsenwerk Niedersedlitz, an epicenter of unrest in Dresden two days prior,
appeared reports in the Sächsische Zeitung that the “first requests of all honest mates is to
again carry on working in an orderly manner.”135 The effort to transmit peace continued
into the next week, with stories of workers distancing themselves from the provocateurs
and unmasking or arresting foreign agents sent to disturb the peace.136
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The Propaganda Plan
On June 21 and 22, in the Dresden Region, officials from the counties along with
representatives from major workplaces that had experienced unrest met to discuss what
had transpired. Through such meetings and the reports they produced as well as the
general self-reflection the SED found itself forced to undergo, party leaders came to
understand that prior to June 17, the press had no real connection with the workers and
had been, along with radio, largely ineffective in shaping general support for the regime.
This predicament was, of course, compounded by RIAS’s continued popularity. The
party leaders would also come to the realization that they had failed to understand what
workers actually discussed and what motivated them.137 As the reports from the Regional
Party Control Commission (BPKK) noted almost one month later, functionaries simply
did not know the true mood of the population.138 Fixing the problem would require
“comprehensive and optimistic” campaigning which began in the days after the public
demonstrated their distaste for the SED’s brand of socialism.139
In the month or so after June 17, mass political work became a top priority.
Previously, such work had been the charge of the Instrukteuren, but now all available
personnel in each county had been deployed to carry out this extensive task. The primary
goals included explaining the New Course while publicizing the official version of June
“Mitteilungen der 1. Sekretäre der Bezirke über die Lage in der Partei und über besondere
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17. All such units received instructions for this mass political work along with weekly
information from regional party leadership in Dresden concerning the argumentation of
this program along with the special articles in the press and radio reports. The SED held
running agitation seminars in which they distributed such information to hundreds of
propagandists in each location.140 By mid-July, thousands of propagandists would be
working daily throughout the Dresden Region.141
To communicate its intentions, and specifically its meeting on June 21 (14.
Tagung des Zentralkomitees der SED) and the resolutions pronounced therein, the
Central Committee of the SED employed various methods designed to re-establish and
represent in the official public sphere its communities of support in national and
international realms.142 In the week following the demonstrations, the Central Committee
conveyed these propagandizing tactics to regional leadership for the immediate future,
calling on all forces to implement the New Course. This tactic, according to Party
leadership, represented the regime’s most powerful weapon to prevent future
provocations on German soil. These instructions called for expressions of gratitude for
the Soviet forces’ intervention, vigilance to identify those who might look to initiate
unrest; the uncovering of enemies who sought to turn Germany into a “Korea,” and open
communications between the Party and the workforce. The last program would, for
example, be realized in a simulated public sphere through GDR radio with the program,
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“Workers ask – Propagandists Answer,” that aired in the morning and evening hours. The
Party also requested that local governments expand existing visual propaganda in the
cities, villages, and factories.143 In Dresden, the SED printed the resolutions of the 14.
Tagung, which essentially confirmed the implementation of the New Course and
condemned the demonstrations in leaflets that the Party then distributed to the counties,
factories, housing communities, and villages. Posters accompanied the leaflets and those
factories that published their own newspapers printed extra copies that they circulated
among workers. Audibly, the loudspeaker systems in factories and towns received and
broadcasted the declarations of the Central Committee at regular intervals.144
On June 18, the Central Committee had sent out a request to all counties asking
that the regional governments send to Berlin examples of positive declarations and
resolutions they had received from workforces and residents. The committee further
requested that all written enemy transmission be sent to Party Information.145 Press and
radio would publicize these positive declarations from the workforce and elsewhere in
Dresden with the intention of reaffirming the SED’s imagined communities of support.146
The official line included news that, as early as June 17, at least one factory
loudspeaker system had broadcasted on the hour the resolutions drafted by workers who
protested against the day’s demonstrations and those who had participated in them. This
announcement described the demonstrations as “riots” and demonstrators as the
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“mob.”147 Sometimes, workers just wanted their colleagues to start working again. In
Freital at the Edelstahlwerk, some of the one-thousand-man workforce composed a
resolution which they requested be played on the loudspeaker, that those who continued
to strike, even on June 18, resume working.148 Other written resolutions, such as one
drafted at Stadt-und Kreissparkasse Dresden, placed the authors in the socialist camp in
the larger Cold War and expressed their anger against the “machinations of the West
German provocateurs” and their faith in the SED and its ability to prevent war.149 After
the June 17 unrest, government agencies such as the city council in Dresden drafted
resolutions reaffirming the faith employees had in the regime’s ability to recognize its
mistakes while condemning the demonstrators as enemies of the state.150 So, too, did the
workforces of the Dresden libraries, which in its resolution—a product, so they claimed,
of “free and open debate”— thanked the majority of the population, the police, and the
Soviet Occupation Forces that prevented the fascists from starting a third world war.151
Some workforces transmitted declarations of solidarity or confidence in the regime
directly to the Central Committee in Berlin via telex, such as the stoneworkers at the
granite works in Demitz-Thumitz (55 kilometers from Dresden), who proclaimed their
solidarity and faith with the SED on June 19.152 The party received a number of such
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declarations, with the press department in Berlin processing examples from around the
GDR.
In the weeks following the uprising, the SED transmitted these types of solidarity
declarations through the press to re-establish its legitimacy by publicizing an imagined
community of support. Press stories of the peace that settled over the GDR accompanied
these declarations of faith in the regime as the SED countered the imagined community
of dissent so successfully established by RIAS.
The regime’s efforts to publicize transmissions of support began within days of
the June 17 unrest, with the announcement on the front page of Neues Deutschland that
“A wave of declarations of faith,” or Vertrauenskundgebungen, had reached the
regime.153 In the large workspaces in the Dresden Region, factory radio systems
broadcasted workers professing their faith in the regime.154 Declarations of solidarity
with the regime went out over the domestic airwaves in the late evening on June 19.155
The party used similar tactics in the local papers to create the impression that popular
opinion remained on its side. Nationally, Neues Deutschland published stories in which
workers from around the nation expressed their political support, such as in a cable
factory in Oberspree. Here, “97-percent of employees worked,” while one of these
workers declared, “I stand behind the resolutions of our Regime—[the] provocations
were anti-worker.”156 Other workers opined that the SED had earned the trust of the
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workers through its actions while some expressed their approval of the regime’s decision
to call on the Soviet forces.157
The press in Dresden followed this example and ostensibly surveyed the local
workforces for opinions they could publicize to create the illusion of a community of
popular support. For example, a lead article in Sächsische Zeitung of June 24 noted that
“In numerous personal opinions the workers in our region offer the impression that
because the party openly admitted its mistakes, faith of the population in the
regime…continues to grow.”158 The reporters here, who had the chance to chat with some
of the workers at the Transformatoren und Roentgen Werkes Dresden, explained that
such opinions, that they characterized as “the honest opinion of the majority of our
workers,” conveyed the messages that workers wanted nothing to do with the
demonstrators of June 17. But the article also conveyed the observation that workers did
want the party to concern itself more fully with their needs. Indeed, the Party addressed
this desire in the second set of resolutions taken up in the fourteenth meeting of the
SED.159

International Community and Support
As RIAS broadcasted declarations of solidarity from throughout the western Cold
War community, the SED followed suit, with the regime’s media instruments
representing an international community of supporters in the Soviet Union and the
Eastern Bloc through the official public sphere. The propaganda instructions for the week
157
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of June 29 asked for the local (county) SED leaders in Dresden to consider the
“continuous revelations” concerning the background of June 17 (more on this shortly)
and the “effects on the global public.”160 These instructions noted that the destruction of
the fascist provocation represented a victory for socialist nations and the establishment of
peace. The regime publicized that the “countless solidarity demonstrations throughout the
world, and above all those of the Soviet workers, show that the German people are not
fighting for peace and unification alone.” 161 This all formed a crucial part of the
propaganda campaign in the summer of 1953 and served to counter the power of the rival
public sphere.
This part of the SED’s public relations campaign focusing on a strengthened
international community played out in the national and local presses. Neues Deutschland
claimed that despite fascist mercenaries in the GDR, things fell through for the western
provocateurs because of the Soviet army and the “democratic strength” of the East
German people. As a result, the German-Soviet relationship had been strengthened.162
Editors translated Pravda articles that spoke to the “voice of millions of Soviets,” who
revealed in their speeches and discussions the “powerful growth of the world-wide peace
movement.”163
In Dresden, the editors at the Sächsische Zeitung published a range of articles that
reinforced Cold War German nationalism and the connections that theoretically bound an
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imagined community of citizens on the socialist side of the Iron Curtain. Readers learned
that, “the entire Eastern Bloc press conveys the firm solidarity of the working classes in
those nations, which have been conveyed through their letters.”164 Bulgarians learned that
those forces that worked to shatter the peace grew in proportion to the strength of the
socialists, while Hungarians learned through Szabad Nep (“A Free People”—the official
organ of the Hungarian Working People’s Party) that the connection that bonded the
masses, the state, the party, and the workers demanded constant attention.165 In Budapest
at the Waggonfabrik – Wilhelm Pieck, the workers drafted a letter in which they vowed
that the “fascist attack” had affected not only the German people, but all peace-loving
people.166 The declarations of solidarity went the other way, too. For instance, the SED
publicized through ADN (and the Sächsische Zeitung) a letter composed by the workers
in Freital thanking the Soviet workforce for their “brotherly bond” in the struggle against
fascism. They directed the letter to the workers at the Stalin Automobile Works in
Moscow: “The solidarity demonstrations of the entire Soviet people give us new power
and strength in our the national struggle for the establishment of a unified Germany…in
total confidence of the SED and to the regime the defeated enemies of our democratic
order will be granted no respite .”167
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Protests and their Transmissions
Using a trick out of RIAS’s playbook, the SED publicized public protest in
domestic locales, too.168 The arrangements for such events began during the week after
June 17 and, it appears without irony, that the SED in Berlin carefully planned out a
demonstration for Friday June 26. Neues Deutschland, along with GDR radio, announced,
for example, that a demonstration in Berlin had been scheduled for the afternoon and
would support the regime’s reform package and its efforts to raise living standards while
providing evidence of workers’ faith in the regime.169 The official coverage of the
protests noted that demonstrators filled the streets, chanting “Long live Wilhelm Pieck
and the GDR” and listened to Otto Grotewohl’s version of X-Day, which recounted
Western provocateurs in “cowboy pants and Texas-style shirts” who wanted to disrupt
international developments pertaining to Germany.170 Pieck himself showed up, too,
along with Wilhelm Zaisser. The article that appeared in Dresden in the Sächsische
Zeitung noted that despite the pouring rain, 70,000 Berliners took to the streets to show
support.171
Beneath that headline appeared a call for a large-scale youth demonstration on
July 1 at Karl-Marx-Platz in Dresden. According to the local media in Dresden, fivethousand youths, including many from the Free German Youth, appeared in the streets on
Wednesday, July 1 to “express their solidarity with the Party of the working class and
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[the] regime.”172 Of course, one wonders about the true mood of those who demonstrated
in support of the regime, as the demonstrations, were of course, planned by the party and
local workplaces. Through “investigative” or internal conversations with the SED’s youth
leadership from the day of the demonstrations, it became apparent that apathy pervaded
the organization while conversations with the youth who attended revealed that they did
not really have any faith in the regime, either. Still, a good number did show up at the
rally and most seemed to actually listen to the speeches, but a good portion of the youth
merely chatted with one another, paying little attention to the regime’s theatrics.173
The Sächsische Zeitung also described the demonstration and loyalty rally (a two
part affair in the minds of the SED) that moved through Görlitz on Friday, July 4, as a
“powerful” event that drew not only thousands of comrades to Leninplatz, but “many
party-less workers, too.”174 Party leaders rehashed the official story, wherein American
imperialists and their German lackeys hatched X-Day. Hidden behind the theatrics
masquerading as a public outpouring of support, participants aired grievances and
functionaries bemoaned low turnout. Workers at Görlitz Maschinenbau, for example
argued that it was much too soon for such an event and that the regime would have to
prove through action, rather than rhetoric, that it could earn the workers’ trust. Others
contended that they had just demonstrated against the regime and refused to demonstrate
in support of the regime less than two weeks later. It must have seemed ridiculous, after
all. Perhaps even more alarming than these workers’ lukewarm enthusiasm for the
“’Wir helfen den neuen Kurs verwirklichen!’” Sächsische Zeitung, 3 Juli, 1953 (SAPMO-BArch,
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government’s efforts was the pervasive belief among these workers that revolution and
unrest had engulfed the neighboring Eastern Bloc nations.175

Recognizing the Power of Rumor
As noted in section one, while rumors functioned as an alternative form of
political participation for those who spread them, they represented deliberate “enemy
activity” to the SED. An analysis published by the NDPD entitled “The Provocation of
June 17 and its Background –‘Messenger of the Enemy,’” noted the power of rumor
during the unrest and reflected a larger body of concerns coursing through the party. The
essay referenced nineteenth century French painter Honore Daumier’s Crispin and
Scapin, which, in the writer’s mind perfectly characterized the hideous nature of rumors
that served the politics of dissention and war mongering: the rumor existed in the arsenals
of those who sought to ruin society. The article suggested that one could identify the
victims of rumors in and around June 17, for example, the single woman who purchased
seventy-two loaves of bread with her meager savings (for fear of revolution, shortage, or
currency reform? The article is not clear here). Furthermore, this was not the first time
rumor had incited financial panic although in the minds of SED functionaries, this could
have turned into a larger run on the banks. In Dresden, and probably elsewhere, rumor of
currency reform following the announcement of the New Course had prompted
speculation and irregular purchases.176 According to this piece, the rumor had presented
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another set of challenges and helped spread “X-Day.”177 The arguments presented by the
NDPD also reinforce interpretations of the rapid pace at which the June events developed
(and ended) that proved essential to the very modernity of the June 17 demonstrations:
“Just as the Schwindelkurslüge [of 1951—the so-called “currency reform lie”—a rumor
which supposedly began in the West] unraveled literally overnight, so too failed in just a
few hours the lies and rumors that had psychologically prepared X-Day.”178 Or, to return
to one of the central arguments presented in chapter three, public discussion, prompted
and aided by illicit foreign broadcasting had created a space where revolution became
thinkable in a hitherto impossibly short period of time. The analysis presented by the
NDPD continues along familiar, though certainly not identical lines, to what has been
presented here, framing RIAS as a conversation starter: “only because they believe the
rumors from RIAS and the Western muckraking press and fomenting rumors,” were the
provocateurs successful in attempting to begin a third world war.179
In Dresden, the rumor issue appeared as a lesson for readers in the Sächsische
Zeitung under the heading “How Rumors Develop.”180 In the story, the reporter visits the
office responsible for distributing passes for international travel. A young woman exits
the building and is quite upset, complaining that things should have improved by now. It
turns out that she had applied three months ago for her pass, and the application still
needed to be checked. But, she had heard from the radio (it is unclear which station,
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though RIAS’s coverage of this issue—see chapter three—makes it the prime suspect)
that it only took two days—which was not officially true. The moral of the story: radio
could mislead the GDR’s citizenry through disinformation and create confusion.181 In
others words, the SED recognized that rumors mattered.

Atrocities
While RIAS and other western outlets and politicians used the execution of Willi
Göttling as an atrocity that spoke to the inhumanity of the GDR’s brand of socialism, the
SED used the execution of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg as an occasion to publicize the
brutality of the West. Tried as spies who conspired to sell secrets to the Soviet Union, a
jury found the couple guilty of espionage and executed them at Sing Sing correctional
facility in New York on June 19, 1953.182 The SED, which had been using the case as
anti-U.S. propaganda for months, organized local memorials on June 20, with workers in
a number of factories in Dresden drafting protest resolutions that linked the execution
with the recent “failed fascist putsch attempt.”183 Neues Deutschland reported on Sunday,
June 21 that, “screams of fiery outrage,” could be heard through the entire world as
protests broke out in front of the White House. In a protest telegram to President
Eisenhower, the World Federation of Trade Unions spoke for workers around the globe,
expressing their outrage at the execution.184 ADN carried articles from Pravda that argued
that “the blood of the Rosenbergs” bound all of human kind while the news triggered
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protests that shook New York, London, Rome, and Paris.185 Other news reports showed
the same purpose: coverage of protests in Sidney in front of the U.S. embassy against
America’s alleged slide into dictatorship appeared on June 24 in Neues Deutschland and
reported that the “Finnish public protested in numerous telegrams and letters to the U.S.
embassy,” strove to create the impression of an international community of protestors
bound in solidarity against a mutual, inhumane enemy.186

Sie sind Helden
While rumors and dissident public opinion held that the SED leadership trio,
Ulbricht, Grotewohl, and Pieck, were either dead, arrested, or on the run, the party looked
to rehabilitate the images of these three in the weeks after June 17. During this period, the
party commenced this effort by simply putting their portraits back onto the walls where
rumor had led to their removal.187 The media organs then aimed to represent through the
official public sphere the broad support these three men still enjoyed—or at least the
image of popular support. Neues Deutschland publicized (via ADN) laudatory letters—
socialist fan mail, really— received by Otto Grotewohl from around the GDR in the wake
of June 17, which served as “Mark[s] of confidence from all strata of society.”188 Pieck
addressed Dresdeners on the front page of the Sächsische Zeitung on June 29 via
telegram, in an article that noted that he was still recovering in the Soviet Union,
reinforcing the SED’s narrative of events and calling for national unity.189 One day later,
on his sixtieth birthday, a representative filling in for the absent Pieck, bestowed the
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prestigious title “Hero of Labor” (Held der Arbeit) upon Walter Ulbricht in recognition of
his service to the construction of an “economy of peace” and a “unified, democratic
Germany.”190 Pieck himself recorded a speech in the Soviet Union that GDR radio
broadcasted. Like Grotewohl, he mentioned the numerous faith declarations and “marks
of confidence” that he had received and that since June 17, he had felt an especially close
bond with citizens of the GDR.191
On Friday, July 3, a memo detailing propaganda tactics called for county
leadership to broadly popularize Ulbricht’s speeches. Propagandists received instructions
to discuss Pieck’s speech with factory workers and organize letter writing campaigns. In
an effort to create the impression—true or not—of positive popular opinion, agitators
received orders to collect commentary from workers of all levels and publicize such
opinions on factory bulletins and over the factory radio systems. Excerpts from the
speech were to accompany Pieck’s images as part of the larger visual propaganda effort,
while radio systems were to broadcast the speech into communal listening spaces during
work breaks. Outside of the factories, functionaries found themselves charged with
carrying out the above duties in enlightenment offices and in communal living spaces
where letter writing campaigns were to be held.192 These communications functioned as a
machine for manufacturing public opinion for the official public sphere that established
legitimacy in the form of the support of GDR leadership of an imagined national
community.
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Early results of this public relations campaign proved disappointing for the
regime. In almost every area of the Dresden Region residents maligned Ulbricht’s
newfound status as labor hero.193 In various locales, the “mood of the people was against
Ulbricht” and discussions amongst workers revealed curiosity regarding the timing of his
designation as Hero of Labor.194 Workers at Spinnerei und Weberei in Ebersbach wanted
to know why Ulbricht had not only been honored as a Hero of Labor, but why he had
been paid DM 10,000 for all the errors that the party made on his watch. And these
workers demanded Ulbricht appear in Dresden so they could “give him a piece of their
mind.”195 In a printing house in Görlitz, workers wondered why the party chose not to
make Pieck’s whereabouts public knowledge for so long, as it only encouraged the
rumors. Rumor—probably false—circulated in Sebnitz that Pieck had not actually spoken
on the radio and someone had impersonated him.196 One can probably construe this as a
representative example of public opinion as the workers here (2,500) came from twentyfive localities.

Conclusions
On June 17 the SED had found itself outflanked by the rival public sphere and it
continued to struggle mightily in the aftermath of this challenge. In some ways, June 17,
as a modern mass demonstration, did have a tidy ending: the SED, with Soviet help,
effectively and quickly cleared the streets of public protestors on the afternoon and
evening of June 17, removing a national conversation from public space and neutralizing
193
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what had become, in Arendtian parlance, spaces of appearance. Despite some
demonstrators lingering in the streets that night and sporadic strikes and work stoppages
in the weeks that followed, the SED effectively confined mass protest to a single day. On
the other hand, the spirit of June 17 carried on into the next weeks in the rival public
sphere and many felt that revolution continued and the future of the GDR remained in
doubt. RIAS, like rumor, made some sense of a confused situation, undermining the SED
and endowing June 17 with national and international imaginings. Those who gave their
lives on June 17 offered the most hallowed method by which to do so and the mourning
ceremony in West Berlin epitomized the power of radio in a national moment of silence.
RIAS also underscored the notion of solidarity as a key component of June 17, and more
importantly, bluntly noted the difference, in its opinion, between fabricated (through the
official public sphere) and authentic (in the rival public sphere) bonds of solidarity. The
station’s broadcasts also demonstrated the international dimension of post-war German
nationalism, whereby western nations commiserated with (East) German suffering. The
SED offered an alternative explanation for June 17 that became part of a larger public
relations effort to re-establish the appearance of national and international communities
of support desperately needed to legitimize its rule. The party employed its media
apparatuses to publicize staged solidarity rallies and what sometimes amounted to
Potemkin protests. Efforts to rehabilitate the SED’s leading men also proved quite
difficult, with Dresdeners unwilling to accept Walter Ulbricht as a Labor Hero,
considering his accomplishments and failures—real or rumored.
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Conclusion

The June 17 events of 1953 followed the modern revolutionary script but
introduced a new wrinkle: the electronic transmission of protest that rapidly mobilized
the masses and fueled a nationwide demonstration. This study has suggested that June
1953 thus constituted the first modern, radio-driven demonstration, whereby protest on a
nationwide scale unfolded nearly instantly. We have also seen that the occasion had roots
not only in the GDR’s short-term economic decisions and political maneuvering, but in a
rival public sphere that had allowed private citizens to become collectively ascendant and
challenge the legitimacy of a regime that struggled to project its authority.
Indeed, the Soviet intervention revealed the real basis of the SED’s power, and
the optics of the event were quite horrible. But the (open) threat of force could never be
suitable for a regime that based its legitimacy on humane philosophical underpinnings.
We also should remember here that the Stasi prior to the June events had not yet become
the omnipresent force of the later decades and the first bricks of the Wall were still eight
years away.1 And we should also consider that East German communists’ alliance with
Stalin took place under circumstances in which his armies had done the heavy lifting to
stop Hitler and the Soviet leader had only months prior been an ally of the SED’s
American antagonists. So on one hand, the SED truly did have the people’s best interests
in mind and believed that their time had arrived. This mindset must have certainly been
especially strong in Dresden, at least in the early days, when the desolate Old City and
toppled Church of our Lady served as daily representations of its two greatest enemies.

1

See Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, Armin Mitter, and Stefan Wolle, eds., Der Tag X - 17. Juni 1953
Die »Innere Staatsgründung« der DDR als Ergebnis der Krise 1952/54 (Berlin: C.H. Links Verlag, 1996).
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Finally, Walter Ulbricht, Otto Grotewohl, and Wilhelm Pieck were Old Communists.
They, and others like them, had dedicated their lives to a cause and had a myopic vision
for its course in their later years (more on this later).Thus the SED’s confidence in the
virtue of its positions and unwavering faith in its policies should not surprise us.
This righteousness manifested itself in the official public sphere, a projection of
the party’s collective opinion. And since the SED philosophically conceived of itself as
the embodiment of working class interests, its positions were that of the public, or at least
the largest and most important part of it. That some of the GDR’s citizens still had not
gotten with the program simply represented false consciousness or lack of
enlightenment—issues that could and would be overcome. Indeed, the new Dresden
could now exist not only as a representation of western (meaning fascist and capitalist)
crimes, but as a didactic tool to get such a process underway, too. Consider for example
the Church of our Lady, which remained a symbolic memorial to war until reunification,
or stories and pictures of Stalin Avenue, the avenue that embodied monumental planning
built along socialist principles. Such projects and the greater East German habitat
therefore functioned as a visible element of the official public sphere and the party’s
confidence in its objectives. The official public sphere also found expression with
Sichtwerbungen, such as banners, “friendship corners,” and “public” declarations. The
inference here by placing quotation marks around the word public is intentional: the party
looked to establish the appearance of public support by encouraging the displays of
support for its programs and faith in the socialist purpose. As some have pointed out, this
amounted to a world of appearances that belied the true political feelings of the
population. Undoubtedly, some of those volunteers that hung a banner of support from
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their window decrying RIAS or western warmongers did in fact harbor feelings that
aligned with those of the regime. But since displays of opposition obviously did not exist
in the official public sphere, it is of course impossible to determine the authenticity of the
displays, which, of course, leads to monikers like “phony public sphere.”
Because there existed only one public entity—the authoritarian regime—this
study has suggested that the arrangement in the GDR and other Soviet-type states was
reminiscent of the absolutist early modern European state. As with Louis’ Versailles and
Augustus’ Zwinger (note the word here has a root in zwingen, to force or compel), the
SED looked to re-present power before the people. The politics of display noted above
stood in here quite nicely, and one could argue that the Stalin Allee was similar to the
early modern palace in that it was a sort of “people’s palace.” Or perhaps consider the
Palace of the Republic, the seat of the East German congress that was open to the public
for entertainment from the late-1970s. Furthermore, as in the early modern system, the
hidden uncertainties of the regime led to greater displays of power. Of course there were,
as noted, several important differences. The early modern regime looked to impress
distance upon its subjects while the SED, as a socialist regime, looked to create the
feeling of closeness. But, as we have seen, such efforts found little success in the early
1950s. To this point, consider that following the Hungarian Uprising of 1956—more on
this shortly—the leaders of the SED, in a panic, packed up and moved to the outskirts of
Berlin to distance themselves from any possible unrest. The compound, known as die
Waldsiedlung (forest settlement) built near Wandlitz to house the leading statesmen
certainly revealed the party’s doubts—and fears.2
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A significant difference between the representative culture of the early modern
period and that which existed in the GDR relates again to distance. As pointed out earlier,
the modern state extended beyond the scope of physical representations and political
communities emerged as imagined communities: states now projected through media
apparatuses what we could not experience or see in person. In the GDR, the SED used
radio as part of the official public sphere to extend its representation, and thus its
authority and legitimacy, to the entire nation. Radio had played an important role in the
Nazi seizure and maintenance of power and this did not go unnoticed by the socialists.
The Party carried out what they considered a propaganda makeover that would broadcast
the exact opposite of what the National Socialists’ efforts delivered: the truth. Thus they
wasted little time getting their message onto the airwaves.
A central argument in this study has revolved around the idea of an imagined
community. To this end I have modified Benedict Anderson’s original thesis (though I
am certainly not the first to do so) to suggest that radio played a similar role to print
capitalism in socially constructing a particular type of GDR nationalism. This nationalism
that existed on the radio (and in print) found inspiration and direction in the
internationalism of the post-war period. Therefore, Benedict Anderson’s idea of a fixed
national boundary gets pushed to the wayside here and we might better understand the
imagined community broadcasted as one that integrated East Germans in to the Eastern
Bloc politically and culturally. The SED broadcasted this internationalism as a solidarity
or Verbundenheit between East Germans and Soviet and Eastern Bloc peoples, and
celebrated the successes of the Red Army and instructed the GDR in Soviet cultural
happenings. East German nationalism on the radio also projected an all-German
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community based on working class solidarity. Broadcasters recorded workers’
demonstrations in the Federal Republic and transmitted such protests to the GDR and
listeners in the West in an attempt to undermine the government there and foreshadowing
the vastly more effective transmission of protest in June of 1953. The delivery system for
such programming in the GDR was extensive and pervasive. The Betriebsfunk system
meant that the Party essentially had a captive audience and the Stadtfunk system allowed
it to audibly project its authority into those spaces where people naturally congregated,
like the Postplatz.
The SED also employed organized and choreographed demonstrations as a way to
represent publicness to its citizenry. The party regularly announced and held rallies that it
then later publicized to represent its popular support. Stalin’s death afforded a notable
and unique opportunity to do so. Using the occasion to stage synchronized rallies wherein
attendants and those listening on the radio could imagine themselves as part of a larger
community of mourners produced an occasion full of international imaginings.
This study has also suggested that a rival public sphere developed alongside the
representative culture embodied in the official public sphere. This political publicness
existed in the form of improvised news and foreign radio broadcasting. We have also
seen that while modern dictatorial regimes such as the SED attempted to fashion
totalitarian states, radio broadcasting and the widespread ownership of receivers created a
breach in their communications fortress. This was not unlike the pamphlets from the
Netherlands that made it into France or the alternative media (backdoor news) in China
that undermined/undermines the regimes those respective states. Nor was it unlike the
radio programming during World War II that aimed at destabilizing home fronts.
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However, RIAS was also quite different from anything that had come before by virtue of
its location in the “other half” of a divided Germany. The station existed as a pillar of the
rival public sphere and continuously, and quite often, successfully, called into question
the SED’s agenda.
RIAS programming, like that of its rivals in the GDR, pulled listeners in the two
Germanys into aural communion to form an imagined community of all Germans.
Political shows kept East Germans abreast of governmental developments in the FRG and
these extended to all segments of society. Such programming offered East Germans
alternative news to that which was available in the official public sphere while at the
same time challenging the political positions of the SED at every step. These broadcasts
also chipped away at the SED’s prestige and thus its legitimacy. On this point, it is
important to note that RIAS openly campaigned (like the GDR) for a reunified Germany
and envisioned reunification proceeding under West German control (as it did in 1989).
Thus, RIAS’s decision to refer to the GDR as “the Zone” in lieu of its official name
probably reinforced the belief in this period that the division was only temporary. Talk,
though, is only important if someone is listening, and in the case of RIAS, it certainly
enjoyed greater listenership in the period leading up to the June 1953 events than did the
GDR’s stations.
Perhaps the most important development—and an overlooked one—was RIAS’s
ability to inspire action. After the SED dismantled or co-opted workers’ traditional
associations of collective deliberation and political action, RIAS filled in as a virtual
forum and helped workers organize in opposition to the regime. The campaign surveyed
in chapter two showed that communication went both ways, which RIAS receiving
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information from the workers in the GDR and then broadcasting ideas about how workers
might resist the regime. The activities here speak volumes about the station’s motivations
and power behind the Iron Curtain, as workers’ actions revealed widespread listenership
and the ability of the station to shape action on the ground. First, RIAS allowed informed
workers to present a unified front in different locales—foreshadowing its role on June 17.
Indeed, the station internally boasted of its newfound faculty to turn individual resistance
into mass resistance that could develop so quickly as to paralyze briefly the state; one that
they continuously derided as illegitimate.
This study has suggested that rumors constituted the second-most important
element in the rival public sphere. Naturally, foreign radio broadcasting, which delivered
news unavailable in the official public sphere and was thus probably unknown to the
functionaries tasked with recording public opinion, tied into the formation of “rumors.”
Therefore, in some cases, these rumors were true or at least partially true, despite the
regime’s record often categorizing them as false or dis-information. A notable example of
this included the pervasive stream of improvised news related to the strikes in Pilsen in
the period before June 17. The SED obviously had little interest in making such unrest
the talk of the town, thus, outside sources—probably RIAS—delivered the news in and
around Dresden. Improvised news of the uprising, which actually was a violent event,
kept the event in the news cycle of the rival public sphere and helped de-stabilize the
situation even further in the weeks prior to the June events. While reports regarding the
Pilsen uprising circulated in the region in the form of (often accurate) improvised news,
many stories strayed from the truth. The rumors that the regime had stepped down or
fled—and often in some dishonorable way—show that bits of true news became the
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social materials out of which residents constructed sometimes-alternative or hope-filled
realities. This is significant, and offers a key insight into the event: what participants
knew or thought to be happening is often quite different from what historians know or
think they know to have happened. The polarized news outlets almost certainly
contributed to the proliferation of improvised news and one has to wonder if the medium
contributed here, too. After all, it took some effort to tune into foreign radio stations due
to jamming and the need—sometimes, though not always—to do so secretly meant that
residents might have been more likely to have heard bits and pieces of stories through
static or low volume. These may have been moments of improvisation.
After the announcement of the New Course, the rival public sphere, to paraphrase
Tim Blanning, had developed its own power and it was in these spaces that revolution
became thinkable. The story by now seems vaguely familiar: financial crisis had
weakened the regime’s position and its public calls for reform had heightened
expectations. Rumor had damaged the leadership’s prestige and improvised news
suggested that the authorities had moved violently to put down revolutionary fervor
nearby.3 While the events of June 17 were not, of course, inevitable, the stage had
certainly been set.

3

I allude to France in 1789, where upheaval destroyed traditional information barriers like the Church, and
as a result, rumors circulated unchecked in the early years of the Revolution. In his classic work, The Great
Fear: Rural Panic in Revolutionary France (1932), Georges Lefebvre traced the spread of rumor, panic,
and unrest that traveled along rural and military roads, beginning on July 20 and continuing through August
3. Lefebvre followed the spread of the rumors and unrest in concentric circles, where the peasants reacted
violently as “news” regarding brigands reached the local town or village. Supposedly, the nobility had
instructed these brigands to destroy crops and put down revolutionary fervor. Of course, we now know
there were no brigands, but the peasants rebelled anyway with the rumors taking on a life of their own. As
another historian put it, “the reign of rumor had begun.” (see Jordan, David P., “Rumor, Fear, and Paranoia
in the French Revolution,” Oxford Scholarship Online. May 2010). What turned out to be misinformation
helped give birth to the Terror, as well, after rumor of a military coup and food riots, supposedly redirected
by aristocrats, made their rounds. Even the end of the Terror had some basis in rumor: gossip purported that
Robespierre was planning to marry Louis’ daughter and proclaim himself king.
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The analysis of the June 17 events presented here proposed that the occasion was
not a truly spontaneous one, which in a way puts it at odds with the entire historiography
minus the public interpretation of the SED. While that overtly political interpretation
falsely accused “western agents” of hiding in the GDR and springing to action on the
morning of the seventeenth, one must admit that the reasoning behind such a story is not
unreasonable when one considers two factors. In the long term, RIAS had pushed for
mass mobilization against the regime and its programming—consider again the campaign
against the collective contracts, which aimed to arm workers with a unified argument
against the regime. And recall RIAS’s own assessment from that event in 1952: “Last
year RIAS almost singlehandedly solidified anti-communist resistance in the Soviet Zone
and turned individual resistance into mass resistance. I think we all ought to recognize
this fact and implore RIAS to maintain this policy.”4 Of course, the SED was not privy to
this internal report and this is not to say that RIAS planned the June 17 demonstrations,
but the station was certainly aware that it had the power to dramatically shape the
situation. Thus, when the spontaneous (and even these had been discussed among the
construction workers over the weekend) demonstrations of June 16 broke out in Berlin,
simply by covering them the station gave the entire population a “unified argument” and
a script to follow the next day.
That the commentators did not call for a general strike—a point they made in
interviews after the fact—does not seem to have mattered much. They came close enough
and listeners heard what they wanted to hear. As we have seen, some recalled hearing the
station call for a general strike, though their memories prove faulty in this case. One
“Zur Information der Korrespondenten,” Berlin 24. April 1952, Release # 1630, Office of the United
States High Commissioner for Germany Berlin Element, Information Branch (DRA Potsdam F304-0104/0004).
4
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might note, though, that RIAS remarked that one of the protest’s slogans had been
“Tomorrow it continues.” This study has suggested that by merely reporting the day’s
events, the RIAS broadcasted a script for the next day and it is little surprise that things
played out the way they did on June 17. Indeed, the protestors marched through the
streets and declared their solidarity with the Berlin marchers, chanted similar slogans, and
made analogous demands, essentially enacting the script they had been given. Yet radio
had ushered in a new era of public protest that day. Participant Rainer Hildebrandt’s
observation that a “leaderless” uprising had now become possible and that we had
entered a new era where ten thousand protestors could be in the streets within hours was
an astute one indeed.5
Finally, this study has attempted to contribute to our understanding of
nationalism’s role in the June 17 demonstrations and has suggested that radio’s centrality
in the event sheds light on this debate. Certainly, RIAS endowed the demonstrations with
national imaginings on the night of June 16 and helped turn the workers’ protests into a
movement that spoke to national questions and alluded to national unity. For example, by
reporting that with a sound truck demonstrators had declared, “If you are a son of the
nation [Volkes], join us!”6 Such slogans, heard by workers around the GDR that evening,
help explain why things moved beyond economic issues so quickly. This inquiry into the
question of nationalism has also shown that in the aftermath of the June 17
demonstrations, RIAS allowed for moments of national imaginings. Most notable among
these was the demonstration of sorrow held in Berlin to pay tribute to those (unknown)
victims of June 17. RIAS’s transmission of the occasion, with the crowd and listeners
Hildebrandt, “17 Juni: Großer Tatsachenbericht.”
“Die Sendungen des RIAS am Dienstag, 16. Juni 1953”: “Wenn Ihr Söhne des Volkes seid, schließt Euch
an!”
5
6
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sharing moments of song and of silence, represented an instance full of national
imaginings.

Take Two: Hungary, 1956
The new stage of the revolutionary script—coordination in strata of
communication outside of government control such as electronic mass media—has
played out in the second half of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first.
Just over three years after East Germans took to the streets to protest the Sovietstyle regime, Hungarians did the same. Events here followed a strikingly similar script:
an ascendant public, encouraged by foreign broadcasting and improvised—and mostly
accurate—news of unrest in a neighboring state, took to the streets and challenged the
existing order. 7
As in the GDR, Western foreign broadcasting penetrated the Hungarian
Communist Workers’ Party (HCWP) of Hungary’s broadcasting landscape. The United
States, with RFE and VOA, beamed messages of hope to Hungarians who tuned in with
specially modified radios. Indeed, in the 1950s, the United States’ very public liberation
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rhetoric had implied assistance, and Hungarians took this idea to heart.8 Of course, the
U.S. had stayed on the sidelines in 1953, and privately President Dwight Eisenhower
(along with those who crafted foreign policy) had accepted that John Foster Dulles’
“rollback” and the “liberation of captive peoples” was simply unrealistic.9 Still,
Hungarians listened to RFE and VOA broadcasts that encouraged hopes of liberation, and
years of broadcasting had heightened expectations among the population, whether these
ideas were realistic or not. Indeed, from these stations’ broadcasts, listeners gathered that
they had a powerful ally on their side that was willing to come to their aid should they
actively resist Soviet domination. Furthermore, for five years, these transmissions had
stimulated conversations among listeners in a rival public sphere that often led to
discussions regarding the possibility of an armed uprising, with help from the West. In
short, RFE and VOA helped make revolution thinkable.10
American efforts to challenge the communist regime in Hungary developed
beyond radio, too. For example, from late 1954 until the middle of 1955, Operation Focus,
an extension of RFE, dropped millions of leaflets over Hungary. The government
intended for these leaflets, an extension of American foreign policy, to stir resistance
activity and ultimately help Hungarians force concessions from the government. There is
evidence that these leaflets held significance for Hungarians who deduced from their
appearance that they had a powerful ally on their side. These leaflets then circulated
among the population prompting conversations in the rival public sphere pertaining to the
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possibility of action; some Hungarians even spoke of reviving the revolutionary script of
1848-9.11
As in the GDR, American broadcasting had stimulated the growth of a rival
public sphere in Hungary. When RFE aired Khrushchev’s secret speech in 1955 and
Matyas Rakosi found himself forced to resign, the government appeared to falter and the
rival public sphere became ascendant. Hungarian students became aware of unrest in
Poland between October 19 and 22 via RFE broadcasts—a situation not unlike that which
unfolded in the GDR in regard to the Pilsen rebellion. In an effort to show solidarity with
the Poles, students in Szeged began demonstrating, which in turn inspired similar
demonstrations in Budapest. In the capital on the evening of 22 October, students drafted
a list of demands, just as dissidents had done in 1848 (and in numerous other instances,
including June 1953). Radio broadcasts on 23 October shaped the collective action of the
opposition and directed mass gatherings that formed the basis for a popular uprising in
Budapest. When students attempted to broadcast their demands over the airwaves the
night of 23 October, a contest as to who controlled Hungarian media ignited the
demonstration. News of the outbreak of violence spread throughout Budapest, and what
began as a skirmish became a city-wide uprising. Through radio transmissions, leaflets,
and posters, the revolution coagulated in the capital. Fighting factions communicated via
shortwave broadcasts, many of which were relayed by RFE from one group of Freedom
Fighters to another. Copycat lists of demands circulated among the population while
posters and the written word verified the veracity of claims made by radio.12 News of the
demonstration went out over the radio on October 23 and participation exploded. As in
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the GDR, radio fostered collective activity and calls for solidarity drove the movement.
For instance, coalminers, who had gone on strike immediately after hearing of the events
in Budapest, refused to resume work “as long as Russian soldiers were murdering their
brothers in Budapest.”13
By the morning of October 24, news of revolution had already spread outside of
Budapest and inspired Hungarians throughout the nation to follow the lead of the capital.
On 24 October, workers and students hundreds of kilometers from the hostilities in the
capital city were brought into the fold via radio transmission. When those outside of
Budapest heard the news of the violence, they immediately felt the pull of national
imaginings and communities throughout Hungary rose up against their foreign occupiers.
The Sixteen Points inspired similar lists of demands and unified the aims of the
movement. The popularity of Western broadcasting stations contributed to Hungarians’
recognition of shortwave radio as an effective means of broadcasting and the regime’s
opponents had become adept at utilizing the potential of this type of radio. This meant
that Revolutionary radio operators transmitted local news and leveraged the leadership of
the Revolution. The desire to listen to Western broadcasting meant that the majority of
Hungarian households had procured (or had altered) a set to receive shortwave
broadcasts—those transmitting the revolution had a large audience.14
This rapid swelling of the uprising has become one of its defining characteristics.
Authorities on the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, such as Charles Gati, maintain that the
revolution was spontaneous. Paul Kecskemeti agreed, appropriately titling his book The
Unexpected Revolution. Indeed, events took western governments by surprise. But as
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with 1953, spontaneity was only one part of the revolutionary equation: the rapid
explosion primarily stemmed from the communications infrastructure in place and an
energized rival public sphere. The swift unification of the uprising can also be explained
by the communities formed through Western broadcasting between 1951 and 1956,
primarily RFE and VOA. These broadcasts had fostered the establishment of
independence-minded communities, bound by the belief in Western assistance. When
news of the first shots aired, Hungarians felt that those in their communities harbored the
same thoughts of liberation and shared similar faith in their imagined Western allies.
Through their calls for help, Hungarian freedom fighters who manned shortwave radio
stations affirmed this pre-existing faith in the West.15
After Soviet forces crushed the revolution on November 4, 1956, the popular
belief held by Hungarians that the West would come to their aid proved to be deceptive—
a recurring theme for Eastern Bloc residents. In Hungary the revolutionary script seemed
familiar here, too: as in 1848, Western Europe had professed the desire for Hungarian
self-determination, yet in reality, held little interest in intervening in a meaningful way.
Soviet troops capitalized, ending another battle between the two sides for independence.
This was also the second time the Soviets used force to quell unrest in one of their
satellite states—but this time they hesitated.16

Take Three: East Germany, 1989
The Soviets’ suppression of the East German demonstrations and the Hungarian
Uprising confirmed Soviet rule of Eastern Europe and proved that the West, and
especially the United States, with its posturing and rollback rhetoric had no intention of
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intervening behind the Iron Curtain. But, each time the Soviets deployed tanks it created
a public relations debacle that damaged their diminishing prestige. The Warsaw Pact
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 to restore hard-line rule after eight months of reforms
under Alexander Dubcek aimed to soften the nature of Czech socialism meant that
stability and legitimacy existed only in appearance in the Eastern Bloc states. And this
was true of all the satellite states: by 1968, the native governments lacked the genuine
legitimacy that would have been necessary for their political survival without Soviet
backing.17
Mary Fulbrook challenges the notion that Soviet-style totalitarian regimes stood
directly opposed to “the people.” In her effort to capture the normality of everyday GDR
life, she has more recently proposed the elegant term “participatory dictatorship.”
Essentially, she argues that while only a few had true power, almost everyone, in some
way or another, participated, whether through direct involvement or through various
forms of protest. Fulbrook thus rejects the totalitarian model that this study has presented,
though that may be largely due to the periods under study. Certainly, this analysis covers
a period wherein East Germans experienced the aftermath of war and Stalinism, rather
than the consumerist socialism and stability of the later decades. And of course, 1953 had
something to do with that, as the regime opted for a program of repression and expansion
(a strengthened secret police and greater party discipline) and retreat (they never again
ignored consumer demands as they had between the summer of 1952 and the June events).
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In short, life probably became much more normal for most East Germans after 1953 and
before 1989.18
The very unexpectedness of the 1989 revolutions seemed to endorse the stability
of the state, though some have argued that revolt was never far from the surface. There is
certainly ample evidence to back up either argument, but observers in the 1980s could see
that the regime had in many ways become ossified. Indeed, Erich Honecker and others
remained mentally grounded in the pre-war period, promoting cheap streetcar tickets
while consumers wanted blue jeans. Honecker’s decision to embrace East-West détente
only exacerbated his difficulties. His need to differentiate the GDR from the FRG in a
favorable light proved an unfeasible goal. In the later period then, party, and thus the state,
had become thoroughly outmoded. And even if mass revolt was not lurking right below
the surface, the public certainly had its power. Sure, there the GDR produced some
homegrown favorites (die Puhdys; Unser Sandmännchen), but on balance the little
republic could not compete with Western music and fashion and this put the party at odds
with the rival public sphere, which by the 1980s had become the supreme arbiter in
matters of good taste (to paraphrase Tim Blanning, yet again).19 In 1989, the rival public
sphere became the ultimate arbiter in matters of politics, too.
Rolf Steninger argues that 1989 represented the completion of 1953, which, in his
mind, constituted an unfinished revolution. He points to the nearly identical slogans
expressed in Leipzig 36 years later—Wir sind ein Volk; Free and Secret Elections;
Freedom of the Press—and contends that the only significant difference between the two
events was the Soviets’ decision to stay out. Of course, international developments set the
Fulbrook, The People’s State; Kowalczuk, 17. Juni 1953 - Volksaufstand in der DDR, Kowalczuk, Mitter
and Wolle, eds. Der Tag X - 17. Juni 1953.
19
See Epstein, The Last Revolutionaries and Blanning, The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture.
18

302

stage here, too, as political transformations in the Soviet Union represented decisive
factors leading to the peaceful revolutions in Germany. Hungary and Poland, too, with
their successful efforts to liberalize their governments, demonstrated that the Soviet
Union would tolerate liberation in the Eastern Bloc. Perhaps most importantly,
Gorbachev’s policies of Glasnost and Perestroika horrified SED leadership and when the
Soviet leader decided to allow revolution to take place elsewhere in the Bloc, it became
thinkable in the GDR.
Historians like Ray Rühle and Peter Hohendahl have argued that revolution
became thinkable in emergent public spheres—the former points to a church-based
publicness and the latter posits that the actors in a “revolutionary public sphere”
overthrew the “state public sphere.”20 As this study has built upon their ideas, the model
these authors present does not look radically different than what I suggest happened in
1953. But did the actors of 1989 follow the same script as those in 1953? For one thing,
the actors were different. New modes of political and social protest, especially in the
1980s, replaced the East German social democratic tradition of the 1950s and 60s. Avantgarde artists, bohemians, environmentalists, along with other purveyors of counterculture matured into a sort of intellectual proletariat. These dissidents found space in the
Protestant Church, and armed with samizdat leaflets, became emboldened and moved
outside of their initially limited spheres of protest. Largely responding to historian Linda
Fuller’s assertion that 1989 was the work of intellectuals, Gareth Dale argues that this
“intellectual proletariat” along with traditional workers, laid the foundation for mass
protest in 1989. In this way, he sees 1989 as a continuation of the 1953 revolts, as both
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were products of the working class, though the latter protests lacked the strikes that
activated the former.21
So while protestors were less likely to have been dressed in the blue work suits of
the 1953 event and the issues were broader, we still find an ascendant public, a weakened
and reforming regime in the Soviet Union that directly affected the policies of its satellite
states, unrest in a neighboring state, and a media that had been covering events for
months. Indeed, television broadcasted images of refugees streaming out of the GDR (by
way of Hungary) or crowds gathered in Leipzig, Berlin, and Dresden for the organized
Monday demonstrations. In this way the media, especially that in the West, shaped and
propelled the events.22 When a group of journalists asked SED official Günter
Schabowski about the rumored removal of travel restrictions, he mistakenly informed the
press that the borders had been opened. While the wall probably would have come down
eventually, this bit of misinformation, amplified by TV and radio outlets, almost certainly
hastened the course of events.23
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